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Abstract
Intrusion Detection Networks (IDNs) constitute a primary element in current cyberde-
fense systems. IDNs are composed of different nodes distributed among a network
infrastructure, performing functions such as local detection–mostly by Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS)–, information sharing with other nodes in the IDN, and
aggregation and correlation of data from different sources. Overall, they are able
to detect distributed attacks taking place at large scale or in different parts of the
network simultaneously.
IDNs have become themselves target of advanced cyberattacks aimed at bypassing
the security barrier they offer and thus gaining control of the protected system. In
order to guarantee the security and privacy of the systems being protected and
the IDN itself, it is required to design resilient architectures for IDNs capable of
maintaining a minimum level of functionality even when certain IDN nodes are
bypassed, compromised, or rendered unusable. Research in this field has traditionally
focused on designing robust detection algorithms for IDS. However, almost no
attention has been paid to analyzing the security of the overall IDN and designing
robust architectures for them.
This Thesis provides various contributions in the research of resilient IDNs
grouped into two main blocks. The first two contributions analyze the security of
current proposals for IDS nodes against specific attacks, while the third and fourth
contributions provide mechanisms to design IDN architectures that remain resilient
in the presence of adversaries.
In the first contribution, we propose evasion and reverse engineering attacks to
anomaly detectors that use classification algorithms at the core of the detection
engine. These algorithms have been widely studied in the anomaly detection field, as
they generally are claimed to be both effective and efficient. However, such anomaly
detectors do not consider potential behaviors incurred by adversaries to decrease
the effectiveness and efficiency of the detection process. We demonstrate that using
well-known classification algorithms for intrusion detection is vulnerable to reverse
engineering and evasion attacks, which makes these algorithms inappropriate for real
systems.
The second contribution discusses the security of randomization as a counter-
measure to evasion attacks against anomaly detectors. Recent works have proposed
the use of secret (random) information to hide the detection surface, thus making
evasion harder for an adversary. We propose a reverse engineering attack using a
query-response analysis showing that randomization does not provide such security.
We demonstrate our attack on Anagram, a popular application-layer anomaly de-
tector based on randomized n-gram analysis. We show how an adversary can first
discover the secret information used by the detector by querying it with carefully
constructed payloads and then use this information to evade the detector.
The difficulties found to properly address the security of nodes in an IDN motivate
our research to protect cyberdefense systems globally, assuming the possibility of
attacks against some nodes and devising ways of allocating countermeasures optimally.
In order to do so, it is essential to model both IDN nodes and adversarial capabilities.
In the third contribution of this Thesis, we provide a conceptual model for IDNs
viewed as a network of nodes whose connections and internal components determine
the architecture and functionality of the global defense network. Such a model is
based on the analysis and abstraction of a number of existing proposals for IDNs.
Furthermore, we also develop an adversarial model for IDNs that builds on classical
attack capabilities for communication networks and allow to specify complex attacks
against IDN nodes.
Finally, the fourth contribution of this Thesis presents DEFIDNET, a frame-
work to assess the vulnerabilities of IDNs, the threats to which they are exposed,
and optimal countermeasures to minimize risk considering possible economic and
operational constraints. The framework uses the system and adversarial models
developed earlier in this Thesis, together with a risk rating procedure that evaluates
the propagation of attacks against particular nodes throughout the entire IDN and
estimates the impacts of such actions according to different attack strategies. This
assessment is then used to search for countermeasures that are both optimal in terms
of involved cost and amount of mitigated risk. This is done using multi-objective
optimization algorithms, thus offering the analyst sets of solutions that could be
applied in different operational scenarios.
Resumen
Las Redes de Deteccio´n de Intrusiones (IDNs, por sus siglas en ingle´s) constituyen un
elemento primordial de los actuales sistemas de ciberdefensa. Una IDN esta´ compuesta
por diferentes nodos distribuidos a lo largo de una infraestructura de red que
realizan funciones de deteccio´n de ataques–fundamentalmente a trave´s de Sistemas
de Deteccio´n de Intrusiones, o IDS–, intercambio de informacio´n con otros nodos de
la IDN, y agregacio´n y correlacio´n de eventos procedentes de distintas fuentes. En
conjunto, una IDN es capaz de detectar ataques distribuidos y de gran escala que se
manifiestan en diferentes partes de la red simulta´neamente.
Las IDNs se han convertido en objeto de ataques avanzados cuyo fin es evadir las
funciones de seguridad que ofrecen y ganar as´ı control sobre los sistemas protegidos.
Con objeto de garantizar la seguridad y privacidad de la infraestructura de red y de
la IDN, es necesario disen˜ar arquitecturas resilientes para IDNs que sean capaces
de mantener un nivel mı´nimo de funcionalidad incluso cuando ciertos nodos son
evadidos, comprometidos o inutilizados. La investigacio´n en este campo se ha centrado
tradicionalmente en el disen˜o de algoritmos de deteccio´n robustos para IDS. Sin
embargo, la seguridad global de la IDN ha recibido considerablemente menos atencio´n,
lo que ha resultado en una carencia de principios de disen˜o para arquitecturas de
IDN resilientes.
Esta Tesis Doctoral proporciona varias contribuciones en la investigacio´n de IDN
resilientes. La investigacio´n aqu´ı presentada se agrupa en dos grandes bloques. Por
un lado, las dos primeras contribuciones proporcionan te´cnicas de ana´lisis de la
seguridad de nodos IDS contra ataques deliberados. Por otro lado, las contribuciones
tres y cuatro presentan mecanismos de disen˜o de arquitecturas IDS robustas frente a
adversarios.
En la primera contribucio´n se proponen ataques de evasio´n e ingenier´ıa inversa
sobre detectores de anomal´ıas que utilizan algoritmos de clasificacio´n en el motor
de deteccio´n. Estos algoritmos han sido ampliamente estudiados en el campo de la
deteccio´n de anomal´ıas y son generalmente considerados efectivos y eficientes. A
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pesar de esto, los detectores de anomal´ıas no consideran el papel que un adversario
puede desempen˜ar si persigue activamente decrementar la efectividad o la eficiencia
del proceso de deteccio´n. En esta Tesis se demuestra que el uso de algoritmos
de clasificacio´n simples para la deteccio´n de anomal´ıas es, en general, vulnerable
a ataques de ingenier´ıa inversa y evasio´n, lo que convierte a estos algoritmos en
inapropiados para sistemas reales.
La segunda contribucio´n analiza la seguridad de la aleatorizacio´n como con-
tramedida frente a los ataques de evasio´n contra detectores de anomal´ıas. Esta
contramedida ha sido propuesta recientemente como mecanismo de ocultacio´n de
la superficie de decisio´n, lo que supuestamente dificulta la tarea del adversario. En
esta Tesis se propone un ataque de ingenier´ıa inversa basado en un ana´lisis consulta-
respuesta que demuestra que, en general, la aleatorizacio´n no proporciona un nivel
de seguridad sustancialmente superior. El ataque se demuestra contra Anagram, un
detector de anomal´ıas muy popular basado en el ana´lisis de n-gramas que opera en
la capa de aplicacio´n. El ataque permite a un adversario descubrir la informacio´n
secreta utilizada durante la aleatorizacio´n mediante la construccio´n de paquetes
cuidadosamente disen˜ados. Tras la finalizacio´n de este proceso, el adversario se
encuentra en disposicio´n de lanzar un ataque de evasio´n.
Los trabajos descritos anteriormente motivan la investigacio´n de te´cnicas que
permitan proteger sistemas de ciberdefensa tales como una IDN incluso cuando
la seguridad de algunos de sus nodos se ve comprometida, as´ı como soluciones
para la asignacio´n o´ptima de contramedidas. Para ello, resulta esencial disponer de
modelos tanto de los nodos de una IDN como de las capacidades del adversario. En la
tercera contribucio´n de esta Tesis se proporcionan modelos conceptuales para ambos
elementos. El modelo de sistema permite representar una IDN como una red de nodos
cuyas conexiones y componentes internos determinan la arquitectura y funcionalidad
de la red global de defensa. Este modelo se basa en el ana´lisis y abstraccio´n de
diferentes arquitecturas para IDNs propuestas en los u´ltimos an˜os. Asimismo, se
desarrolla un modelo de adversario para IDNs basado en las capacidades cla´sicas de
un atacante en redes de comunicaciones que permite especificar ataques complejos
contra nodos de una IDN.
Finalmente, la cuarta y u´ltima contribucio´n de esta Tesis Doctoral describe
DEFIDNET, un marco que permite evaluar las vulnerabilidades de una IDN, las
amenazas a las que esta´n expuestas y las contramedidas que permiten minimizar
el riesgo de manera o´ptima considerando restricciones de naturaleza econo´mica u
operacional. DEFIDNET se basa en los modelos de sistema y adversario desarrollados
anteriormente en esta Tesis, junto con un procedimiento de evaluacio´n de riesgos que
permite calcular la propagacio´n a lo largo de la IDN de ataques contra nodos indivi-
duales y estimar el impacto de acuerdo a diversas estrategias de ataque. El resultado
del ana´lisis de riesgos es utilizado para determinar contramedidas o´ptimas tanto en
te´rminos de coste involucrado como de cantidad de riesgo mitigado. Este proceso
hace uso de algoritmos de optimizacio´n multiobjetivo y ofrece al analista varios
conjuntos de soluciones que podr´ıan aplicarse en distintos escenarios operacionales.
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1Introduction
1.1 Context
According to the C.I.A. World Factbook [C.I.A., 2010], more than 2.1 billion people
in the world (29.6% of the estimated world population) are connected to Internet, and
almost 6 billion people use mobile phones (84% of the world population). Cyberspace
plays a key role in modern societies and economies [Patel et al., 2013]. Over the last
decade, Internet has changed the way we interact with Public Administrations, has
given rise to new business and entertainment models, and has influenced the way we
communicate. However, as acknowledged by the Spanish National Security Strategy,
cyberspace is nowadays an open and uncontrolled environment. The complexity
and globalization of cyberattacks has increased very significantly in the last years,
causing an important breach between the capabilities of attackers and defenders.
Internet is rapidly evolving to embrace new computing and communication
paradigms, such as cloud computing, wireless networks, and smart mobile platforms.
Cloud computing services allow users to externalize computing resources (e.g., net-
works, servers, storage, applications, and services) to a remotely located site and
use them on-demand [Mell and Grance, 2011]. Wireless networks have also gained
much popularity in the last decade, particularly those based in the 802.11 (Wi-Fi)
family [Crow et al., 1997] both for home access and in urban spaces [Ylipulli et al.,
2013]. While this has contributed very significantly to facilitating Internet access
from almost everywhere by using mobile devices, it has also created many new
vulnerabilities.
Apart from personal users, companies and governments have become highly
dependent on the cyberspace for their daily activities. Critical tasks such as commu-
nication activities, business and financial transactions, and even the control of critical
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infrastructures now depend on the Internet. Until very recently, most of these tasks
were carried out in confined and –in many cases– carefully secured platforms. Threats
such as espionage and data loss were certainly a concern, but since such systems
were rarely accessible from the outside, the spectrum of potential attack avenues
was limited. In contrast, most current organizations have their systems permanently
connected to Internet, and many of them are offloading parts of their infrastructures
to the cloud. This has resulted in a substantial increase of the threats they are
exposed to [Santora, 2013], and has given rise to terms such as “cyber-espionage”,
“cyber-warfare”, or “cyber-terrorism”.
The profile, intentions, and capabilities of attackers have also changed extraor-
dinarily. Until very recently, they were considered “socially isolated young men”
[Jordan and Taylor, 1998] driven by motivations such as gaining notoriety in the
hacking underground scene or by cyberactivism campaigns. Although most of them
were technically very skilled, they did not have substantial economic resources to
develop sophisticated attacks. Nowadays, however, both the sophistication of attacks
and the motivations of the adversaries have evolved. For instance, the so-called Ad-
vanced Persistent Threats (APTs) [Tankard, 2011] combine sophisticated techniques
and exploitation vectors to bypass security mechanisms and remain undetected for
prolonged periods of time in attacked systems. Moreover, rather than “isolated
obsessed young men”, attackers have turned into organized teams with economical
or political motivations, targeting high valued infrastructures from governments
and big companies. Such teams are often hired or sponsored by rival companies or
governments. Stuxnet [Falliere et al., 2011], for example, is an APT—and one of
the first cyberweapons—that targeted Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) and was
used to attack uranium enrichment plants in Iran. Because of its sophistication
and the amount of resources estimated for its development, it is believed that some
government was behind it.
The situation discussed above demands more intelligent countermeasures to
protect the networks and critical systems. According to the well-known Common
Criteria for ICT systems evaluation [Common-Criteria, 2012], properly protecting
the assets of an organization requires that countermeasures fulfill two main properties
(see Figure 1.1). First, countermeasures should be sufficient, i.e., if the countermea-
sures do what they claim to do, the threats to the assets are countered. Second,
countermeasures must be correct, i.e., they must do what they claim to do.
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Figure 1.1: Evaluation concepts and relationships established by the Common Criteria.
1.1.1 Cyberdefense Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) constitute a primary component for securing
computing infrastructures. An IDS monitors activity and seeks to identify evidence
of ongoing attacks, intrusion attempts, or violations of the security policies [Scarfone
and Mell, 2007]. IDSs have evolved since the first model proposed in the late 1980s
[Denning, 1987], and the current threat landscape makes the classical approach for
intrusion detection no longer valid. Moreover, intrusion detection must also deal with
emerging paradigms in computing and communications. For example, performing
detection in wireless nodes such as smartphones [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2013] or
wearable sensing devices [Al Ameen et al., 2012], requires lightweight procedures
that do not consume much resources like energy or memory.
Detection paradigms and architectures have also evolved to cope with the re-
quirements of complex network infrastructures. Rather than stand-alone components
strategically placed to protect a complete network or system, the current trend is to
rely on a distributed network of detection nodes. Intrusion Detection Networks (IDN)
are composed of different IDS nodes distributed among a network performing local
detection and sharing information with other nodes in the IDN. One of the major
advantages of IDNs is that, because the detection functions are distributed across
different network locations, so is the workload required for each function. Classical
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intrusion detection components such as Snort [Roesch, 1999] must be implemented
in a single device. Therefore, this host is in charge of gathering the data (monitor
the network), pre-process it, running detection algorithms, and generating responses
accordingly. This approach is inappropriate both for resource-constrained scenarios
and for large networks. The problem becomes even harder if the worst-case scenario
for detection is forced by an adversary [Crosby and Wallach, 2003; Smith et al.,
2006].
IDNs attempt to solve this problem by distributing the tasks among different
nodes. Depending on their role in the network, some nodes gather local data and
send it to another node, probably with more resources, who correlates the data and
performs actual detection. This separation of duties makes IDNs a suitable solution
for distributed systems, including mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), where there
are no central nodes and every host must collaborate to ensure a proper network
behavior [Pastrana et al., 2012]. IDNs are also used in networks geographically
separated to allow different entities to collaborate and mitigate large scale attacks
[Bye et al., 2010]. Current attacks are capable of infecting simultaneously various
networks or incorporating evasion techniques to pass undetected [Fogla and Lee,
2006]. Moreover, many zero-day attacks target simultaneously a huge number of
systems worldwide [Shin and Gu, 2010], leaving little time to patch other networks.
Thus, to prevent threats from propagating through different domains, collaboration
between different IDNs is essential.
Since they are key elements of most organizations’ cyberdefense systems, IDSs
often become themselves the target of attacks aimed at undermining their detection
capabilities. This may result in the degradation of the second property evaluated by
the Common Criteria, which states that countermeasures must be correct. Actually,
when attacking a system, the adversary’s first goal is to degrade the effectiveness
of the cyberdefenses, thus making the countermeasures inappropriate. In the case
of IDNs, attackers may use common attacks for networks to degrade the efficacy
of the detection accuracy. Most of the research in this area has focused on attacks
against stand-alone IDS boxes and the design of robust detection algorithms [Biggio
et al., 2013; Fogla et al., 2006; Kolesnikov and Lee, 2005; Ptacek and Newsham,
1998; Wagner and Soto, 2002]. However, almost no attention has been paid to robust
architectures for IDNs, and only a few works have very recently begun to consider
attacks against IDNs [Bye et al., 2010; Fung, 2011].
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1.1.2 Machine Learning Based Detection
One of the major problems that IDSs must face is adapting to continuous changes
both in the networks they defend and the capabilities of the adversaries. The use
of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in the detection process has been extensively
studied as a potential solution to this problem. Concretely, classification algorithms
are often used to automatically build classifiers that map events as normal or intrusive.
This approach has resulted successful in many scenarios. However, the use of ML has
been recently questioned because its design does not consider adversaries [Barreno
et al., 2006; Biggio et al., 2013; Sommer and Paxson, 2010] and, therefore the
resulting detectors can be potentially manipulated. One of the proposed methods
to counteract attacks and make resilient ML algorithms is the use of secret or
random components [Huang et al., 2011; Mrdovic and Drazenovic, 2010; Wang et al.,
2006]. While randomization is extremely useful in many security applications such
as cryptography, it is unclear whether it is robust enough in the field of intrusion
detection.
Similar to ML algorithms, Evolutionary Computation (EC) is a branch of Artificial
Intelligence widely used in the research of intrusion detection. EC involves global
optimization methods to solve the problem at stake. In the case of intrusion detection,
the problem being solved is the detection of anomalous or intrusive events. One of
the key advantages of EC is that resulting detectors are easy to understand and
process [Orfila et al., 2009], which is a desired property for IDS. Another advantage
of EC methods is that they result rather efficient in challenging scenarios, like Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) [Sen and Clark, 2011], where the adversarial model
rapidly changes and obtaining responses in real time is critical.
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
IDSs, both working as isolated components or as part of a larger IDN, are designed
to provide attack detection capabilities to a protected network. These systems are
generally placed in the network perimeter and, consequently, are among the first
security barriers that an adversary encounters. Advanced adversaries are increasingly
developing attack techniques against IDS nodes with the aim of counteracting
their detection capabilities. The Common Criteria [Common-Criteria, 2012] also
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establishes that “owners of assets [...] may choose to increase their confidence in the
sufficiency and correctness of some or all of their countermeasures by ordering an
evaluation of these countermeasures”. Accordingly, it is critical to provide methods
to facilitate such evaluation for IDSs and IDNs.
This Thesis considers the problem of attacks and defenses against IDNs, providing
specific attacks to machine learning based anomaly detectors and optimal solutions
to make the detection resilient. We next describe the main motivation and objectives
of this work. Firstly, we state that the traditional use of classification algorithms for
intrusion detection is prone to attacks, and we question the use of randomization as
a measure to secure such algorithms. Secondly, we establish the need of systematic
approaches for evaluating the security of IDNs in adversarial environments.
1.2.1 Motivation
Problem 1: Vulnerabilities of intrusion detection algorithms based on
machine learning
The design of machine learning based algorithms for intrusion detection, particularly
for anomaly-based detection, should consider the presence of adversaries that will
attack the detection function itself. Unfortunately, classical machine learning algo-
rithms are not designed with this assumption in mind. Attacks against the detector
can aim at reverse engineering its inner workings, i.e., learning how the algorithm
decides whether an instance belongs to one class or another. This is generally used
to devise strategies to evade detection, where the main goal is to carefully modify an
instance that would be classified as anomalous so that it becomes normal and still
achieves the attacker’s goals. Both reverse engineering and evasion attacks deal with
one fundamental limitation of classical classification algorithms: they do not attempt
to hide the decision surface. In an intrusion detection setting, the adversary has the
ability to interact with the algorithm, obtain the classification labels for instances of
his choice, and use the knowledge gained about how detection works to create, for
example, attacks that will pass undetected (false negatives) or normal instances that
will raise an alarm (false positives). Such undesirable, induced behaviors—along
with some others that will be described in the next chapter— will undermine the
confidence put on the detectors.
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Some advanced detectors (e.g., KIDS [Mrdovic and Drazenovic, 2010] or Anagram
[Wang et al., 2006]) have suggested that randomization of the decision surface will
make reverse engineering and evasion harder for an attacker. The central idea of
such algorithms consists of introducing a random, but controlled, component into
the classification process. This is often implemented as a secret key, in such a
way that an adversary who is not in possession of the key will not know exactly
how the traffic will be processed and, consequently, will not be able to design
attacks that thwart detection. The security of randomized classifiers has not been
proved yet, and it remains unclear whether it suffices to prevent reverse engineering
and evasion attacks, or it just makes them more difficult but still possible and realistic.
Problem 2: Resilient intrusion detection networks
Current cyberdefense systems are composed of a collection of networked components
that include data collectors, filters, aggregators, correlators, etc. Detection is thus
a complex distributed function that depends on information collected, processed,
and exchanged by different subsystems. So far, security analysis about cyberdefense
systems has focused almost exclusively on individual detection nodes, neglecting
both the threats the overall IDN is exposed to, and robust design principles to make
them resilient against them. For instance, many current IDNs follow a hierarchical
architecture where security-related events flow from distributed detectors up to
aggregation and correlation components located on the top tiers. In this scenario,
it is not properly understood the impact that attacks on a subset of all the IDN
components would have on the overall detection function, nor what elements (e.g., the
roles of the attacked subsystems and how their outputs are processed by subsequent
components) are relevant for the attack to succeed. Conversely, it is also unknown
how to design architectures that resist, at least to some extent, certain types of
deliberate attempts to evade detection or, more generally, subvert the protection
offered by the IDN.
1.2.2 Objectives
The main goal of this Thesis is to improve the security of intrusion detection
systems and networks operating in adversarial settings by developing
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techniques to analyze their vulnerabilities and countermeasures to in-
crease their resiliency. In particular, we will focus on the following three general
objectives:
• O1. Study techniques to reverse engineer and evade IDSs based on machine
learning algorithms that could be used to assess the security of current detection
approaches and to devise countermeasures that make them resistant against
adversarial manipulations.
• O2. Develop a suitable model for (a) IDNs in adversarial environments that
integrates the key features of individual components and existing architec-
tural options; and (b) goals, tactics, and capabilities of adversaries aiming at
disrupting the IDN operation.
• O3. Based upon a model such as that described in the point above, study
techniques to explore the vulnerabilities of IDNs, the threats to which they are
exposed, and optimal countermeasures to minimize risk considering possible
economic and operational constraints.
1.3 Contributions and Organization
This Thesis provides several contributions in the field of resilient IDNs along the
lines discussed in the main objectives above. These contributions are grouped in the
following four points:
1. A general technique to explore reverse engineering and evasion attacks
against machine learning based IDS. Chapter 3 describes these attacks
and provides experimental results against IDS using detectors based on classi-
fiers.
2. A reverse engineering attack against randomized classifiers. One of
the mechanisms proposed to increase the security of anomaly detectors is the
use of randomization to hide the decision surface from adversaries. Chapter 4
analyzes this solution and provides a sophisticated attack against Anagram,
a popular randomized anomaly detector. It is also proved that discovering
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the secret key makes evasion easier than in the non-randomized setting, as it
provides further capabilities to an adversary.
3. A model for IDNs and adversarial capabilities. Chapter 5 provides
a general model for IDNs operating in adversarial settings. The model is
illustrated with two common scenarios for IDNs, providing examples of such
adversarial capabilities.
4. A framework for the optimal allocation of countermeasures in IDNs.
Chapter 6 presents a framework that allows to automatically determine the
overall risk an IDN is subject to as a consequence of potential attacks against
individual components. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the application of
multi-objective optimization algorithms to search for countermeasures that are
optimal both in terms of risk and cost.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions, analyzes the contributions of
this Thesis and the published results, and discusses open research problems and
future work.
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2Intrusion Detection Networks in
Adversarial Environments
This chapter analyzes the state of the art in the area of attacks against intrusion
detection solutions, including stand-alone IDSs and IDNs. First, Section 2.1 presents
an overview of IDNs, including common detection approaches and classical IDSs.
Then, Section 2.2 reviews the state of the art of attacks against IDSs and IDNs
and presents a recent taxonomy for attacks which is adopted in this Thesis. Finally,
Section 2.3 summarizes the chapter and discusses the main problems in the field.
2.1 Intrusion Detection Networks
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and/or blocking any attempt to bypass
the security of a system [Bace and Mell, 2001]. Due to the continuous evolution of
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), intrusion detection is an open
and volatile research field. The seminal work of Denning in 1987 [Denning, 1987]
proposed a general model for intrusion detection which is independent of specific
technologies or implementations. Denning stated that “exploitation of a system’s
vulnerabilities involves abnormal use of the system; therefore, security violations
could be detected from abnormal patterns of system usage”. Nowadays, almost 30
years after the work of Denning, this statement is still valid. However, as the
complexity of network and information systems increase, so does the capabilities of
adversaries, which continuously forces the intrusion detection research to adapt to
new adversaries.
Intrusion Detection Systems have evolved since the work of Denning. Due to
the increasingly sophisticated threat of current attackers, the classical approach for
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intrusion detection is no longer valid. Moreover, intrusion detection must also face
the challenge posed by new paradigms in computing and communications, including
cloud computing and the new generation of wireless technologies.
This section first reviews the classical approach of IDS which work stand-alone, i.e.,
without sharing information with other IDSs. Then, the main detection approaches
are presented, with special emphasis in the machine learning algorithms which have
been widely used for anomaly detection and are subject of study in parts of this
Thesis. Finally, we discuss the need of IDNs to address the deficiencies of classical
IDSs.
2.1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
An IDS is a system that analyzes data to detect malicious activity, reporting an alert
if such an activity is found. IDSs are normally formed from several components. In
the most classical architecture, IDSs consists of 4 components [Corona et al., 2013]
(see Figure 2.1), namely the decoder, the preprocessor (or set of preprocessors), the
detection engine and the alert module. The way in which these components work is
described next:
1. The decoder receives pieces of raw audit data from the audit data collectors
and transforms each of these pieces into data that the preprocessor can handle.
2. The preprocessor extracts features from the raw data. It receives the pieces
of data transformed by the decoder, analyzes them to determine which pieces
depend on each other and treats dependent pieces in such a way that they
can be later scrutinized by the detection engine. A typical preprocessor
widely used in network-based IDSs is the TCP preprocessor, whose main task
is to compose session flows from a given set of TCP segments (reordering
fragments, assembling them, etc). Currently, sophisticated preprocessors are
able to perform detection tasks supplementing those performed by the detection
engine.
3. The detection engine receives the data treated by the preprocessor and
examines it searching for intrusions. If an intrusion is found, the detection
engine requests the alert module to raise an alert.
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of a classical IDS.
4. The alert module is in charge of raising the alerts requested by the detection
engine. Raising an alert can range from logging the alert in a local file to
emailing the alert to the system administrator.
There exist many different taxonomies to classify IDSs, depending on the corre-
sponding component of the IDS [Patel et al., 2013]:
1. Regarding the source of the audit data, an IDS can be network based or host
based:
(a) Network IDSs (NIDSs): they analyze network traffic. The level of
detection may vary from one NIDS to another, but most of them have
modules in charge of analyzing traffic from the network, transport, and
application layers in the OSI model. For instance, Snort [Roesch, 1999],
one of the most used open source IDSs, has a preprocessor specialized
in HTTP data, another one for TCP data and the same for the other
protocols and layers in the OSI model. NIDSs are normally placed outside
the system being monitored but in the same network segment, thus
enabling them to monitor a complete LAN.
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(b) Host IDSs (HIDSs): they analyze local data of the devices. Most of
them analyze the sequence of system calls of the programs running in
the device. Within these sequences, optimal HIDS analyze system call
arguments, memory registers, stack states, system logs, user behaviors,
etc.
2. Regarding the model used to detect malicious activity, an IDS can be misuse-
based, anomaly-based or hybrid. In next section we analyze in detail these
approaches.
3. Regarding the type of action triggered when a malicious behavior is detected,
an IDS can be active or passive:
(a) Passive IDS: when a malicious behavior is detected, an alert is raised
and no further action is taken.
(b) Active IDS: apart from raising an alert, the IDS tries to neutralize the
malicious data by executing a predefined action. Some authors refer to
active IDSs as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
There are many other possible classifications. For example, in [Amer and Hamil-
ton, 2010], a taxonomy based on the following characteristics is presented:
1. Regarding the technology, IDSs may be wired or wireless. Furthermore,
wireless IDSs can be further classified as fixed or mobile.
2. Regarding the data processing method and the arrangement of its compo-
nents, IDSs can be centralized or distributed.
3. Regarding the timing of the detection process, IDSs can be real time or
non-real time.
4. Regarding the detection technique, IDSs can be state-based or transition-based.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of IDSs, two important measures are mainly
used: the hit rate and the false positive rate. The hit rate (denoted H or true
positive rate) measures the effectiveness of an IDS by indicating the percentage of
intrusions that it detects (see Equation 2.1). The false positive rate (denoted F )
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Table 2.1: Contingency matrix for binary classification problems: true negatives (TN), false positives
(FP), false negatives (FN) and true positives (TP).
Detection
Negative Positive
Real
Negative TN FP
Positive FN TP
measures the accuracy of an IDS by indicating the percentage of false alarms that
it raises (see Equation 2.2). In order to calculate these two statistics, the following
four values are necessary (see contingency matrix in Table 2.1): the number of real
intrusions detected (true positives or TP), the number of real intrusions undetected
(false negatives or FN), the number of alarms raised without any real intrusion taking
place (false positives or FP), and the number of normal events considered normal
(true negatives or TN). As a binary classification problem, IDSs are often evaluated
using metrics from the information retrieval field such as the precision and recall.
Considering an intrusion as the relevant information to be retrieved from the data,
the recall indicates the fraction of relevant instances retrieved, i.e., it coincides with
the hit rate. The precision indicates the fraction of retrieved instances that are
relevant; i.e., given an alarm by the IDS, the precision indicates the likelihood that
this alarm actually represents and intrusion (see Equation 2.3).
H =
TP
TP + FN
(2.1)
F =
FP
FP + TN
(2.2)
Precision =
TP
FP + TP
(2.3)
Another important statistic that has recently become relatively popular in the
field of IDSs evaluation is the Intrusion Detection Capability index [Gu et al., 2006]
(denoted CID). CID is the ratio of the reduction of uncertainty of the IDS input,
given the IDS output. It is formally defined as:
CID =
I(X;Y )
H(X)
(2.4)
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Where I(X;Y ) is the mutual information between the set of inputs to the IDS
(X) and their corresponding outputs (Y ); and H(X) is the entropy of the input data.
The higher the CID is, the better capacity the IDS has to classify the input properly.
Besides the hit rate (H) and the false positive rate (F ), the CID takes into account
the prevalence B of attacks in the dataset, defined as:
B =
FN + TP
TP + FP + TN + FN
(2.5)
Since not all systems have the same probability of being attacked, the CID index
provides a more accurate measure than the hit rate and the false positive rate.
Moreover, evaluating an IDS using H and F is somehow difficult, as various points of
operation (i.e., pair H, F) are considered, and it must be defined an optimal tradeoff
between the two measures. As the CID considers the two measures along with the
prevalence of attacks, it can be used as a single scalar measure to evaluate the IDS.
Using the metrics H, F and B, extracted from the contingency matrix (Table 2.1),
the CID can be computed as shown in Equation 2.6. Further details about this
measure can be found in [Gu et al., 2006].
CID = −BH log BH
BH +HF
−
−B(1−H) log B(1−H)
B(1−H) + (1−B)(1− F )−
− (1−B)(1− F ) log (1−B)(1− F )
(1−B)(1− F ) +B(1−H)−
− (1−B)F log (1−B)F
(1−B)F +BH
(2.6)
2.1.2 Detection Approaches
There are many approaches proposed in the literature to detect intrusions. They can
be classified in three main categories: misuse, anomaly, or hybrid detection. Each of
these detection approaches, together with the machine learning techniques used for
anomaly detection, are next presented.
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2.1.2.1 Misuse Detection
Misuse detection looks for intrusive evidence in the monitored events using previous
knowledge from known attacks and malicious activity. The most common approach
for misuse detection is to compare the monitored events with intrusive patterns stored
in a database. These stored patterns are called signatures, and misuse detection is
often called signature-based detection. For example, Snort [Roesch, 1999] is a NIDS
which contains a huge number of publicly available signatures. The signatures follow
a specific format, and allow for a deep inspection of the network packets at network
(IP protocol), transport (TCP and UDP protocols) and application layer (protocols
such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, etc.).
Although signature-based is the most common approach for misuse detection,
there are additional methods to represent knowledge of known attacks.Attack path
analysis [Chen et al., 2007; Guzzo et al., 2014], for example, models the actions
provoked by a potential attack in the system using several attack paths. If a monitored
event follows any attack path from the beginning to the end, then it is considered
intrusive.
Misuse detection works well for known vulnerabilities and attacks. Indeed, they
have low false positive rates because if an activity matches a signature or follows a
known attack path, then it is very likely that this activity actually has malicious
intentions. However, misuse detection is not able to detect zero-day attacks. These
attacks do not have an associated signature in the IDS, either because they have been
discovered recently and the signatures have not been published yet [Gascon et al.,
2011], or because the IDS have not been updated with the new required signatures.
For example, Snort offers a set of signatures for free, but these signatures are at least
one month old. Thus, free versions of Snort do not protect against potential threats
appearing in the last month.
2.1.2.2 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detectors compare monitored activity with a predefined model of normality
to detect intrusions. These systems compute the model of normality by a learning pro-
cess that is usually done off-line, i.e., before deployment, although recent approaches
suggest the use of online training to update the model as new normal activity is
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observed [Lee et al., 2011]. The monitored activity can be either network flows,
service requests, packet headers, data payloads, etc. During the learning process, the
system analyzes a set of normal data and computes the normal model. Afterwards,
any activity that does not fit in the normal model is considered a potential intrusion.
Several approaches have been proposed so far to compute the model from network
data [Liao et al., 2013].
• Statistic-based approaches [Ariu et al., 2011] define the normal model as the
probabilities of appearance of certain patterns in the training data, using
thresholds and basic statistical operators such as the standard deviation, mean,
co-variance, etc. In detection time, any activity that considerably differs from
the learned probabilities is considered malicious. Here, the term “considerably”
depends on the thresholds established, which also determines the tradeoff
between false positive and detection rates.
• Specification-based approaches are built by experts who know how the system
monitored should behave. Any activity that does not fit this behavior is
considered anomalous. For example, Sekar et al. [Sekar et al., 2002] uses
state-machine specifications of network protocols. The anomalies are detected
whenever the state-machine does not ends the execution in a valid final state.
• Heuristic-based approaches automatically generate the model of normal behavior
using different approaches such as machine learning algorithms [Pastrana et al.,
2012], evolutionary systems [Aziz et al., 2012] or other artificial intelligence
methods [Kumar et al., 2010]. This approach is probably the most extended
in the research community because it provides lightweight solutions offering
good results [Pastrana et al., 2012]. A more detailed explanation of machine
learning for intrusion detection is given below.
• Payload-based detectors analyze application layer data to look for attacks
[Perdisci et al., 2009; Wang, 2007]. One of the problems of using anomaly-
detection for detecting malicious payloads is the difficulty of deriving features
from the monitored data. A common approach is to extract n-grams from
payloads to compute the model and detect anomalies [Wang et al., 2006]. An n-
gram is a sequence of n consecutive bytes obtained from a longer string. The use
of n-grams has been widely explored in the intrusion detection area, although
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it presents some limitations too [Hadziosmanovic et al., 2012]. Moreover, the
size of the vectors increases exponentially with n, which makes this method
useless in some restricted scenarios.
One potential problem of anomaly-based IDSs is the need to periodically re-train
the model as network traffic evolves. Online training solves this problem, but also
opens the door to new threats as we discuss later. Another problem is that they still
present some limitations that make them useless in real world scenarios [Sommer
and Paxson, 2010], including the huge amount of false positives they produce or the
difficulty to faithfully compute a model of normality. As a consequence of this, few
commercial systems actually use anomaly-based approaches.
2.1.2.3 Hybrid Detection
Anomaly based detectors produce a huge amount of false positives if the model of
normality is not generic enough. The alternative are misuse-based detectors, which
however are unable to detect zero-day attacks and are vulnerable to polymorphism
[Song et al., 2007]. In order to properly detect real-world intrusions, a combination
of both techniques is necessary. Hybrid IDSs combines both misuse detection and
anomaly detection. For example, in Snort [Roesch, 1999], the data preprocessors
performs anomaly-based detection while decoding and generating the events, and
the detection engine performs the signature matching.
2.1.2.4 Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence (AI) looks for methods and procedures to provide computers
with human-like intelligence. In the case of intrusion detection, because of the huge
amount of data being processed in the cyberspace, it is required to use automatic
tools that detect intrusions without little human intervention.
Machine Learning (ML) is a branch of AI which provides such methods. ML
algorithms automatically build detection engines from a set of events performing a
training process. These models are then used to detect intrusions in real time. There
are two classical approaches to train the system: supervised and unsupervised. In a
supervised setting, the training dataset is labeled, and the learning algorithm knows
to which class each trace belongs to. Examples of supervised learning algorithms are
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Decision Trees, Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and Support Vector Machines
(SVM). An unsupervised algorithm obtains a program that is able to separate
traces from different classes without knowing which the exact class of each trace
is. Clustering and Correlation-based algorithms are good examples of unsupervised
ML. ML techniques offer the benefit that they can detect novel differences in traffic
(which presumably represent attacks) by being trained on normal (known good) and
attack (known bad) traffic [Huang and Lee, 2004].
Classification algorithms build classifiers from a training data set that are used to
classify events in detection time. Given a set of n samples X = X1, ..., Xn where each
sample Xi is composed of j features (F1, ..., Fj), a classification algorithm generates
a classifier that, for each new trace provided, returns its estimated class Ci from the
set of classes C = C1, ..., Ck.
Nowadays, many intrusion detection techniques proposed by the research commu-
nity use ML and classification algorithms to discern between normal and intrusive
data [Tsai et al., 2009]. For example, [Pastrana et al., 2012] presents a comparison of
six different classification algorithms for intrusion detection in the domain of Mobile
Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs). The experiments are performed using simulated net-
work traffic, under different scenarios and conditions. Results showed that Support
Vector Machines along with Genetic Programming achieve better detection accuracy
than the remaining algorithms studied (Na¨ıve Bayes, Multi-layer perceptron, Linear
model and Gaussian Mixture Model).
The use of Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) in intrusion detection aims at automat-
ically evolving solutions that will be applied in the detection process [Sen and Clark,
2011]. EAs maintain a population of individuals, where each individual is a particular
solution to the given problem. The population evolves during various generations
following various procedures inspired by the laws of natural selection. Concretely,
the evolution selects the best individuals to reproduce and compose subsequent
generations. The selection is done regarding a fitness function, which measures
how well each individual in the population performs. The selected individuals are
crossed over or mutated to provide variability in the offspring individuals. After
a given number of generations, or else when an optimal solution is achieved, the
algorithm stops and the best individual of the last generation is given as solution.
A particular case of EA is Genetic Programming (GP) [Koza, 1992] , where the
individuals are programs with a tree-like shape, and the output of these programs is
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used to determine the fitness function of the individuals.
In intrusion detection, whenever an alert is raised it is important to understand
which event has triggered such alarm. Thus, it is easier for a security operator to
determine the impact of the intrusion or to decide if it is a false alarm. Anomaly
detection systems face the challenge of transferring alarms into understandable reports
for the security operator [Sommer and Paxson, 2010]. Regarding this challenge, one
of the main advantages of GP against other classical ML algorithms is that the
programs evolved could be easy to understand and readable [Orfila et al., 2009].
Accordingly, it is easier to know how the detection is done.
2.1.3 Networks and Architectures
A large-scale coordinated attack targets or utilizes a large number of hosts that
are distributed over different administrative domains, and probably in different
geographical areas [Zhou et al., 2010]. These attacks have the property of targeting
multiple networks or sites simultaneously, and may use evasion techniques to stealthy
compromise each single network. For example, an attacker may slow down the scan
in one single host by increasing the frequency of packets sent to this host. Meanwhile,
it can use the time between packets to scan hosts from other networks. The main
characteristic of large-scale attacks is that they usually target multiple hosts from
either a single host or from many hosts. That is, the attack is distributed among
various hosts.
IDNs are used in many scenarios, from collaborative domains, where different
entities share information to detect global attacks [Zhou et al., 2010], to local wireless
network composed by a network of sensors, like for example Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET) [Xenakis et al., 2011]. In both cases, the IDN is composed of multiple
nodes distributed over the network where each node communicates with one or many
other nodes [Patel et al., 2013]. Depending on how nodes are connected, and which
are their responsibilities or roles within the network, the architecture of an IDN can
be either centralized, hierarchical, or distributed. We next explain such architectures.
Figure 2.2 shows an scheme of such architectures, and Table 2.2 summarizes the
description of each architecture and provides examples from the literature.
In a centralized architecture, there is a central node gathering data from the
remaining nodes in the network [Snapp et al., 1991]. The central node correlates
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Figure 2.2: IDN architectures.
the data and emit responses. The main problem of this approach is that the
central node becomes a critical point, and if it falls down (for example, due to an
attack or bandwidth bottlenecks), the entire IDN falls. Moreover, the central node
requires much more processing and communication capabilities, which makes this
architecture useless for constrained networks like MANETs. DShield [Ullrich, 2000] is
a cooperative, web-based project, where a central server receives data from multiple
sources and generates security reports, such as the most trending attacks or recently
discovered vulnerabilities. These reports are accessible through Internet. DShield
works in a client-server model, and users can upload their logs using a web interface.
In a hierarchical architecture the network is organized into different levels of
detection and nodes have different roles depending on their responsibilities within
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the hierarchy. Each level of the hierarchy is divided into zones or clusters. In each
cluster, cluster-members gather local data and provide these data to the cluster-head,
and this aggregated data is then transmitted to a higher level node, who correlates.
This way, a tree-based hierarchical architecture is established to cover all the network.
For example, DSOC [Karim-Ganame et al., 2008] is a hierarchical IDN for protecting
different networks through the Internet. DSOC considers four roles of IDN nodes:
data collectors, remote correlators, local analyzers and global analyzer.
In a distributed architecture, the nodes share responsibilities and there are no
central, critical nodes. Nodes have two main functions. First, they detect intrusions
locally using monitored events within their sites. Second, nodes share data with other
nodes to correlate with their local detection and thus obtain a global awareness of the
network. Information sharing can be done in different ways, following a Peer-to-Peer
model [Ghosh and Sen, 2005], a subscribe-publish behavior [Fung and Boutaba, 2013],
etc. DOMINO [Yegneswaran et al., 2004] is a complex cooperative network that
connects nodes through Internet. The nodes are connected following a distributed
architecture, although each of them performs detection in local networks using local
hierarchies.
There are many works in the research literature facing the problems of trust
in IDNs [Gil-Pe´rez et al., 2013], correlation methods, detection algorithms, etc.
According to a recent survey by Patel et al. [Patel et al., 2013], most of the
distributed detection approaches are proposed for wireless networks such as MANETs,
and few works address the problem of collaboration among entities from different
administrative domains. However, this is nowadays a hot research topic which is
gaining interest by the research community [Fung and Boutaba, 2013; Gil-Pe´rez
et al., 2014; Patel et al., 2013].
2.1.3.1 Intrusion Detection Networks in MANETS
A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a network of mobile wireless nodes. Nodes
can communicate with every other node located within a specific distance, called
transmission range. When a node wants to send a packet to another node that does
not belong in its one-hop neighborhood then it has to rely to intermediate nodes
to forward the packets to the final destination. Thus, efficient routing protocols
are required in order to optimize the communication paths. MANETs do not use a
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Architecture Characteristics Examples from the literature
Centralized • Several nodes are connected to
a central node.
• External nodes collect data,
and the central node aggre-
gates and correlates it.
• The collectors send informa-
tion to the central node.
• The central node makes the
final decision and emit re-
sponses, if needed.
• DShield [Ullrich, 2000]
• DIDS [Snapp et al., 1991]
Hierarchical • The nodes in the IDN are clus-
tered in different levels.
• Nodes in the lowest levels col-
lect data.
• Intermediate levels aggregate
data from lower levels.
• The highest level contains a
single node who correlates
data from lower levels and
makes the final decision.
• DSOC [Karim-Ganame et al.,
2008]
• Hierarchical IDN for MANETs
[Huang and Lee, 2004]
• Zone-based IDN for MANETs
[Sun et al., 2006]
Distributed • Each node in the IDN is con-
nected to one or various nodes.
• There is not a single node mak-
ing decisions, i.e., the detec-
tion is distributed.
• There are different approaches
to share information: P2P,
publish-subscribe, etc.
• Peer-to-Peer model [Ghosh
and Sen, 2005]
• DOMINO [Yegneswaran et al.,
2004]
• Distributed IDN for MANETs
[Zhang et al., 2009]
Table 2.2: Description of the architectures of IDNs and proposed works.
fixed infrastructure and all the nodes belonging to the network may be mobile. In
MANETs there is no central node acting as an access point, and mobile nodes share
the responsibility of the proper functionality of the network, since a collaborative
behavior is required.
Several IDNs have been proposed to be used in mobile networks. Marti et al.
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[Marti et al., 2000] presented in 2000 an IDS approach for MANETs that implements
two techniques, named Watchdog and Pathrater. These are used to detect and
prevent nodes performing packet dropping in the routing protocol. Every node in
the network is provided with an IDN node to perform local detection and response.
Watchdog nodes monitor their neighbors to identify malicious behavior: if the node
sends a packet to a neighbor which is addressed to another node, Watchdog is used
to observe whether the neighbor actually forwards the packet. It manages a table
of failure scores for each of its neighbors, and when it observes that a packet is not
forwarded by a neighbor, the score is increased. When the score of some neighbor
exceeds a certain threshold, then it is considered malicious. Afterwards, whenever
a new route has to be selected to send a packet to any destination, Pathrater uses
the information from Watchdog to avoid routes with malicious nodes. Though the
proposal of Marti et al. does not consider cooperation nor distributed detection
(i.e., each node detects intrusions locally), we include it in our analysis since many
distributed approaches implement Watchdog as basic detection function in nodes.
Zhang et al., initially in 2000 [Zhang and Lee, 2000], and later in 2003 [Zhang
et al., 2003], proposed a distributed and collaborative detection architecture. Every
node in the network monitors their local neighbors, locally and independently, to
detect any sign of intrusion. The key idea is that they may share information to
perform this search for intrusion. Each IDN node is structured in several pieces or
modules. Initially, a data collection module gathers audit traces and activity logs.
Then, a local detection engine analyzes the data to look for local anomalies. Two
modules are responsible for performing the response actions: the local and global
response modules. To share information, an extra secure communication module
is used to provide trusted communications. In these approaches Zhang et al. use
classifiers to detect anomalies. They use entropy and conditional entropy to describe
the characteristics of “normal” traffic and classification algorithms to build models
of “normal” behavior. Therefore, classifiers are trained using “normal” data, to
predict what is normally the next event given the previous n events. If a detector
node monitors an event which is not what the classifier has predicted, an alarm is
triggered.
Huang and Lee [Huang and Lee, 2003] presented a cluster-based IDN, in order to
combat the resource constraints of MANETs. The authors use a set of statistical
features obtained from routing tables and apply a decision tree algorithm, C4.5, in
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order to discriminate “anomalous” and “normal” traffic. This approach allows the
identification of the source of the attack, if the attack occurs within one-hop. Later,
in 2004 [Huang and Lee, 2004] they proposed a hybrid system where they use both
specification-based and anomaly-based detection, by using a taxonomy of anomalous
activities and a finite state machine, which represents the correct behavior of the
Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [Perkins, 2003] protocol.
In 2003, Karchirski and Guha [Kachirski and Guha, 2003] proposed the use
of multiple collaborative sensors, where each sensor acts as a lightweight mobile
IDN node. Each node has a different role: network monitoring, host monitoring,
decision-making and action-taking. The nodes are divided into clusters, and each
cluster has a head node which monitors packets. Nodes vote to select their cluster
head, based on the connectivity data received after a broadcast step. Karchirski and
Guha focus on minimizing the use of resources by the IDN nodes. However, they do
not give details about how the detection process is performed.
Sun et al. [Sun et al., 2003] presented a model for IDN nodes in 2003. The model
is used in a collaborative approach, due to the Global Aggregation and Correlation
(GACE) component. GACE components are responsible for the communication
to share detection events between IDN nodes. Later, Sun et al. [Sun et al., 2006]
have also dealt with the problem of cooperativeness between nodes and presented
a non-overlapping zone-based IDN. In their approach, the nodes of the IDN are
grouped into zones, such that some of the internal nodes of a zone act as gateways to
other zones. The nodes use Markov Chains to detect intrusions and they send alarms
to their corresponding gateway when they detect some abnormal activity, using the
proposed MANET Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (MIDMEF).
Kurosawa et al. proposed in [Kurosawa et al., 2007] an approach for intrusion
detection for the AODV routing protocol. Each IDN node monitors its neighbors
using a vector of 3 features: the number of RREQ and RREP messages sent and
received, respectively, and the average of the variations of the destination sequence
numbers between each RREQ with its corresponding RREP packets. They use an
adaptive anomaly-detection approach. First, the average of all vectors of a training
set is computed, which constitutes the normal model. Each input sample is compared
with this average using an euclidean distance. If this distance exceeds a certain
threshold, the packet is considered malicious; otherwise, the sample is included in
the training dataset to recompute the average (normal model) in a next slot. Thus,
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in each slot the detection is adapted to possible changes in the topology. In this
work, no response action is described.
Authors in [Zhang et al., 2009] propose a method where every node in the IDN
cooperate to detect Black Hole attacks in the route discovery phase of the AODV
protocol. The main idea is to compare the Sequence Number (SN) of the response
with the SN originally posted by the receiver to detect nodes attempting a Black Hole
attack. For such a purpose, they define a new packet, the SREQ, which queries for
the destination of the SN original. This way, the sender can compare the SN original
with the SN of the RREP received. If it does not coincide, then the intermediate
node sending the fake RREP is considered malicious. The intermediate node is
responsible for asking the destination for the SN, sending an SREQ packet. Due to
its malicious behavior, it may not cooperate in this step to avoid being detected, by
not sending the SREQ or by modifying the response. Therefore, cooperativeness
between IDN nodes is needed, because neighbors of the malicious node can detect if
the attacker has forged the SREP or if it has dropped the SREQ.
Sen et al. [Sen and Clark, 2009] presented different evolutive approaches to detect
intrusions. More precisely, the authors use simulated networks to obtain the data
they use to evolve the programs, implementing different attacks. First, in [Sen and
Clark, 2009] a grammatical approach is used to detect Packet Dropping, Flooding,
and Route Disruption attacks. They achieve good detection rates for the three types
of attacks, but with a rather high false positive rate in the Packet Dropping and
Flooding attack. They argue that this is due to packet losses that usually occur
in these networks, and differentiating packet losses from malicious droppings is not
an easy task. Secondly, in [Sen et al., 2010] they use Genetic Programming with a
multiobjective approach to obtain programs that maximize the detection rate and
minimize both the false positive rate and the energy consumption, which is one
of the main constraints in MANETs. They evaluate their approach for two types
of attacks, the Flooding attack and the Route Disruption attack. In both works,
different intrusion detection approaches are employed for each kind of attack and,
again, almost all the attacks are detected.
In 2011, Su [Su, 2011] proposed a IDN where IDN nodes monitor their neighbors
in order to detect packets that are suspicious of being part of a Black Hole attack in
the AODV protocol. If an IDN node observes that a node is responding (i.e., sending
a RREP) to a RREQ which it has not previously forwarded, then its malicious score
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is increased by 1. When this score exceeds a predefined threshold, a block message
(response) is broadcast to the nodes in the neighborhood, and the malicious node
is blocked by these nodes. This block message is firstly authenticated with the ID
of the detector node, and carries information indicating that the packets sent by
the malicious node should be ignored. Thus, authors assume that there is some
authentication mechanisms to ensure that the ID of a node cannot be forged and
that block messages cannot be modified or counterfeited.
Li et al. [Li et al., 2012] recently proposed a cooperative scheme where IDN
nodes share their observations with their neighbors. It uses a reputation scheme.
Every node in the network runs an IDN node which manages a local view of its
neighborhood implemented as a list of trustworthiness about each neighbor. Agents
perform local detection to observe misbehaving neighbors (for example, using the
Watchdog technique from [Marti et al., 2000]). Then, detection events are exchanged
between neighbors, and based on the received data from other IDN nodes, the
local views of of the nodes are updated. Only information received from trusted
nodes is considered. The main innovative idea from other similar approaches is
that authors propose a multidimensional level of trust. Instead of a single value,
the trust in neighboring nodes depends on three values: the collaboration trust,
which measures how collaborative is a peer; the behavioral trust, obtained from
the observed anomalous behavior; and the reference trust, which depends on the
correctness of the reports given by the neighbor.
2.2 Intrusion Detection in Adversarial Settings
In this section, we first review the main proposals to attack IDSs. Second, we make
a special emphasis on attacks focused on specific ML algorithms, as they have been
widely used in the literature for intrusion detection. Finally, we review the most
relevant proposals that address attacks to IDNs.
2.2.1 Early Attacks to Intrusion Detection Systems
The research on attacks against IDSs gained research attention in the late nineties,
when IDSs were so sophisticated that adversaries were forced to consider them while
targeting the endpoints.
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Figure 2.3: Packet insertion attack. A packet is processed by the NIDS, whereas it is not actually
reaching the endpoint being monitored.
2.2.1.1 Packet Insertion and Evasion
Evasions against NIDS were first proposed by Ptacek and Newsham in 1998 [Ptacek
and Newsham, 1998]. In this seminal paper, the authors highlighted the existence
of some ambiguities in the TCP and IP protocols that allow different systems to
implement the protocols differently. An evasion succeeds when the NIDS ignores
packets which are going to be processed on the endpoints (packet evasion) or when it
accepts and processes a packet which is not processed by the endpoint system (packet
insertion). Packet insertion and evasion lead to different data being processed at the
endpoints and NIDS, which can be used by an adversary, for example, to evade a
signature matching as shown in Figure 2.3. In [Pastrana et al., 2013] we provided a
detailed description of the methods that the adversary may use to evade a NIDS
using these protocol ambiguities as well as the solutions proposed to mitigate the
problem. These solutions mainly rely on normalizing the traffic before it reaches
the NIDS [Antichi et al., 2009; Varghese et al., 2006; Vutukuru et al., 2008; Watson
et al., 2004], or to configure the NIDS specifically for each endpoint operating system
[Shankar, 2003] (the last solution is implemented in the popular IDS Snort [Roesch,
1999]). These solutions solve the problem of ambiguous traffic, and are rather efficient
in current networks. Thus, research on attacks to IDS have turned to higher layers
of the detection.
2.2.1.2 Polymorphic Worms and Mutant Exploits
The most explored technique to evade IDS is probably the modification of intrusion
patterns to avoid signature matching. The first approach considered was implemented
by polymorphic worms. The main characteristic of a worm is the self-replicating
capability among different victims. A polymorphic worm changes its appearance
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each time it propagates from one infected host to another. Indeed, many automated
tools are publicly available, such as CLET, a polymorphic shellcode engine published
in Phrack (a hacking community journal) [Detristan et al., 2003]; or ADMutate
[Macaulay, 2007]. These polymorphic worms can effectively evade detection by
signature-based IDSs [Perdisci et al., 2006]. However, polymorphic worms still
contain invariant and structural similarities between different instantiations. This
invariant parts are used by automatic signature generators like Paragraph [Newsome
et al., 2005]. Moreover, statistical analysis of the mutated worms also allows for its
identification [Kruegel et al., 2006].
In 2004, Vigna et al. presented a method to evaluate the response of different
signature-based NIDSs against evasion attacks [Vigna et al., 2004]. The authors
proposed an automated mechanism to generate variations of a given exploit by
applying mutant operators to a predefined exploit template. As the modifications
could make the exploit to become ineffective, they proposed the use of a system (an
oracle, according to the authors) to monitor the quality of the exploit. Figure 2.4
shows the schema of the proposed framework. Using a series of mutation mechanisms
and a set of exploit templates, the framework combines both sets to deterministically
generate a set of mutant exploits. Then, these mutant exploits are analyzed by the
external oracle in order to verify that the changes are valid (such a verification was
made by checking that the application of the exploits to the target applications were
successful). Moreover, the mutant exploits are presented to the analyzed NIDSs
(authors experiment with Snort and RealSecure), to verify whether the mutant
exploits could actually evade the detection or not.
Regarding the set of mutation mechanisms included, they used transport layer
mechanisms, application layer mechanisms, and mutation layer mechanisms. Regard-
ing the transport layer, they used some of the techniques presented by Ptacek and
Newsham in 1998, like IP fragmentation, along with new ones, like using IPv6 instead
of IPv4. They also proposed application layer mutations. Concretely, they modify
FTP traffic, by inserting telnet commands in the FTP flow; HTTP traffic, generating
malformed headers; and SSH traffic, inserting NULL records in the negotiation of the
master key. Finally, as part of the so-called mutation layer, they used polymorphic
shellcode and alternate encodings to directly modify the semantics of the exploits.
As for the results, they were quite promising, as 6 out of 10 exploits were evaded in
Snort and 9 out of 10 were evaded in RealSecure.
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Figure 2.4: Framework for creating and testing mutant exploits [Vigna et al., 2004]
2.2.1.3 Mimicry and Blending Attacks
A polymorphic worm changes its appearance every time it is instantiated. These
types of worms can effectively evade the detection of signature-based NIDS, as it is not
feasible for a NIDS to manage all the different signatures of all the possible instances
of a worm, even with automatic signature generators, because the complexity of
these detectors is rather high. However, polymorphic worms are not classified as
normal behavior, and therefore, they cannot evade anomaly-based NIDS. Next, we
present the mimicry and polymorphic blending attacks, which are attacks whose aim
is to appear as normal events. These attacks have been designed to evade both HIDS
and NIDS.
In 2002, Tan et al. presented a novel idea to evade anomaly-based HIDS that do
not take into account the arguments of system calls [Tan et al., 2002]. In particular,
they showed how to evade the Stide HIDS [Forrest et al., 1996]. Authors realized
that Stide looked for anomalies using a detection window size, i.e., it only detected
anomalies if the number of involved system calls was smaller than the window size.
Since Stide uses a detection window size, if the attacks are modified so that the
abnormal sequence of system calls is larger that the window size, the attacks may
succeed and still remain undetected. Authors proposed to automatically look for all
the allowed sequences that, if correctly tuned, do nothing to the system and make
malicious sequences larger.
Wagner et al. presented a study in 2002 to evade anomaly-based HIDSs [Wagner
and Soto, 2002]. All the methods studied were related to the fact that many host-
32 2. Intrusion Detection Networks in Adversarial Environments
based anomaly detectors in 2002 monitored systems call sequences. Thus, an attack
can remain undetected if no system calls are made, although the damage that such an
attack can cause is quite limited. Moreover, just changing the parameters of a valid
system call may allow an attack to be executed undetected. This situation happened
because most HIDS in 2002 did not examine these parameters when searching for
anomalies.
In 2005, anomaly-based HIDSs were improved in such a way that they no
longer examined only the sequence of system calls of a program, but also additional
information such as the values stored in the stack, the origin of the system calls, the
information about the call stack, etc. Kruegel et al. [Kruegel et al., 2005] showed that
if a legitimate program containing malicious code is able to modify some memory
segments, it can manage to control the flow of the program and execute pieces of the
malicious code at memory locations where detection can be evaded. In particular,
the authors claimed that such an operation can be achieved by directly modifying
the register, the stack and the heap areas. In order for an attacker to be able to
launch the aforementioned attack, she must first find a vulnerability in the code of
the program to be infected (e.g., using symbolic execution) and then, find a sequence
of system calls that can be executed in the program without raising suspicion. In
their research, Kruegel et al. focused on the Intel X86 architecture and managed
to infect a vulnerable program written in C as well to bypass the detection of two
different HIDSs.
In 2005, Kolesnikov et al. [Kolesnikov and Lee, 2005] extended the idea of
polymorphic worms and proposed the use of Polymorphic Blending Attacks (PBAs)
against NIDS, which was later refined by Fogla et al. in [Fogla et al., 2006]. A PBA
is a technique that aims to change the appearance of an attack in such a way that it
blends in with the normal behavior of a network. It is therefore aimed to evade both
signature-based and anomaly-based NIDS. A PBA is composed of three parts (see
Figure 2.5):
• The attack vector, used to exploit a vulnerability of the target system success-
fully and thus penetrate in the target host.
• The attack body, which represents the core of the attack performing the malicious
actions inside the victim, for example, a shellcode. It is encrypted with some
simple reversible substitution algorithm using as key the substitution table.
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Figure 2.5: General structure of a Polymorphic Blending Attack (PBA).
• The polymorphic decryptor, which has the substitution table to decrypt the
attack body and then transfers the control to it
The main steps involved in the generation of a PBA are described next.
1. Learning the normal profile of the NIDS : the authors assume that the attacker
has complete knowledge of the anomaly-based NIDS to be evaded. With such
knowledge, the adversary can use the NIDS learning algorithm and a set of
normal traffic in order to construct a statistical normal profile similar to the
one used by the NIDS.
2. Encrypting the attack body : in order to generate polymorphic instances of an
attack vector, the attack body (i.e., the malicious code) is encrypted using a
simple reversible substitution algorithm, where each character in the attack
body is substituted according to a particular substitution table. The objective
of such a substitution is to masquerade the attack body as normal behavior,
guaranteeing that the statistical properties specified in the normal profile are
satisfied (note that finding an optimal substitution table is a very complex
task).
3. Generating the polymorphic decryptor : when the PBA reaches the victim
host, the attack body must be decrypted and executed. In order to do that, a
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polymorphic decryptor is required. Such a decryptor consists of three parts: the
code implementing the decryption algorithm, the substitution table necessary
to perform the decryption process and the code in charge of transferring the
control to the attack body.
In [Fogla and Lee, 2006], the authors extended their work and proposed a formal
framework to automatically generate PBAs against any statistical anomaly-based
NIDS. They stated (and proved) that such NIDSs could be represented as a Finite
State Automata (FSA), either deterministic (FSA) or stochastic (sFSA). As a
consequence, the problem of finding a PBA for a NIDS became equivalent to finding
a PBA for an sFSA. However, finding such a PBA was, as proved by the authors,
an NP-complete problem. For this reason, they proposed a method to reduce the
NP-complete problem to a satisfiability (SAT) problem (if the NIDS had been
represented as an FSA) or Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problem (if the NIDS
had been represented as an sFSA), two types of problems for which polynomial-time
algorithms already existed.
In 2011, Kayacik et al. proposed a method to generate exploit mutations with
which to evade any anomaly-based HIDS capable of outputting anomaly and delay
rates [Kayacik et al., 2011]. In order to generate such mutations, Genetic Program-
ming (GP) was used. GP individuals were represented by ordered sets of system calls
with their arguments (if any) and evolved according to a fitness function with three ob-
jectives: increasing the attack success, minimizing the anomaly rate and minimizing
the delay. Concretely, they studied an attack composed of a sequence of 3 defined sys-
tem calls and arguments: open(’/etc/passwd’), write(’toor::0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash’)
and close(’/etc/passwd’). If this sequence was found in the set of system calls of the
individual, its fitness was increased.
They compared two approaches, a “black-box” approach, where the attacker only
knows the outputs that the IDS produces from a particular set of inputs, and a
“white-box” approach, where the attacker has knowledge of the internal behavior of
the IDS. The results of such a comparison show that, although using the white-box
approach produces exploits with lower anomaly score, the black-box technique may
achieve similar rates if the exploit length is increased, even being a more difficult
problem. Therefore, they concluded that in certain cases no internal knowledge of
an IDS is necessary to evade it. A complementary study made in that work was to
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determine the effectiveness of the approach when generating exploit mutations for a
particular IDS and using the resulting mutations in another IDS. This could be the
case where an attacker possesses an IDS but wants to evade another one.
2.2.2 Machine Learning Algorithms in the Presence of Ad-
versaries
ML algorithms build classifiers from a training data set and are used to classify
events in detection time. Nowadays, many intrusion detection techniques in the
research community use ML and classification algorithms to discern between normal
and intrusive data [Lee et al., 1999; Rieck et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2009].
The benefits of ML are manifold. First, they are relatively easy to use and do not
require much understanding about what the insights of the algorithms are. Tools
such as Rapid Miner [Land and Fischer, 2012] and WEKA [Hall et al., 2009] permit
users to set-up the algorithms in a black-box fashion by just providing the input
dataset. Second, ML are fast and provide good results in terms of efficiency. The
detection is often very efficient and consumes little amount of resources. This is
a rather important aspect to detect intrusions in real time, mostly in constrained
scenarios such as MANETs. Third, ML algorithms have been widely studied in the
field of intrusion detection, and provide good results in terms of detection and false
positive rates. At a first sight, these strengths makes ML a suitable and helpful
solution for intrusion detection. However, as we discuss below, the use of ML for
intrusion detection has been recently criticized by the research community and several
problems regarding its use have arisen.
Dalvi et al. in 2004 [Dalvi et al., 2004] stated for the first time the problem of
using ML algorithms in adversarial environments. The authors stated that the design
of robust classifiers requires continuous ad-hoc reconfiguration in order to face the
adversarial actions. This problem can be viewed as a “game” between the adversary
and the classifier design, and thus, authors proposed a mathematical model in terms
of the optimal strategy used by the adversary. Dalvi et al. assumed that an adversary
has perfect knowledge about the classifier, which is a strong assumption. Lowd
and Meek in 2005 [Lowd and Meek, 2005] presented a reverse engineering attack to
quantify the maximal cost required by the adversary to gain enough information
about the classifier in order to evade it.
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A classification of attacks against ML was first proposed by Barreno et al. [Barreno
et al., 2006] in 2006 and later updated by Huang et al. [Huang et al., 2011] in 2011.
This taxonomy classifies the attacks regarding three aspects: the Influence, the
Specificity, and the Security Violation.
1. Influence. Depending on the process of ML that the attack affects, it can be
either causative, if they have influence over the training data, or exploratory,
if it can just interact with the classifier in detection time. Causative attacks
are mostly efficient if they target ML using online learning, where the classifier
adapts to changing conditions through continuously retraining in detection
time. For example, Biggio et al. [Biggio et al., 2012] have proposed a poisoning
attack against the SVM algorithm by injecting data in the training set of an
incremental solution.
2. Specificity. The attack can be targeted if it focuses on particular, small set
of points, or indiscriminate if the adversary seeks to disturb any point from
the distribution.
3. Security Violation. Depending on the result of attacks, these can be either
integrity attacks, which results in false negatives (i.e., attacks which evade the
classifier), or availability attacks, aiming to generate so many false positives
that the classifier becomes unusable. Huang et al. in 2011 [Huang et al., 2011]
proposed a new Security Violation class which is the privacy attacks. In these
attacks, the adversary aims to reveal any information related to the classifier,
such as the ML algorithm used, the data distribution, etc.
In 2010, Sommer and Paxon presented a paper where they discussed the use of
ML in the field of anomaly detection of network intrusions [Sommer and Paxson,
2010]. They claimed that detecting real-world attacks in real scenarios is such a
complex task that cannot be performed automatically with ML algorithms. They also
stated that using ML for intrusion detection should be done carefully, as there are
several differences with some other ML applications, like product recommendation,
spam detection or natural language translation. Authors analyze five main problems
that system designers must take into account:
1. Outlier detection, i.e., the lack of “intrusive” examples in the training phase.
Training a system with ML requires data with high representation of all classes.
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2. High cost of errors, i.e., the need of achieving a high detection rate while
having a low false alarm rate. In other areas, an error may comprise an spam
arriving to the client email account or missing a potential client. However, a
successful attack in a system may have tragic effects.
3. Semantic gap, i.e., the problem of providing security administrators with a
good understanding of the alarms. ML algorithms are able to discern between
classes. However, classical algorithms cannot explain why a given instance
has been classified as its related class. Thus, a system administrator who
wants to know what happened when analyzing an alert should not have extra
information, which is usually needed.
4. Diversity of network traffic, i.e., the problem of faithfully representing the
real world in the training phase. Due to the complexity and variety of current
networks, even with a huge training dataset it is not possible to assure that
the system has dealt with all the possible scenarios.
5. Difficulties with evaluation, i.e., the lack of publicly available datasets
to experiment. System designers often use simulated traffic which do not
correspond with real scenarios. Additionally, using real data recorded in some
institution or network can reveal sensitive data, leading to privacy concerns.
In 2011, Nelson et al. quantified the effort required for an adversary to find
near-optimal evasions [Nelson et al., 2011]. A near-optimal evasion is the attack
performed by the adversary against an ML algorithm which require the lowest number
of queries. The quantification of such near-optimal evasion provides the complexity
required by an adversary to evade a classifier, which can be used to design robust
classifiers.
Recently, Biggio et al. [Biggio et al., 2013] have proposed a framework for
empirical assessment of the robustness of classifiers to attacks. The framework
requires the definition of four different components:
1. Adversarial model. It defines the goals, capabilities and strategies assumed
for the adversary. The goal is defined in terms of the taxonomy proposed
in [Barreno et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2011]. These capabilities include the
attacker knowledge about the classifier -concretely about the training data-
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the feature set, the learning algorithm, the decision function, and the feedback
from the classifier. The capabilities also include the skills of the adversary, i.e.,
the control that it has over the training and test datasets. Finally, the attack
strategy refers to quantification of the optimal evasions, e.g. how features are
modified from the vector space, how many samples are modified, etc.
2. Data model. Depending on the assumptions given for the adversary, the
distribution of the data may change differently. The data model establishes the
degree of change in the distribution of both the training and detection data
used by the classifier due to the adversarial activity.
3. Generation of training and testing sets. This component proposes an
algorithm to generate training and testing datasets that uses the data distribu-
tion derived from the previous component. These datasets are then used to
train and test the classifier to perform the evaluation under attack.
Regarding the countermeasures to attacks against ML algorithms, Barreno et
al. [Barreno et al., 2006] provided three mechanisms that could be used to coun-
teract adversaries. First, regularization allows to train classifiers that have some
prior knowledge, thus reducing the complexity of the classifiers and encode expert
knowledge which may be useful for the detection. Second, disinformation and infor-
mation hiding prevents the adversary to deducing which the decision boundary of
the classifier is. For example, by do not providing feedback about the result of the
detection, the learner prevents from probing attacks. Third, randomization of some
components of the detection also makes harder the task for adversaries, as it does
not know which the exact boundaries of the detection are.
Another method proposed to harden the task to adversaries is the use of multiple
classifiers [Biggio et al., 2010; Giacinto et al., 2003]. The main idea is to combine
several classifiers for the detection, even applied to different set of features. The
combination can be done in several ways. For example, the IDS McPAD [Perdisci
et al., 2009] uses different classifiers based on Support Vector Machines but which
construct features differently. McPAD combines the classifiers randomly choosing
a subset of them. Given the output of these selected subset, authors propose four
different combination methods to get a final anomaly threshold: calculating the
average, calculating the product, choosing the maximum or choosing the minimum.
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The analysis of the state of the art in the adversarial machine learning turns into
the following conclusions:
• The use of ML for intrusion detection must consider the adversarial setting
where IDS are placed. Indeed, IDS normally are the first barrier that attackers
find, and thus it is likely that they will try to attack them.
• The classical design of ML algorithms has focused on efficiency and efficacy of
the results, and it has considered a common data distribution in both training
and testing phases. However, this is clearly erroneous in the case of intrusion
detection.
• The taxonomy of attacks presented in [Barreno et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2011]
and the framework to evaluate classifiers presented in [Biggio et al., 2013] open
new research horizons in the field of robust design of ML algorithms, that can
be generalized to the intrusion detection area.
• It is rather impossible to consider a perfect classifier providing good detection
performance while being robust against attacks. Thus, it is necessary to
understand the adversarial model and consider what, how and where the
attacks are being happening in order to set additional countermeasures and
maintain a certain level of security in the protected systems.
2.2.3 Attacks to Intrusion Detection Networks
IDNs are complex defense mechanisms that detect and counteract distributed, so-
phisticated attacks against distributed organizations or entities. This makes them
an attractive target for attackers. Thus, besides performance requirements such
as accuracy and efficiency, features such as resilience against attacks are becoming
increasingly critical in order to maintain an acceptable level of security even in
the presence of adversaries. Few works have dealt with the problem of adversarial
capabilities in IDNs.
As stated by Bye et al. [Bye et al., 2010], research on IDNs can be divided into
two main components: the detection aspect and the framework aspect. The first
includes the internal procedures implemented in the nodes to process the data, such
as detection functions, correlation algorithms, data aggregation, trust management,
40 2. Intrusion Detection Networks in Adversarial Environments
etc. The attacks presented in the previous section for IDS are applicable to the
detection aspect stated by Bye et al., though little attention has been paid to the
framework aspect. Bye et al. define five building blocks that must be considered for
the framework of IDNs:
1. Communication Scheme. It indicates how nodes communicates between
them. This scheme defines the architecture of the network.
2. Group Formation. How nodes are aggregated in the network. Depending
on the network, creating “teams” intended to accomplish specific missions is
useful to divide tasks.
3. Organizational Structure. It determines whether the nodes have the same
responsibility, or if there are nodes having more competences than others.
4. Information Sharing. It defines the format and contents of messages inter-
changed. Nodes may exchange local data collected by sensors or knowledge
about intrusion events detected.
5. System Security. This block considers the security of the IDN itself. Con-
cretely, three factors are considered: trust management, which is defined to
deal with malicious insiders; access control (P2P, publish/subscribe, central
authorities, etc.); and availability, to define continuity plans even in presence
of attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS).
From the five blocks above, only the last considers robustness of the network
itself against adversaries. In their work, Bye et al. define an adversarial model with
adversaries only capable of performing query/response analysis. This is a rather
useful attack for an adversary, as it is used to gain information about the functions
(as the attack presented in Chapter 4) and locations of the nodes. Accordingly,
authors propose a robust design for resilient IDNs dealing with privacy localization
attacks. However, authors do not consider other adversarial capabilities, such as
modification of data or packet insertion. Thus, the adversarial model presented in
[Bye et al., 2010] is incomplete.
In 2011, Fung [Fung, 2011] defined a set of “insider attacks”, i.e., attacks where
the adversary has gained access into the IDN. Fung introduces four attacks. First,
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the sybil attack, where the adversary uses fake identities to make false reports and
gain influence in the IDN. Second, the newcomer attack, where the adversary changes
its identification information once it is detected. Third, the betrayal attack, where a
benign node turns into malicious and sends false information attacking other nodes.
Four, the collusion attack, where different malicious nodes collaborate to attack
the IDN. Regarding these attacks, Fung provides a review of the main proposals
for IDNs, analyzing the robustness of each proposal against the presented attacks.
The work by Fung provides an overview of specific attacks, and the likelihood of
happening in the architectures proposed in the literature. However, it does not take
into account general adversarial capabilities.
Xenakis et al. [Xenakis et al., 2011] surveyed the weaknesses of IDNs architectures
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). The main purpose of authors is to point
out flaws in the design of architectures in many aspects, including the ratio of false
positives, communication overhead incurred in the network, processing requirements
for the nodes performing detection, etc. However, they do not expose weaknesses
derived from specific attacks targeted against the different proposals.
2.2.4 Taxonomy of Attacks
A recent survey by Corona et al. [Corona et al., 2013] identifies six general categories
of attacks against classical IDS (see Table 2.3). In this Thesis we consider this
taxonomy to categorize the attacks. The attacks are classified regarding the goal of
the adversary, which results in different consequences:
1. Evasion, where an attack is carefully modified so that the IDS would not be
able to detect it. These are the most common attacks studied in the literature.
For example, blending and mimicry techniques are examples of evasion.
2. Overstimulation, where the IDS is fed with a large number of attack patterns
to overwhelm analysts and security operators. For example, Mucus is an IDS
stimulation tool by Mutz et al. [Mutz et al., 2003] that generates packets that
purposely matches the signatures of Snort [Roesch, 1999] to generate a large
number of detection alerts.
3. Poisoning, where misleading patterns are injected in the data used to train
or construct the detection function. This attack is applicable to IDS that use
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retraining, i.e., that modify the detection function in detection time [Rubinstein
et al., 2009]. An example of such attacks are the Allergy Attacks [Chung
and Mok, 2006, 2007], which targets automatic signature generators such as
Polygraph [Newsome et al., 2005]. These attacks insert noisy data into the
generation process to generate signatures in the IDS that filter out normal
requests.
4. Denial-of-Service (DoS), where the detection function is disabled or severely
damaged. Algorithmic complexity attacks [Crosby and Wallach, 2003] are
examples of such attacks. These attacks force the IDS to perform the worst
case scenario, for example by generating packets that make the signature
matching to generate the highest number of matches [Smith et al., 2006].
5. Response Hijacking, where carefully constructed patterns produce incorrect
alerts so as to induce a desired response. This attack directly targets the
response module of a system. For example, in a MANET, several colluding
malicious nodes may send false reports indicating bad behavior of a benign
node [Fung and Boutaba, 2013]. An IDN node then may block or ban such
benign node from the network.
6. Reverse Engineering, where an adversary gathers information about the
internals of the IDS by stimulating it with chosen input patterns and observing
the response. The common approach is to perform query-response analysis, for
example to discover signatures used by IDS [Mutz et al., 2005]. As part of the
contributions of this Thesis are the reverse engineering attacks presented in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Corona et al. focus their work on IDS working in a stand-alone fashion, i.e.,
without communicating with other systems. These systems have a common structure,
depicted in Figure 2.1, i.e., decoders, preprocessors, detection engine, and response
module. However, the taxonomy does not provide general mechanisms an adversary
can use to achieve her goals. Moreover, the survey focuses on stand-alone IDS, not
considering specific attacks to IDNs. Typically, these specific attacks are focused on
the communications between nodes and the propagation of the information in the
network.
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Attack Goal Examples from the literature
Evasion To bypass the detection of the IDS • Polymorphic Blending Attacks
[Fogla et al., 2006; Kolesnikov
and Lee, 2005]
• Packet Insertion [Ptacek and
Newsham, 1998]
• Mutant Exploits [Vigna et al.,
2004]
Overstimulation To stimulate the IDS and force it to
generate a huge amount of alarms
• IDS stimulator [Mutz et al.,
2003]
Poisoning To modify the detection function or
any component in the IDS
• Attacks to signature genera-
tors [Newsome et al., 2006;
Perdisci et al., 2006; Rubin-
stein et al., 2008]
• Allergy Attacks [Chung and
Mok, 2006, 2007]
Denial of
Service
To make the IDS unavailable or use-
less
• Algorithmic complexity
attacks [Crosby and Wallach,
2003; Smith et al., 2006]
Response
Hijacking
To force the IDS to generate specific
responses useful for the adversary
• IDS stimulator [Mutz et al.,
2003]
• Sybil and Betrayal attacks
[Fung, 2011]
Reverse
Engineering
To obtain information about the func-
tioning or internal components of the
IDS
• Reverse Engineering of Net-
work Signatures [Mutz et al.,
2005]
• Traffic analysis [Bye et al.,
2010]
• Query-response analysis [Pas-
trana et al., 2014]
Table 2.3: Taxonomy of attacks proposed in [Corona et al., 2013].
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2.3 Discussion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the state of the art in the area of attacks against
intrusion detection solutions, including stand-alone IDSs and IDNs. Misuse detection
has proven inappropriate to detect sophisticated threats such as polymorphic attacks,
which are included in many existing APTs and other malware distribution mechanisms.
Research in the IDS field has been trying to move towards anomaly detection
approaches for more than a decade. However, anomaly detection has also many
drawbacks, including the difficulty to generate appropriate models of normal behavior.
Machine learning is currently the best available technique to face this problem, and
a very significant number of works have explored the use of many machine learning
algorithms for intrusion detection.
The research community has recently questioned the security of machine learning
algorithms when adversarial environments are considered. The design of resilient
machine learning algorithms is an active research topic in which little progress
has been made over the last few years. One key limitation is that most proposals
are discussed using artificial datasets, and it is unclear that they will work in real
scenarios. A recent framework by Biggio et al. [Biggio et al., 2013] suggests that,
in order to test the resilience of classifiers against attacks, the artificial datasets
used for training and testing should include potential modifications performed by
an adversary. Still, there is a substantial lack of experimental work exploring the
problems derived from an attacker who can modify instances at will to subvert the
detection function.
In order to secure IDSs against attacks, many state of the art solutions have
proposed using secret random components in the detection process [Wang et al.,
2006][Perdisci et al., 2009][Huang et al., 2011]. For example, Anagram [Wang et al.,
2006] randomly partitions each incoming payload into a number of non-overlapping
subsets using a random mask. Thus, the authors state that a potential adversary
could not know which parts of the payloads are being processed and, therefore, will
be unable to perform the attack. Despite such claims, it is still unclear whether
these solutions improve the security against current attacks.
More generally, a prudent practice in security engineering is to design systems
that remain secure—or, at least, whose security degrades smoothly—even if some
integrating parts are compromised. IDNs are key components of current cyberdefenses
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and should be designed according to this principle. Thus, even if components such as
local sensors (IDSs) are attacked, the overall detection network should still perform
well. While strong analysis models for attacks on individual IDN nodes have been
explored, almost no research works have focused on the study of resilient IDNs in
the face of adversaries.
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3Attacks on Machine Learning Based
IDSs
3.1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms have been largely used in the intrusion detection
field [Pastrana et al., 2012; Song et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2009], particularly for
anomaly-based detectors. Basically, these algorithms learn a model from a training
set composed of attack-free samples. The obtained model is later used during the
detection process to classify activities as normal or malicious.
Most ML algorithms require a representation of the data in the form of a vector of
nominal or numerical features. In network intrusion detection, feature construction is
the process that converts raw traffic data into feature vectors. Feature construction
at the network layer may use session attributes (e.g., number of packets sent and
received, duration of the session, etc.) or fields extracted from packet headers
(e.g. sequence numbers, windows sizes, etc.). Moreover, feature construction at
application layer can be also performed using session attributes. For example, a
recent work by Goseva et al. [Goseva-Popstojanova et al., 2014] use session-based
features to characterize web traffic. Authors compare C4.5, CART and SVM to
distinguish between vulnerability scans and actual attacks to web servers. However,
when applying ML to detect malicious payloads at the application layer, the feature
construction process is not trivial. A common approach is to use text processing
methods, like n-grams [Torrano-Gimenez et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2006; Wang and
Stolfo, 2004], which obtains all the words of size n from the payload. To reduce
the dimensionality of the data space and obtain more lightweight classifiers, some
proposals set n to 1.
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ML algorithms consider a similar distribution of the training and test datasets.
Most frequently, the main goal for IDSs is to maximize the detection rate while
minimizing the false positive rate. Accordingly, in intrusion detection ML algorithms
have been applied with the main purpose of optimizing these rates, and not much
attention has been paid to actually protecting these systems against adversaries
interested in manipulating the classification process. Only recently, the research
community has focused on designing robust ML algorithms [Biggio et al., 2013;
Huang et al., 2011] for adversarial environments, but still many current proposals
do not consider such settings. However, since the deployment of IDS is done in
adversarial scenarios, when designing an IDS it is critical to evaluate not only its
effectiveness, but also the security and robustness of the detection. Sommer and
Paxson discussed the appropriateness of using ML for IDS [Sommer and Paxson,
2010]. One of the problems there stated is that network traffic exhibits a great
variability even within a single network, which is wider at the application layer where
the payloads are encapsulated. Thus, it is unfeasible to get a dataset that properly
represents all the network data space to train the IDS.
In this chapter we discuss and analyze the use of four classical ML algorithms for
malicious payload detection in the presence of adversaries. We provide experimental
results that confirm the problem of using an artificial dataset for training an IDS,
and show that ML-based IDS that are trained with non-representative datasets are
vulnerable to attacks. Specifically, it is shown that the models learned work well for
the specific distribution of the training dataset (i.e., the IDS is efficient). However,
they may also learn specific rules or pattern of this distribution. An adversary who
infers these irregularities will be able to attack the system by properly modifying
some features (i.e., the IDS is not robust).
Even when the adversary gets feature vectors that evade the system, she still
has to build raw payloads from these vectors to obtain real world evasions. This
requires to invert the feature construction process, which is only possible if the
feature construction has an inverse function. This challenge has been recently stated
by Huang et al. [Huang et al., 2011], who questioned “how the feature mapping can
be inverted to design real world instances”. In this work, we show that if the feature
construction is simple and lightweight, then it is easy for an adversary to obtain its
inverse function. Thus, the process of finding real world evasions from the feature
space is easier. For example, if the construction from payloads uses 1-grams, the
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adversary only needs to include or remove single bytes wherever she chooses into the
payload.
The experiments discussed in this chapter were conducted using the CSIC 2010
Dataset [Torrano-Gimenez et al., 2010], which is composed of real HTTP traffic
data with both normal and anomalous requests. A reverse engineering attack
is first presented, where the adversary discovers the main features used in the
detection process and how they are used. The attack uses Genetic Programming
[Koza, 1992] (GP) to generate models over the traffic distribution that resemble the
behavior of IDS classifiers built from training datasets following a similar distribution.
Subsequent analysis of the obtained models suggests mechanisms to evade these
IDSs. The process is illustrated with four representative IDSs implementing different
classification algorithms, concretely two decision trees (C4.5 and CART), Support
Vector Machines (SVM) and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). These algorithms have
been widely used in the field of intrusion detection (see, e.g., [Goseva-Popstojanova
et al., 2014; Pastrana et al., 2012; Torrano-Gimenez et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2009]).
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
adversarial model assumed for the attacks presented in this chapter. In Section 3.3
we present the experimental framework used to demonstrate the attacks, which are
then described in Section 3.4. The main experimental results are analyzed in Section
3.5, and Section 3.6 discusses potential countermeasures and open problems. Finally,
Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Adversarial Model
In the analysis of attacks and countermeasures against a system, it is important
to establish the capabilities assumed for an adversary. Indeed, depending on these
capabilities, different procedures are established in the design of countermeasures,
which is critical in order to avoid spending unnecessary resources. Since intrusion
detection systems have only been analyzed in adversarial environments very recently,
there is a lack of widely accepted adversarial models. Despite this, most works in this
area assume an adversary with, at least, the capabilities described next [Biggio et al.,
2013]. The attacks presented in this work assume that the adversary has knowledge
about the following information:
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1. The distribution of the training data used by the IDS. This does not mean
that the adversary has the same training dataset, but she must know the
distribution and characteristics like the protocol used, type of traffic, normal
contents, common patterns, etc.
2. The Feature Construction method (FC). We assume that the adversary knows
the algorithm used to generate feature vectors from the raw payloads. Thus,
the adversary knows how the payloads are mapped into the classifier’s feature
space.
Both the distribution and feature construction method may be kept secret in many
cases. In this work we do not consider the problem of how to get this information.
However, from the security point of view, this possibility cannot be underestimated,
and the security of the system should not reside in the obscurity of its implementation.
Indeed, many authors have assumed that this information is known by an adversary
[Biggio et al., 2013]. In fact, in [Huang et al., 2011] authors stated that “specialized
features constructed for a specific learning problem [...] may not be known or inferable
by the adversary” but “knowledge about the training and evaluation data used by the
algorithm [...] may be available to the adversary because of actions the adversary
makes outside the system [...] or because the adversary is an insider”. Moreover,
recent works (see, e.g., [Ateniese et al., 2013]) have proposed reverse engineering
attacks that disclose statistical properties and information about the training set of
a classifier.
3.3 Experimental Setup and Base Classifiers
This section describes the setup and assumptions made in our experimental work.
First, Section 3.3.1 explains the data used, its content, and the feature construction
method used. Next, Section 3.3.2 details the classification algorithms studied, how
we have constructed the experimental IDSs and measured their performance in terms
of detection and false alarm rates.
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3.3.1 Dataset
A major issue in intrusion detection is the selection of an adequate dataset to
evaluate proposals. For example, the DARPA dataset [Lippmann et al., 2000] has
been widely used for intrusion detection. However, it has been criticized by the
research community [McHugh, 2000], mainly because it is outdated and does not
include many of the current attacks, what makes it inappropriate for the detection of
web attacks. In this work, we use the CSIC 2010 HTTP dataset [Torrano-Gimenez
et al., 2010]. This dataset has been successfully used for web detection in previous
works, such as for example [Nguyen et al., 2013; Torrano-Gimenez et al., 2009].
The dataset contains traffic targeted to a realistic web application developed
for this purpose. It consists of an e-commerce web application running on Apache
Tomcat, and it is composed of several web pages that allow users to do actions such
as buying items with a shopping cart or registering by providing their personal data.
Some of the web pages require certain parameters, for example the user name and
address for the registration process or the name of the product that the user wants
to buy.
The traffic contained in the dataset was automatically generated and contains
normal and anomalous requests targeted to all the web pages of the application, using
different values for those web pages that accept different parameters. In total, 36,000
normal requests and more than 25,000 anomalous requests are included in the dataset.
All the requests are labeled either as normal or as anomalous. The dataset includes
modern web attacks such as SQL injection, buffer overflow, information gathering,
CRLF injection, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), server side include and parameter
tampering. Further details about the dataset can be found in [Torrano-Gimenez
et al., 2010].
The complete dataset is composed of 61,065 traces. We randomly divide it into
three subsets. The first subset is used to train and build the classifier at the core
of the IDS using the corresponding algorithm (details of the construction process
are given below). The second subset is used to test each IDS and to train the GP
models as part of the reverse engineering attack. These are independent processes
and therefore we use the same subset. Finally, the third subset is used to test the
GP models.
The dataset uses two FC methods: 1-grams and expert knowledge. Although
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Table 3.1: The 89 non-null 1-grams from the HTTP dataset CSIC 2010.
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the dataset uses these two FC methods, the evasion attacks studied here focus on
the features extracted with the 1-grams method, in order to show its weaknesses.
Torrano et al. [Torrano-Gimenez et al., 2012] show that using a combination of these
two methods increases the effectiveness of the detection. However, in this work we
study if this combination improves the robustness of the IDS against adversarial
attacks.
The FC method based on the 1-gram method for intrusion detection works as
follows: every HTTP request p is associated with a feature vector
xp = (x1, x2, . . . , x256)
where xi contains the number of occurrences of the i-th 1-gram in the method, path,
and arguments of p.
An analysis of the 1-grams extracted from the dataset indicates that from the
256 possible features (i.e., the total number of ASCII characters), only 89 (34.77%)
appear one or more times in the HTTP requests. These 89 characters are listed in
Table 3.1.
The FC process based on expert knowledge considers 28 features relevant for
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Table 3.2: The 28 features constructed using expert knowledge from the HTTP dataset CSIC 2010.
Features extracted with expert knowledge
Length of the request Length of the path
Length of the arguments Length of the header “Accept”
Length of the header “Accept-Encoding” Length of the header “Accept-
Charset”
Length of the header “Accept-Language” Length of the header “Cookie”
Length of the header “Content-Length” Length of the header “Content-
Type”
Length of the Host Length of the header “Referer”
Length of the header “User-Agent” Method identifier
Number of arguments Number of letters in the arguments
Number of digits in the arguments Number of ’special’ char in the argu-
ments
Number of other char in the arguments Number of letters char in the path
Number of digits in the path Number of ’special’ char in the path
Number of other char in path Number of cookies
Number of distinct bytes Entropy
Number of keywords in the path Number of keywords in the argu-
ments
the detection process. These are listed in Table 3.2. Some of these 28 features refer
to the length of different parts of the request, as length is important for detecting
attacks such as buffer overflows. Non-alphanumeric characters are present in many
injection attacks. Therefore, four types of characters are considered: letters, digits,
non-alphanumeric characters that have a special meaning in a set of programming
languages (referred in Table 3.2 as “special” char), and other characters. Several
features are created by analyzing their occurrences in both the path and the argument
values. Another feature is built by studying the entropy of the bytes in the request.
Additionally, the construction by expert knowledge also considers keywords of several
programming languages that are often used in injection attacks, and count the
number of occurrences in the path and the arguments of the request.
Overall, the 89 features obtained from the 1-gram method and the 28 features
from the expert knowledge are combined for each payload, resulting in vectors with
117 features. Since in this work our aim is to analyze the weaknesses of the 1-gram
construction process, the evasion attack focuses only on the 89 features constructed
using 1-grams, although the reverse engineering attack focuses on the overall set of
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the IDS studied. It is composed of a FC module and the classification algorithm
at the core of the detection engine.
features. We explain these attacks in detail in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.
3.3.2 Classification Algorithms
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of the IDS built to demonstrate our attacks. First,
the HTTP traffic is preprocessed as explained in the previous section in order to
extract a feature vector for each HTTP payload. Four classification algorithms are
used as detection engines: C4.5 and CART decision trees, SVM, and MLP. The
IDS is trained to classify HTTP packets using labeled data with both normal and
intrusive packets, using the first part of the dataset.
Each classification algorithm is tested with the second part of the dataset. As
output of the testing process, the classification algorithm indicates for each test
request whether it has been correctly classified by the detector or not. In order to
evaluate the effectiveness of the IDS, we first define the measures used. On the one
hand, a real attack can be detected, obtaining a True Positive (TP), or not detected,
being a False Negative (FN). On the other hand, a normal event (non-malicious)
can be signaled as normal by the detector, being a True Negative (TN), or can be
classified as an attack, resulting in a False Positive (FP). Given these definitions,
several metrics are defined, as explained in Chapter 2:
• Hit rate (H). It is the ratio of attacks that are properly detected by the system.
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Table 3.3: Detection rate (H), false alarm rate (F) and CID index of the classification algorithms
studied.
C4.5 CART SVM MLP
H 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96
F 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12
Cid 0.73 0.72 0.67 0.62
It should be maximized.
• False positive rate (F ). It is the ratio of normal events wrongly classified as
intrusions. It should be minimized.
• CID index [Gu et al., 2006]. As explained in Chapter 2, the CID measures the
amount of uncertainty of the input resolved once the IDS output is obtained,
and provides a single scalar to assess the efficacy of the IDSs.
Table 3.3 shows the effectiveness of the different IDS classification algorithms studied
over test data. In the table, bigger H and CID values and lower F value means better
effectiveness of the classifier. As it can be observed, the best classifier is the C4.5,
with a 96% of Detection Rate (H) and a 4% of False Positives Rate (F ). In general,
it can be observed that the classifiers obtain high detection rates with acceptable
false alarm rates.
3.4 Attacks
This section first describes a general technique to conduct reverse engineering attacks
against IDS based on classifiers such as those described above. The scheme is based
on the idea of obtaining an approximation of the inner workings of the classifier (i.e.,
of its decision surface). Such an approximation is then used to search for strategies
that evade it, which are then mapped into real world payloads.
Figure 3.2 shows the overall process of the attacks. The top of the image
corresponds to the behavior of the IDS. First, the IDS gets some training data with
a given data distribution. The feature construction (FC) obtains the feature vectors
from the raw data, which are then used to train the classifier using the corresponding
ML algorithm. The classifier is used in detection mode to evaluate new events and
outputs a response (normal or intrusion).
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the attack performed by an adversary to evade IDS that use an invertible FC
method and ML algorithms.
The bottom part of Figure 3.2 represents the actions performed by the adversary
in each attack. Given an attack payload, the adversary first performs a reverse
engineering attack (bottom-left part of the figure), which obtains a GP model. Then,
this model is processed to search for evasion strategies (bottom-right part of the
figure). In the following sections we detail the reverse engineering and the evasion
attacks .
3.4.1 Reverse Engineering Attack
We next present an attack aimed at reverse engineering the inner workings of the
classifier at the core of the IDS. This is done using the data distribution used for
training the IDS that, as explained before, is known by the adversary. Recall that
we also assume that the adversary knows the feature construction algorithm used by
the IDS. Our main hypothesis is that, under these circumstances, the adversary can
generate training samples and build another classifier that is a good approximation,
3.4. Attacks 57
in terms of the decision surface, to the actual IDS classifier; that is, the model built
by the adversary classifies instances similarly to how the IDS does it. Such a model is
subsequently used to perform evasion attacks. We conduct our experiments over the
IDS created using 1-grams with the four different classification algorithms explained
above (C4.5, CART, SVM and MLP). This attack is represented in the bottom-left
part of Figure 3.2.
In this work, we use Genetic Programming (GP) [Koza, 1992] to obtain an
approximation of the decision surface of the actual detection model at the core of
the IDS. We choose GP because it outputs tree-based expressions that can be simply
evaluated with a recursive function. Moreover, these models are easy to understand
and readable [Orfila et al., 2009]. However, the presented reverse engineering attack
works with any algorithm whose output is readable and could be processed by a
posterior searching algorithm.
Given a search problem over a large solution space, GP performs a heuristic
search to obtain a locally optimal solution. GP is a technique that keeps a set of
programs (also called the population of individuals), randomly initialized, which are
evolved according to various procedures inspired by the laws of natural selection. In
our scheme, each program (individual) has a tree-like structure where the root and
intermediate nodes are mathematical and logic functions, and the leaves are terminal
features (see the example in Figure 3.3). Each generation is obtained by selecting
the best individuals from the previous one. Some individuals are mutated (changing
an internal subtree by another) or subject to crossover (exchanging subtrees from
two different individuals), according to a set of parameters. After a given number of
generations, or else when an optimal solution is achieved, the algorithm stops and
the best individual of the last generation is given as solution. Table 3.4 shows the
values used for the GP parameters in our experimentation. These values have been
obtained using 10-fold cross-validation and using the combination of parameters that
performs best in terms of accuracy.
The operators used in the GP algorithm are shown in Table 3.5. Most of them
output a binary value. Therefore, the final output of each individual is binary,
indicating whether the input trace is considered an attack or not. If the final output
is not binary (i.e., the root of the tree is a non-binary function), then an output value
different from zero is interpreted as an attack as well. The fitness function is the
operator measuring how well each individual in the population performs. We use the
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Table 3.4: GP parameters used in the experiments.
Name Value
Number of generations 300
Maximal tree depth [2-10]
Population size 1000
Tournament size 8
Crossover rate 90%
Mutation rate 10%
fitness shown in Equation (3.1), which considers both the classification error, defined
as the number of incorrectly classified events divided by the total events, and the CID.
The greater the CID, the better. Because the algorithm we use aims at minimizing
the fitness, we use (1− CID) in the calculation. The values α and β are the weight
given for each metric, and they must add up to one. In our experiments, we use 0.5
for both values (i.e., the CID and the classification error have equal weight).
fitness = α · E class+ β · (1− CID) (3.1)
A critical parameter here is the maximum tree depth. Since one goal of our
reverse engineering attack is to generate an understandable model of the classification
algorithm, it is important to avoid the bloating of the individuals when crossing and
mutating the trees. The value of the maximum tree depth avoids bloating. On the
one hand, setting a bigger value causes the GP algorithm to evolve more complex
programs, which are likely to be difficult to understand. On the other hand, simpler
models generally obtain worse results efficacy-wise, but they facilitate analysis for
the evasion attack, which is the actual goal of the adversary. In Section 3.5.1, we
provide an analysis of the impact of this parameter in the efficacy and effectiveness
of the attacks.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a model obtained by following this procedure.
This program applies the operators to the features in the leafs following a tree-based
scheme. In the example, we can observe that the model outputs 1 (anomaly) if both
the left side (OR operator) and the right side (ADD operator) are true (i.e., non-zero
values). The goal is that the programs evolve in such a way that they classify each
instance properly, in a supervised setting using the second part of the dataset as
training instances. Finally, programs are tested using the last part of the dataset to
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Figure 3.3: A sample of a GP model.
Table 3.5: List of operators used by GP.
Name Description
ADD Addition of two numbers
MULT Multiplication of two numbers
DIV Division between two numbers. Returns 0 if the denominator is 0
AND Boolean ’and’ operator between two numbers
OR Boolean ’or’ operator between 2 numbers
NOT Boolean ’not’ operator between 2 numbers
GREATER Returns 1 if the first argument is greater than the second, and 0
otherwise
LEAST Returns 1 if the first argument is lower than the second, and 0
otherwise
MAX Returns the maximum of two values
MIN Returns the minimum of two values
measure the effectiveness of the evolved models in terms of classification.
The training and testing phases are repeated several times in order to obtain a
statistically significant measure that does not depend on the initial random seed.
Using different random seeds covers a larger portion of the search space. We then
take the results obtained with the best individual, i.e., the one that has produced
the best test results, to perform the evasion attack.
Finally, it can be observed that in this setting the reverse engineering attack does
not require the adversary to interact with the IDS, because it only uses a dataset
with a similar distribution to the one used during the IDS training.
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3.4.2 Evasion Attack
The reverse engineering attack explained above provides the adversary with a model
of the way the IDS works that facilitates the construction of evasion attacks. Recall
that the main idea of an evasion is to transform a instance that would be classified
as a true positive by the IDS into one that would result in a false negative, i.e.,
performing attacks without generating alarms. The bottom-left part of Figure 3.2
shows a graphical explanation of this evasion attack.
Key information about how to find such evasions can be extracted from the
evolved models using a search algorithm. In our experiments, the models are GP
programs that have a tree shape, with a root node, several internal nodes distributed
in different levels, and a final level with the leaves. The root and each internal node
in a model is an operator and the leaves represent features extracted from the input
data. These are the features that an IDS trained with a similar data distribution
may use in the detection. Therefore, the evasion search is done by analyzing these
features and operators from the models to look for potential vectors that evade the
classifier. Then, these vectors are mapped into real payloads to evade the system
using the inverse of the feature construction (FC−1).
We perform the evasion search by using a special top-down tree-traversal searching
algorithm over each candidate model. The final goal is to make the root node change
the output (from 1, meaning attack, to 0, meaning normal). To this end, we allow
the search to modify the value of its children nodes as follows. On the one hand,
if any of the children is a leaf node, the corresponding feature is set to zero. On
the other hand, if both children are intermediate nodes (operators), the algorithm
requests them being zero, and the process is recursively repeated. In Section 3.5.2
we provide an example of how this search is done over a model.
The search over the tree models provides the adversary with a set of evasion
strategies, which indicate which features should be modified in order to evade the
classifier. The adversary generates a new dataset by implementing the modifications
of the features suggested by the search. Accordingly, the adversary obtains a set of
modified vectors from the input data that cause evasions. This modified dataset is
given as input to the studied classifier to check whether new false negative appears.
Each modified attack that is not detected by the IDS is considered as an evasion
candidate. We use the term “candidate” because, as mentioned above, before
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Figure 3.4: A candidate evasion strategy which modifies the feature F68 to evade detection.
considering it as a real world evasion we have to check that two requirements are
met:
1. The payload obtained after the modification must represent valid HTTP
payload. For example, the word GET cannot be removed from a HTTP
request.
2. The attack still works after the modification. For example, removing the word
INSERT in an SQL Injection translates into a useless payload for the adversary.
Figure 3.4 shows an example of a candidate evasion strategy. The row shows
the 117 features constructed from the payload along with its label (L), indicating
whether is a normal (i.e., L = 0) or an intrusive (i.e., L = 1) instance, and the output
given by the IDS (O). The figure shows an attack trace where, when modifying the
feature 68 from 13 to 0, the output (O) of the IDS changes from 1 (intrusion) to 0
(normal).
For each modified vector that potentially evades the IDS, it is required to get
the corresponding payload to perform real world evasions. This is done by inverting
the feature construction algorithm (FC−1). In the concrete example of 1-grams,
each feature in the vector specifies the number of 1-grams in the payload (see Table
3.1). Accordingly, the adversary only has to remove or insert 1-grams (bytes) in the
payload to get the desired numbers as indicated by the features of the candidate
vectors.
3.5 Results
This section presents the results obtained when attacking the four IDSs created using
C4.5, CART, SVM and MLP. First, in Section 3.5.1 we present the models obtained
62 3. Attacks on Machine Learning Based IDSs
Figure 3.5: Efficacy vs Complexity of models.
through the reverse engineering procedure described above. Since the models are
built using a dataset with a similar traffic distribution than the training dataset used
by the classifiers, the results of the reverse engineering attack are generic for the
four IDSs. Then, in Section 3.5.2 we explain how these models are used to conduct
an evasion search and discuss one example of a malicious payload which is properly
modified to evade the four IDSs studied.
3.5.1 Reverse Engineering
As explained in Section 3.4.1, we have experimented with different values of the
parameter “maximum tree depth”. Figure 3.5 shows the effectiveness in terms of H,
F and CID of the best individuals obtained for each value of the parameter. Recall
that bigger H and CID values and lower F values mean a better effectiveness of
the classifier. It can be observed that, as the maximum allowed depth increases,
so does the accuracy of the obtained models. However, bigger models are more
complex and require bigger efforts to perform the evasion attack. Though the false
positive rate of the models is rather high (above 10% in all the cases), we do not care
about improving this because the final goal is to perform evasion. Accordingly, it is
preferable that the models detect the attacks properly (i.e. getting a high detection
rate), because this provides further information to perform the evasion search.
Figure 3.6 shows the best individual obtained with a maximum depth of 4. In the
next section, we use this individual to illustrate how the search of evasion attacks is
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Figure 3.6: GP model obtained with the reverse engineering attack.
done. In this individual, the relevant features appearing in the leaves of the tree are:
• F96: Number of ’l’
• F89: Number of ’d’
• F86: Number of ’A’
• F67: Number of ’-’
• F17: Number of special characters in the arguments
• F104: Number of ’U’
• F31: Number of ’1’1
It can be observed that, with the exception of the feature F17, all the features
are extracted with 1-grams. Modifying such features to get real world evasions is
straightforward. Thus, the model presented provides the adversary with high chances
to look for evasions. In the next section, we explain how this is carried out.
3.5.2 Evasion
In order to explain how the tree-traversal algorithm works, next we describe the
search over the model shown in Figure 3.6. In order to succeed in evading the IDS,
the output of the tree must be zero. The root is a MAX operator, which requires
that its two children are zero. In what follows we describe how the algorithm works
in each subtree to accomplish this goal:
1Feature 96 is the lower-case of L while Feature 31 is the character of the number one
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Table 3.6: Example of a rule suggested after performing the evasion attack
[F89=0 OR F96=0 OR (F86=0 AND F67=0)] AND (F17=0 OR F104=0 OR F31=0)
1. The left child is a MIN operator, and requires one of its two children being
zero.
(a) The left child is a MIN, and it is zero if either the feature F89 (number of
’d’) or the feature F96 (number of ’l’) are zero.
(b) The right child is an ADD, and requires setting to zero both the feature
F86 (number of ’A’) and the feature F67 (number of ’-’).
2. The second child of the root is an OR operator. It requires that either the
feature F17 (number of special characters in the arguments) is zero or the right
child is zero.
(a) The right child is a DIV operator. It is zero if either the feature F104
(number of ’U’) or the feature F31 (number of ’1’) is zero (in order to
avoid inconsistent operations, if the divisor is zero, the operator DIV
returns zero).
This search suggests various possible modifications of features according to the
analysis above. The modifications are given in the form of rules. Table 3.6 shows an
example of a rule obtained from analyzing the model shown in Figure 3.6. This rule
shows that, for example, if the features F89 and F17 are set to zero, it is possible
evade the tree model. However, performing such modifications to get real world
evasions is not an easy task for an adversary. Indeed, F17 is the “Number of special
characters in the argument’s values”, and in many attacks it cannot be set to zero
because some special characters are required (like, for example, the ’>’ symbol for an
XSS attack). Thus, this modification may not be useful in real attacks. In general,
when evaluating the evasion attack the adversary should focus on modifications that
are semantically valid, as explained in Section 3.4.2. As we show below, focusing
on the features extracted by 1- grams simplifies the search of real world evasions,
because inverting the FC is straightforward for the adversary.
We have analyzed the models generated with different tree depths and obtained
all the output rules. Without loss of generality, we provide an example of how an
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Figure 3.7: Original (above) and modified (below) malicious payloads, classified as intrusion and normal
respectively by the four IDSs studied.
evasion could succeed by following this procedure. One of the modifications suggested
in these rules is to set the number of ’i’ characters to zero. Accordingly, we replace
the character ’i’ by its upper-case representation (’I’) in all the attack instances
initially detected by each classifier, thus generating a payload free of ’i’ characters.
Figure 3.7 shows an example of such a payload, which originally was detected by
all the IDSs studied, i.e., using the C4.5, CART, SVM and MLP classification
algorithms. Then, when such a modification is carried out, it evades detection of the
IDSs. This payload is a typical example of an SQL Injection attack against the web
server. It can be observed that it is a real world evasion because the HTTP protocol
is not case-sensitive, so replacing a capital letter by its corresponding lower-case
letter maintains the functionality of the protocol and thus the attack still succeeds.
However, from the ML perspective, this small change in a feature suffices to alter
the classification output. A prior normalization of the traffic exposed to the IDS,
though, would counteract this evasion.
Another evasion strategy suggested by the rules consists of removing the hyphens
(’-’) characters from the arguments in the URLs. This could be done by changing these
characters by the underscore(’ ’) in the names or surnames of people. For example,
in Figure 3.7, the argument “email” has the value “jperez@fighting-machines.log”. If
the domain of this email is changed to “fighting machines.log”, the evasion succeeds.
However, the HTTP request has a different semantic, i.e., the domain of the email
may not exist, and the response to this request may lead to some error message,
like “invalid email”. Nonetheless, the evasion attack is harder to counteract by the
IDSs, as it is not enough to normalize the traffic, but also it would be required to
remove invalid email domains (which in turn requires to manage a whitelist of these
domains).
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The aforementioned evasion attack may seem simple, as we are only changing a
lower-case letter by its corresponding upper-case character, or hyphen by underscore
characters. It can be observed that an adversary can easily compose a malicious
payload that evades the IDSs. Somehow during training, the classifiers learn that
the presence or absence of these characters can be used to tell apart normal from
anomalous payloads. As shown in Table 3.3, the detectors obtain a rather good
performance in terms of effectiveness. This happens because the ML algorithms are
capable of processing a training dataset and, when a similar testing data is presented,
they classify these data properly. However, ML algorithms do not have the domain-
specific intelligence required to know whether the classification makes sense from
the application at hand –intrusion detection in this case. Accordingly, as we have
demonstrated, they are weak and vulnerable to specific targeted modifications. Once
the adversary discovers this vulnerability through the reverse engineering attack, she
just have to take care of setting properly the number of characters (1-grams) in the
attack payload and thus the IDS will be evaded.
3.5.3 Additional Experimentation
The attacks discussed above were also tested against network-based detectors [Pas-
trana et al., 2010, 2011]. In this case, we used the LBNL dataset [Nechaev et al.,
2010], which provides both normal traffic and traffic corresponding to a port-scanning
attack, and the well-known KDD Dataset, derived from raw traffic captured during
MIT/LL 1998 evaluation [Lippmann et al., 2000]. Different from the work presented
in this chapter, in our previous works we only experimented with the C4.5 algorithm.
At a first sight, the results demonstrated that an adversary could evade a C4.5-based
NIDS with SYN flooding attack and port scanning attacks. However, we found that
obtaining real world evasions in those cases were highly difficult for the adversary,
because inverting the FC used in that works is not easy.
The GP models obtained in [Pastrana et al., 2010, 2011] are showed in Figure 3.8.
As it can be observed, these models are rather simple and easy to understand, which
was one of the objectives proposed for that works. This implies that the reverse
engineering attacks succeeded. Regarding the evasion attack, though, the suggested
evasion strategy from the models forces the attacker to perform hard modifications.
Concretely, the strategy requires to modify either a TCP header field (the window
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LBNL dataset KDD dataset
Figure 3.8: GP models obtained in previous experimentation with network traffic.
size) in the case of the LBNL dataset (left figure), or the “destination bytes” field
of the KDD (right figure), which is the number of data bytes from destination to
source. Consequently, obtaining real world evasions in this case is not easy, or even
impossible in the case of the destination bytes, since it depends on the destination
(victim) and thus the source (attacker) has not control over the field.
3.6 Discussion
We identify three main points that lead to the success of the attacks presented in
this chapter. We next analyze them and discuss possible countermeasures.
1. IDSs are trained with a dataset that does not represent properly the complete
space of HTTP payloads. This is one of the major problems in the application
of machine learning to intrusion detection [Sommer and Paxson, 2010], and the
situation is even worse in the case of payload-based detection. A solution would
be to constantly retrain the detector, in the hope that feeding the classifier
with newly observed payloads will result in more representativeness. However,
these solutions entails new problems. For example, it must be ensured that
the new payloads are attack-free, as otherwise the detector would incorporate
malicious behaviors into its notion of normality. Moreover, the re-training
solution must deal with poisoning attacks, in which the adversary carefully
inserts data in order to progressively move the detection surface to a desired
point. This attack is further explained in a paper by Biggio et al. [Biggio et al.,
2012] with Support Vector Machines.
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2. The feature construction method is simple and it is easy to invert the process
to get real world evasions. The use of 1-grams to extract features is useful
for efficiency purposes, but it allows an adversary to easily find real world
evasions. Ideally, in adversarial environments, the feature construction should
be a one-way function, i.e., whose invert function was computationally hard to
perform. Thus, regarding the feature construction by 1-grams, it is required to
use higher-order n-grams. For example, using values of n greater than 2, the
Anagram IDS solves the problems identified in PAYL. In the next chapter, we
provide further details about this.
3. The adversary knows the distribution of the training dataset and the feature
construction algorithm. A na¨ıve solution to hide this information to the
adversary would be not publish the dataset used for training by the IDS.
However, a query-response analysis would allow to obtain such information,
as proposed by Ateniese et al. [Ateniese et al., 2013]. In general, securing
a system by hiding its functionality is against the Kerckhoff principle which
states that “the security of the system must depend solely on the key material,
and not on the design of the system”. Another solution, adopted by others IDS
like KIDS [Mrdovic and Drazenovic, 2010] or Anagram [Wang et al., 2006] is to
use secret information in the detection function, much in the way encryption
functions use secret keys. However, the secrecy of KIDS has been broken in
[Este´vez-Tapiador et al., 2013]. Regarding the solution proposed by Anagram,
in the next chapter we show that the secrecy of the detection is broken using
a sophisticated reverse engineering attack. Indeed, as we discuss in the next
chapter, randomization of IDS does not necessarily increment the security of
the detection. However, this is still an active research area with more open
problems than solutions.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented reverse engineering and evasion attacks against
payload-based intrusion detection systems based on conventional machine learning
classifiers. The attack is conducted in two phases. First, a reverse engineering on the
IDS aims to discover which properties have the detectors learned from the training
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dataset. Second, by analyzing these properties, the payload is carefully modified to
get an evasion attack. Furthermore, when such IDS rely on weak feature construction
algorithms, the evasion strategies suggested from analyzing the reverse engineered
models are easy to translate into usable real world payloads. The reverse engineering
process suggested here relies on Genetic Programming to derive tree-based models.
The analysis of these models allows the adversary to find evasions over the IDS, by
carefully modifying the payloads. Our experiments show that an adversary can find
evasions in well-known classification algorithms such as C4.5, CART, SVM and MLP.
We have shown how an adversary can evade the detection if the training process
makes the IDS to learn models that are specific to the training dataset used. In
such a case, an adversary can infer such models (or approximations to them) and
use them to evade the system. The premises for the attack are realistic, as both the
traffic distribution of the protected network and the feature construction method are
generally either public or easy to infer. In particular, the weaknesses of 1-grams are
related to the fact that they are easily manipulable by an adversary, which in turn
makes it easy to get real world evasions. This is a fundamental difference with other
works focused on IDS analyzing network level traffic. For these, obtaining such real
evasions requires additional capabilities for the adversary, such as for example being
able to modify connection parameters.
In our approach, the adversary do not require to know the training algorithm, nor
has to query the detector to build models that behave somehow similar to the target
IDS. This avoids dealing with the near-optimal evasion problem stated in [Nelson
et al., 2011], where authors discuss the complexity of a query-response analysis in
terms of the number of queries required by an adversary.
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4Reverse Engineering Attacks on
Randomized Classifiers: The Case of
Anagram
4.1 Introduction
Reverse engineering attacks often seek to acquire knowledge that is essential to
subsequently attain other attack goals. One clear example is evasion, as the attacker
generally does not possess full details about the detection function and, therefore,
potential ways of evading it. For example, in anomaly-based IDS the detection
function is commonly built from a set of “normal” (and attack-free) events, such as
network traffic or service requests, using machine learning algorithms [Hu and Shen,
2012; Pastrana et al., 2012; Satpute et al., 2013; Song et al., 2013]. The resulting
model is then used to spot anomalous activities, assuming that anything deviating
from normality is suspicious. A direct consequence of this operation principle is
that any network packet that fits the normality model will not raise any alarm. An
advanced attacker could try to modify his original attack payload so that it blends
in with the normal behaviour of a network, thus evading detection. These strategies
were termed Polymorphic Blending Attacks (PBA) by Fogla et al. in [Fogla et al.,
2006], and were also demonstrated by Kolesnikov et al. [Kolesnikov and Lee, 2005] to
evade PAYL [Wang and Stolfo, 2004], an anomaly detector based on n-grams (with
n = 1 or n = 2).
The threat posed by evasion attacks such as those discussed in the previous
chapter has forced some schemes to incorporate defenses to thwart them. Nearly
all schemes proposed so far rely on the idea of depriving the adversary of some
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critical knowledge about how the payload will be processed. This can be achieved
in a number of ways. For example, McPAD [Perdisci et al., 2009] generates various
different models of normality, each one based on a distinct set of features, and uses
all (or some) of them to seek anomalies. In doing so, it forces the adversary to craft a
payload that looks normal to all models. A similar idea was explored by Biggio et al.
in [Biggio et al., 2010] by using multiple classifiers and randomly assigning weights
to each of them in the final decision. Other detectors such as KIDS [Mrdovic and
Drazenovic, 2010] draw some inspiration from cryptography and propose a scheme
where the normality model depends upon some secret material (the key). In KIDS the
key determines how the classification features are extracted from the payload. The
security argument here is simple: even though the learning and detection algorithms
are public, an adversary who is not in possession of the key will not know exactly
how a request will be processed and, consequently, will not be able to design attacks
that thwart detection.
While most such schemes successfully provide a rationale of their strength against
evasion, almost none of them include in their security analysis arguments about
an adversary who first reverse engineers the detection function and then uses the
acquired knowledge to evade detection. Thus, for example, in PAYL an adversary
can try to infer, either completely or approximately, which specific n-grams are
not recognized as anomalous and then modify the attack (e.g., by adding carefully
constructed padding as in [Kolesnikov and Lee, 2005]) so that it matches one of those
n-grams. One debatable issue about reverse engineering attacks is precisely their
viability and/or practical relevance. To begin with, it is assumed that the attacker
can somehow observe the responses induced by inputs of his choosing, and also that
he can query the IDS with a potentially large number of payloads. Shedding doubts
about the feasibility of doing this is reasonable, but from a security perspective it
would be unsafe to assume that it is not possible, even if it seems hard to figure out
realistic scenarios where the attacker has such a capability at his disposal.
In this chapter we discuss reverse engineering attacks against randomized classi-
fiers. We focus on Anagram [Wang et al., 2006], a well-known anomaly detector that
models n-grams (with n > 1) observed in normal and attack traffic. Anagram, which
can be seen as an evolution of PAYL [Wang and Stolfo, 2004] to resist evasion by
polymorphic mimicry attacks, also introduces a new strategy to hinder evasion called
randomization. Roughly speaking, each detector uses a secret and random mask
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(the key) to partition packets into several (and possibly interleaved) chunks. These
chunks are reordered according to the secret random mask to produce new inputs to
the same normality model; the maximum anomaly score among them is assigned
to the packet. Thus, in randomized Anagram the secrecy of the mask prevents an
attacker from knowing where and how to modify the original attack so as each chunk
will look normal.
We analyze the strength of randomized strategies such as that incorporated into
Anagram against key-recovery attacks and the security consequences of an adversary
being able to recover the secret mask. In particular:
• We discuss adversarial settings where an attacker is given the opportunity to
interact with the detector by providing carefully chosen payloads and analyzing
the binary response (normal/anomalous).
• We provide an efficient algorithm to recover the secret mask using a bounded
amount of queries to Anagram and discuss the experimental results obtained
with a prototype implementation.
• We show that knowledge of such a secret mask, even if it is just approximate,
could actually make the randomized version of Anagram weaker than the
non-randomized one against evasion attacks. We present an example of how an
adversary may use it to carefully distribute the attack code along the payload
to bypass detection.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the evasion
problem present in PAYL and the design of Anagram, including the randomized vari-
ants. Subsequently in Section 4.3 we introduce an algorithm to recover the key used
in randomized Anagram together with the associated adversarial model. In Section
4.4 we discuss the experimental results obtained with a prototype implementation,
including an example of cross-site scripting (XSS) attack appropriately modified to
evade detection. Finally, in Section 4.5 we summarize the main contributions of this
chapter and draw conclusions.
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4.2 The Anagram Detector
Anagram is a network IDS (NIDS) proposed by Wang et al. in 2006 [Wang et al.,
2006]. It improves PAYL, a former version presented two years before by the same
authors [Wang and Stolfo, 2004]. In 2005, Kolesnikov et al. [Kolesnikov and Lee,
2005] showed a method to evade PAYL using Polymorphic Blending Attacks [Fogla
et al., 2006]. This section analyzes this evasion method and presents the mechanisms
present in Anagram to counteract it.
4.2.1 Evasion Attacks on PAYL
In 2004, Wang et al. presented an anomaly-based NIDS called PAYL (Payload
Anomaly Detection) [Wang and Stolfo, 2004]. For each payload length observed in
the training data, PAYL obtains a normality model by storing every n-gram (with
n = 1 or n = 2) from all available attack-free payloads. In detection mode, PAYL
first extracts the n-grams of the packet being analyzed. Each n-gram that is not
present in the normal model increments the anomaly score of the packet. If the
final anomaly score exceeds a predefined threshold, then the packet is tagged as
anomalous. Kolesnikov et al. described an efficient method to evade PAYL using
Polymorphic Blending Attacks (PBAs) [Kolesnikov and Lee, 2005]. See Chapter 2
for a detailed description of PBAs.
In order to generate a PBA against a NIDS, the attacker first learns the normality
model used by the NIDS, which in the case of PAYL consists of guessing the
distribution of 1-grams (bytes) that normal payloads follow. The attacker then
encrypts the attack body using a simple reversible substitution algorithm, where each
unaccepted byte in the attack body (i.e., one that is not included in the normal model)
is substituted with an accepted byte according to a particular substitution table.
The objective of such a substitution is to masquerade the attack body as normal
behavior, guaranteeing that it statistically fits the normal profile. However, as the
attack body is sent within the polymorphic decryptor, an optimal substitution table
should itself satisfy the normal model as well. Finding such an optimal substitution
table turns out to be an NP-complete problem. In [Fogla and Lee, 2006], Fogla and
Lee reduced the problem to a Satisfiability or an ILP (Integer Linear Programming)
problem, which can be efficiently solved for the problem sizes involved. Finally, the
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polymorphic decryptor is generated. As the anomaly score of PAYL is the percentage
of previously unseen n-grams, the PBA adds some extra normal bytes as padding to
make the score lower. The attack is spread over different packets, according to the
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of the system, in order to make it easier for
the attack to pass undetected.
4.2.2 Anagram
In 2006, Wang et al. proposed Anagram [Wang et al., 2006] to overcome PAYL’s
vulnerability to PBA. Anagram uses a more complex model, and also randomizes
the detection process. We next provide a brief overview of its functioning.
4.2.2.1 Higher Order n-grams
Anagram builds a model of normal behavior by considering all the n-grams (for
a given, fixed value of n) that appear in normal traffic payloads. Unlike PAYL,
Anagram uses higher order n-grams (i.e, n > 2), so instead of recording single bytes
or pairs of consecutive bytes, it records strings of size n. This obviously increments
the complexity of the normal model and, therefore, requires more computational
resources. Anagram uses Bloom Filters [Bloom, 1970] to reduce the memory needed
to store the model and the time to process packets. Anagram also uses a model
of bad content consisting of n-grams obtained from a set of Snort signatures and
a pool of virus payloads. This procedure is called by the authors semi-supervised
learning. In detection mode, each n-gram that does not appear in the normal profile
increments the anomaly score by 1, except if such an n-gram is also present in the
bad content model, in which case the anomaly score is incremented by 5. The final
anomaly score of a packet is obtained by dividing the final count by the total number
of n-grams processed. Note that the use of bad-content models makes it possible
for the anomaly scores to be greater than 1. With this semi-supervised procedure,
the already known attacks are taken into account, making Anagram more efficient.
More details about the implementation and how Anagram works can be found in
[Wang et al., 2006].
Evading PAYL requires to learn the normal profile used by the detector. This
can be done stealthily by sniffing traffic destined to the victim’s network from an
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external system. To be successful, the PBA needs to add normal n-grams (with
n = 1 or n = 2) in order to decrease the relative frequency of unseen n-grams in
the payload [Wang et al., 2006]. However, by using higher order n-grams, Anagram
makes it harder to effectively reduce this frequency. The attacker has to prepare and
execute the complex task of spreading the entire attack among multiple packets so
as to reduce the number of unseen n-grams in each packet. However, this does not
completely prevents Anagram from being evaded. In fact, the problem of finding
a PBA against Anagram can be reduced using the techniques presented by Fogla
and Lee in [Fogla and Lee, 2006]. For this reason, Anagram does not only focus on
higher order n-grams but also introduces the concept of randomized testing.
4.2.2.2 Randomized Anagram
A PBA always contains some number q of n-grams that cannot be encrypted, such as
the attack vector or the polymorphic decryptor. Therefore, to achieve a statistically
significant percentage of valid n-grams, the attacker must add an extra amount p
of padding, with p >> q. In [Wang et al., 2006], a technique called randomized
testing that aims at thwarting PBA against Anagram is described. By using such a
randomization, the attacker will not know exactly how each packet will be processed
and, therefore, where to put the padding to guarantee that evasion is successful.
Figure 4.1 graphically shows how randomized testing works, assuming that a
random mask with 3 sets is used. In this case, incoming packets are partitioned
into 3 chunks by applying a randomly generated mask. Such a mask consists of
contiguous strings of 0s, 1s or 2s. Anagram establishes that each string must be at
least 10 bytes long in order to keep the n-gram structure of the packets (see [Wang
et al., 2006] for a detailed description of the random mask generation). The mask is
applied to the payload of a packet to assign each block to one of the three possible
sets. Each resulting set is considered by Anagram as an independent packet formed
by the concatenation of individual blocks, and are tested separately, thus obtaining
different anomaly scores. The higher of these scores is the one given as anomaly
score of the original packet. If such an anomaly score exceeds a predefined threshold
T, then the packet is tagged as “anomalous”; otherwise it is considered “normal”.
The random mask applied in the detection process is kept secret. Consequently,
an attacker does not know how the different parts of a packet will be processed in
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Figure 4.1: Computation of the anomaly score in randomized Anagram.
the detection process and, therefore, does not know where normal padding should be
added in order to achieve an acceptable ratio of unseen n-grams. Thus, the first goal
of an attacker pursuing to evade Anagram should be to find out the random mask
used. Once this is achieved, the techniques presented in [Fogla and Lee, 2006] to
perform an ordinary PBA could be applied. Moreover, if the adversary is able to
estimate the random mask used in Anagram, this can be used to easily evade the
system it other ways. We describe this in detail and present an example in Section
4.4.4. Next section describes our algorithm to reveal the secret random mask of
Anagram along with the adversarial model that we consider.
4.3 Reverse Engineering Attacks on Randomized
Anagram
In this section, we describe a reverse engineering attack against randomized Anagram.
We first introduce the adversarial model required for this attack to work, including
what capabilities the attacker must possess. We subsequently discuss the algorithm
to recover the random mask. For simplicity, full details about the attack are provided
in Appendix A.
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4.3.1 Adversarial Model
In a reverse engineering attack, the attacker must possess the ability to interact with
the system being attacked, often in ways that differ quite significantly from what may
be regarded as normal (e.g., by providing malformed inputs or an unusually large
number of them). In some cases, the ability to do so is close to the bare minimum
required to learn something useful about the system’s inner workings.
In the field of Secure Machine Learning, in particular when assessing the security
of systems such as Anagram, one major problem comes from the absence of widely ac-
cepted adversarial models giving a precise and motivated description of the attacker’s
capabilities. Barreno et al. [Barreno et al., 2010, 2006] have recently introduced
one such adversarial model and discussed various general attack categories. Our
work does not fit well within this model because our main goal is not force the
algorithm to misclassify an instance, but to recover one piece of secret information
used during operation. Our reverse-engineering scenario is far more similar to that
of Lowd and Meek [Lowd and Meek, 2005], where the focus is on the role of active
experimentation with a classifier. In this case, as emphasized in [Lowd and Meek,
2005] it is absolutely essential for the attacker to be able to: (1) send queries to the
classifier; and (2) get some feedback about properties of the query as processed by
the system.
In this work, we use the adversarial model introduced in [Lowd and Meek, 2005]
to analyze the security of Anagram against reverse engineering attacks. In particular,
we assume that the adversary can query Anagram with specific inputs of his choosing
and analyze the corresponding responses, i.e., the adversary can:
1. Prepare a payload p.
2. Query Anagram with p.
3. Obtain the classification of p as normal or anomalous.
Our emphasis in this work is on what can be attained by assuming an attacker
with such capabilities. Consequently, we do not make any claims about the feasibility
of the proposed attacks in real-world scenarios. However, in practical terms we
identify two different settings where this adversarial model might materialize:
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• Offline setting. In this case, the attacker is given full access to a trained but
non-operational Anagram for a limited period of time. The attacker can freely
query the system and observe the outputs at will and without raising suspicions.
For example, this situation may occur during an outsourced system auditing,
in which the consultant may ask the security administrator to take full control
of the NIDS for a short period of time in order to carry out some stress testing.
Among the battery of tests used, he might include those queries required by
the attack.
• Online setting. Even if the NIDS is operational, it is reasonable to assume
that an attacker can send queries to the NIDS, as the ability to feed the NIDS
with inputs is available to everyone who can access the service being protected.
Thus for example, such queries would be arbitrarily chosen payloads sent to
an HTTP, FTP, SQL, etc. server. Two difficulties arise here. First, getting
feedback from the NIDS (point 3 above) seems more problematic. In order
for the attacker to determine whether an alarm has been generated or not,
he would need to exploit an already compromised internal resource, such as
for example an employee or device that provides him with this information.
Alternatively, side channels may also be a source of valuable information (in
particular, timing channels [Brumley and Boneh, 2005; Chen et al., 2010]),
for example if it takes a different amount of time to classify a normal and an
anomalous request, and this can be remotely determined. The second difficulty
has to do with the fact that during the attack Anagram receives a large amount
of queries, many of which will be tagged as anomalous. As this might certainly
raise some suspicions, the attacker could spread them over a much larger period
of time.
4.3.2 Mask Recovering Algorithm
We next describe an algorithm that recovers the secret mask applied by randomized
Anagram. For reasons that will be clearer later, in some cases our attack could fail
to locate exactly the borders between sets. Fortunately, such errors can only occur
in the proximity of the borders and, therefore, the majority of the recovered mask
is correct. Furthermore, the masks thus recovered are still extremely useful for an
adversary to launch an evasion attack, as they point out which parts of the payload
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Figure 4.2: Input-Output view of the mask recovering attack.
will be grouped together for analysis, even if there is some uncertainty about a few
bytes at the beginning and end of each block.
For readability, in this section we present a high-level description of the attack.
The pseudo-code of all involved procedures along with a detailed explanation can be
found in Appendix A.
As described above, Anagram’s masks are formed by concatenating runs of length
at least 10 of natural numbers from the set [0, K]. As shown in Figure 4.2, our
attack requires two inputs: (1) the maximum estimated size of the mask; and (2)
the maximum estimated number K of sets. The attack would be successful if both
parameters are greater than or equal to the actual ones in the mask. However, these
inputs have a direct influence on the execution time of the attack, in such a way
that a more conservative (or resourceful) adversary could just use sufficiently high
values to guarantee that the recovered mask is correct. Alternatively, it is possible
to launch several attack instances, each one with a progressively higher value, until
the result does not change.
The attack returns a vector with the estimated random mask, each position
indicating the estimated set number. We will use the term delimiter to designate
those mask positions where the mask changes from one set to another; in particular, if
mimi · · ·mimjmj · · ·mj are two consecutive blocks in the mask, with mi,mj ∈ [0, K]
and mi 6= mj, then the delimiter is the first mj.
The algorithm is iterative. At each iteration, it identifies a new set Scurrent. The
attack stops either when all the mask positions are filled with a set number, or when
the maximum number of sets is reached. Each iteration of the algorithm is composed
of two phases, which are explained in next sections. Each phase uses as input an
initial starting point (Is), which corresponds to the first position of the delimiter in
Scurrent. In the first iteration, Is is set to 1. In subsequent iterations, Is is the first
delimiter found in the previous iteration such that no set has yet been assigned to it.
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Figure 4.3: Phase I of the attack: obtaining an “nearly anomalous” payload.
4.3.2.1 Phase I
The main goal of this phase is to construct a payload that is “nearly anomalous”. Such
a payload is one that is classified as normal by Anagram, but such that if one single
byte is replaced by an “anomalous” one µ (which causes changes in n consecutive
n-grams), forces Anagram to classify it as anomalous1. The key observation here is
that such a substitution will cause the payload to become anomalous if and only if µ
is put in a position that belongs to the set with the maximum anomaly score (Smax
for convenience), and that is not close to the border with the next set so that most
affected n-grams fall in Smax.
The payload is built up as represented in Figure 4.3. The algorithm starts with
a normal payload and Is is set to 1. Then, µ is inserted into the 10 positions that
follow Is (red cells in Figure 4.3). Next, the algorithm checks whether the payload
becomes anomalous (i.e. whether Scurrent, which is set 1 in Figure 4.3, is Smax). If so,
the algorithm removes one by one the µ bytes starting at the end (steps 2 and 3 in
Figure 4.3), until the payload becomes normal again (step 3 in the Figure 4.3). The
resulting payload is such that, while it is classified as normal, a single addition of µ
in any of the positions associated with Smax would cause it to become anomalous.
Note that after Phase I, we guarantee that Scurrent = Smax.
4.3.2.2 Phase II
By using the payload obtained in Phase I, Phase II exploits the fact that the addition
of a single µ into the sets of Smax would cause the entire payload to become anomalous,
whereas if it is inserted in any other set the payload remains normal. Phase I obtains
1In our experiments, we have used as µ a byte with very low probability of occurrence in normal payloads,
such as for example control characters (low ASCII numbers) or letters belonging to an alphabet different
from the one used in the service being protected by the NIDS (e.g., n˜, accents, etc. if the system serves
English web pages).
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Figure 4.4: Phase II of the attack to discover the delimiters of the random mask.
The anomalous character µ is moved throughout the payload to detect changes in Anagram’s output.
Each change corresponds to a delimiter of the set being processed. In the figure, the algorithm would
detect the delimiters of Set 1, located at positions 13, 23 and 36.
payloads such that Scurrent is Smax. Now Phase II moves one µ over the entire packet,
as shown in Figure 4.4. Whenever such a moving µ is inserted within the limits of
Smax, the payload becomes anomalous; otherwise it remains normal. This allows us
to identify all those positions of set Scurrent in the mask. In addition, any position
where the output changes from normal to anomalous, or vice versa, is considered a
delimiter between set Scurrent and any other set. Thus, the next starting point Is
will be the first delimiter belonging to a set that has not yet been assigned.
There are some border cases where the procedure described above may fail. These
are next discussed, together with a simple but effective countermeasure consisting of
running Phase II multiple times and carrying out a majority voting step.
4.3.2.3 Majority Voting
In the description of Phase II above it was assumed that the set obtained in Phase I,
Scurrent, is Smax. Thus, µ is moved throughout the entire payload to detect where the
output changes, therefore detecting the delimiters of the current set. However, the
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algorithm fails if the positions close to the delimiters contain an already anomalous n-
gram. The problem is that the payloads obtained in Phase I are “nearly anomalous”,
meaning that one single µ within the limits of Smax usually induces a change in the
output. The anomaly score, as explained in Section 4.2.2.2, is obtained by dividing
the number of unseen n-grams by the total number of n-grams. Consequently, the
output changes when the number of unseen n-grams increases. However, during
Phase II, if µ is inserted within an already unseen n-gram, then the number of unseen
n-grams remains constant, the output does not change and, therefore, the delimiter
is not detected. This situation, which decreases the effectiveness of the algorithm,
can also be exploited to evade Anagram, as we discuss in Section 4.4.4.
In order to increase the robustness of our attack, we introduce a majority voting
scheme. Instead of simply recording the results for a single payload obtained in
Phase I, we use several of them. The algorithm records all the positions indicated by
each payload (votes) and, if some position has at least one half of the votes, then it
is considered a delimiter. Even in those cases where it is unclear where the delimiter
is, an analysis of the number of votes on each position will allow the adversary to
estimate zones where the delimiters are supposed to be, which is enough to evade
the system. We show this fact in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.4.
4.4 Experimental Setup and Results
We have implemented Anagram using the pseudo-code available in [Wang, 2007]. Both
our attack and Anagram’s implementation have been written in Java. Experiments
have been run in a dual-core machine with 4GB of RAM. We have trained and tested
Anagram using the same HTTP datasets used by McPAD [Perdisci et al., 2009],
another application-layer anomaly detector, which are freely available2. A summary
of the number of payloads and the partition into training, validation and test sets
is given in Table 4.1. To generate the bad-content model, we use the web-based
signatures of Snort [Roesch, 1999], as done originally in Anagram3. Furthermore, to
avoid inserting normal n-grams into the bad-content model, we filter out the data
using the validation set from the McPAD dataset and a list of known words of the
2See http://roberto.perdisci.com/projects/mcpad
3We do not use any virus signatures, as Anagram’s authors do not provide information about what kind
of virus database they used.
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Table 4.1: Description of the dataset
Training Validation Test Total
Normal payloads 102157 1521 1050 104728
Attack payloads – – 1050 1050
Total 102157 1521 2100 105778
HTTP protocol.
We performed the experiments using 3 different n-gram sizes: n = 5, n = 6 and
n = 7. Both in the original Anagram paper and in our experiments these values
translate into the best detection quality. The experimental results presented next are
grouped into three sections. In Section 4.4.1 we assess the performance of randomized
Anagram as suggested in the original paper and discuss its limitations in terms of
detection quality. Subsequently, in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 we report on the accuracy
and efficiency (in terms of queries and CPU time) of the attack, respectively.
4.4.1 Detection Accuracy
In this first experiment, we assess the detection accuracy of randomized Anagram
and compare it with the non-randomized version of the detector. Wang et al. [Wang
et al., 2006] reported results on randomized Anagram using a binary mask (i.e.,
with just 2 sets). As our attack is designed to estimate random masks composed
of any number of sets, we also explored the performance of randomized Anagram
using a number of sets greater than 2, with different mask lengths. Specifically, we
have experimented with 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 sets, and mask lengths of 128, 160, 200
and 256 bytes. In this section, we first present a ROC analysis of the randomized
detectors. We next analyze the effect of introducing randomization on the anomaly
score distribution, showing that the anomaly threshold in the case of randomized
detection has to be increased in order to maintain a low false alarm rate.
4.4.1.1 ROC Analysis
Figure 4.5 shows the ROC curves of the detectors using n-grams of size 5, 6 and 7.
Each plot contains a ROC curve for different number of sets, which has been obtained
by averaging the results of different mask lengths. These curves are similar to those
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originally presented by Wang et al. in [Wang et al., 2006]. It can be observed that
for any value of n, as the number of sets increases, so it does the false alarm rate.
However, all detectors achieve a 100% of detection rate with a false alarm rate lower
than 1%. A false alarm rate greater than 1% has traditionally being considered
unmanageable for a human operator at a large installation [Champion and Durst,
1999]. Accordingly, a typical design goal is to develop NIDS that can operate at
points with a false alarm rate under 1%.
4.4.1.2 Anomaly Score Analysis
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of anomaly scores obtained during test using
various n-gram sizes for attack-free packets (FREE, in red) and packets containing
Polymorphic Blending Attack (PBA, in blue). Each plot shows the anomaly score in
the x-axis and the number of payloads having such an anomaly score in the y-axis.
Dotted lines represent the results of the randomized detector using a mask of 128
bytes with 2 sets, while solid lines show the results using a normal, non-randomized
version of Anagram.
As it can be observed, the randomized detector considerably increases the anomaly
scores for both FREE and PBA packets. In our experience, this increment is even
greater for attack-free packets. Although both distributions remain reasonably dis-
tinguishable, the detection threshold in the case of randomized testing is significantly
higher. As we explain in Section 4.4.4, this property makes Anagram less robust
against an adversary who has discovered the random mask.
4.4.2 Effectiveness of the Attack
Figure 4.7 shows an example of the execution of the attack using 3 sets and masks of
160 bytes. The figure is partitioned into three vertical blocks that should be viewed
as concatenated. The actual mask content is shown in the first row (with the tag M).
We run the attack using a maximum number of 8 sets and a maximum random mask
length of 300 bytes. Each set is represented with a different color. The state of the
estimated random mask after each iteration is shown in a different line. Thus, the
second row corresponds to the initial state, where all the positions are set to -1 (in
red). In the first iteration of the attack, the algorithm estimates the positions of the
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Figure 4.5: ROC curves obtained by randomized Anagram for different number of sets and different
n-gram sizes.
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of the anomaly scores using 5-, 6- and 7-grams in non-randomized (plain lines)
and randomized (dotted lines) Anagram.
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of the estimated random mask through consecutive iterations of the attack.
The first line shows the actual mask with 3 different sets. The second line shows the initial state with
all the positions set to -1, while each remaining line corresponds to an iteration of the algorithm.
first set (0, in yellow). In the second iteration, the positions of set 1 are estimated
(light green in the figure), while in the third step the algorithm finds the positions
of set 2 (dark green). After step 3, there is a positive value in every position of the
estimated random mask, so the algorithm stops and returns the estimated mask
which, in this case, perfectly matches the original.
In the case shown in Figure 4.7, the attack recovers exactly the random mask
used. However, due to the situation explained in Section 4.3.2.3, in some cases the
algorithm fails to correctly identify some sets. In order to evaluate such errors, we
calculated the distance between the mask estimated by the attack and the actual one,
measured as the number of incorrectly guessed sets divided by the total number of
sets to normalize the results. We repeated each experiment 10 times with randomly
generated masks for different Anagram configurations (i.e., varying the size of the
n-grams, the mask size, and the number of sets in each mask) and computed the
average distance between the recovered and the actual mask.
The number of packets to be used in the voting process depends on the desired
accuracy. Figure 4.8 shows the error obtained when varying the number of voting
packets for three different Anagram configurations. For the configurations used in
this chapter, it was experimentally determined that no significant error reduction is
achieved with more than 30-40 votes. For example, in the case of random masks of
128 bytes with 2 sets, only 15 packets would be enough to reveal the mask perfectly.
Accordingly, for a mask of 200 bytes and 4 sets, using 20 packets would reveal it
as well. Even in the case of a more complex configuration, such as the one with
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Figure 4.8: Decrease of the average distance between recovered and actual mask as the number of
voting packets increase.
a random mask of 256 bytes and 7 sets, 40 packets correctly recover 82% of the
mask (i.e. an error of 18%). As we discuss later, this percentage provides enough
information to accomplish an evasion attack against Anagram.
In summary, the expected error depends both on the number of sets and the
size of the random mask. Table 4.2 shows the experimental results for two different
attack configurations using 10 and 40 votes, respectively. Several conclusions can be
drawn:
• Binary masks are very easy to recover, no matter the size of the n-grams and,
to an extent, the number of voting packets.
• The attack’s probability of error increases with the number of sets and the
mask length. The size of the n-grams seems to have no significant influence.
• Error decreases as the number of voting packets increases. For example, while
in the case of 10 packets the average error falls between 0.08 and 0.68, it is
reduced to less than 0.07 when 40 packets are used.
An interesting property of our mask recovery process is that, even if it does not
estimate the mask exactly, an adversary can figure out approximately where the
delimiters of the mask are by just looking at the votes, as shown in Figure 4.9. This
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Table 4.2: Average distance between estimated and actual masks. Each row corresponds to a different
number of sets (K), while each column determines the mask length and the size N of the n-grams.
10 voting packets
N=5 N=6 N=7
Average
K 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256
2 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.13 0.08
3 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.40 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.51
4 0.39 0.51 0.62 0.70 0.37 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.42 0.56 0.57 0.70 0.56
5 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.71 0.53 0.70 0.63 0.69 0.48 0.60 0.62 0.70 0.62
6 0.53 0.64 0.63 0.75 0.56 0.68 0.64 0.71 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.64
7 0.61 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.55 0.65 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.68
40 voting packets
N=5 N=6 N=7
Average
K 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256 128 160 200 256
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.04
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.08
7 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.07
plot represents the number of votes obtained for a random mask of length 128 and 3
sets using 7-grams. The x-axis shows the mask positions, while the y-axis shows the
number of votes (i.e., packets indicating that there is a delimiter in this position).
Take for example position 74, which is an actual delimiter. The number of votes
after iterations 2 and 3 are not enough, as the final count does not reach half of the
votes, so the majority voting scheme does not determine that there is a delimiter
there. As a consequence, the algorithm fails and the remaining sets may or may not
be properly estimated. This limitation can be detected either by a graphical analysis
of the voting results or, alternatively, by adjusting the number of votes required to
achieve majority. This would allow the adversary to determine which zones of the
payload are very likely to contain no delimiters. Thus, even if the exact mask is not
recovered, this information may suffice to perform an evasion attack, as we later
illustrate in Section 4.4.4.
4.4.3 Efficiency of the Attack
In the previous section we have shown that the proposed attack succeeds in recovering
the random mask or, at least, gives enough information about its structure. However,
when trying to evade any security system, it is critical to do so spending as few
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Figure 4.9: Votes obtained when estimating the mask of 3 sets and 128 bytes length
computational resources as possible. Figure 4.10 shows the number of queries to
Anagram and the CPU time (in seconds) required by the algorithm for different
number of sets. In general, the time required by the attack directly depends on
the number of queries made to Anagram. In turn, the number of queries strongly
depends on Phase I of the attack, where a “nearly-anomalous” payload is obtained,
hence that the data range (size of each box) is relatively large. For example, using 40
voting packets, the attack requires between 40 seconds (for binary masks) and 120
seconds (for masks composed of 7 sets), with the average number of queries ranging
between 100 and 6000.
4.4.4 Exploiting Randomization to Evade Detection
Figure 4.6 shows that the anomaly score using randomized testing is typically larger
than using normal testing, both for attack-free and PBA payloads. This happens
because those payload bytes that are placed in positions around a mask delimiter
are partitioned and concatenated with other chunks of data. In this process, several
unseen n-grams may appear, even with bytes of normal data. Therefore, in order to
achieve a good detection rate while minimizing the false positive rate, the anomaly
threshold must be increased.
If an adversary is able to obtain the random mask being applied, then he can
use the randomized testing process to evade the system. As mentioned above, when
using randomization the threshold should be increased, thus tolerating the presence
of more malicious bytes in the payload. Such malicious bytes are supposed to be in
the positions of the mask delimiters, so an adversary can generate a packet where
the malicious content is placed exactly in these positions, padding the remaining
parts of the payload with normal bytes. Moreover, if the adversary suspects that
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Figure 4.10: Queries and CPU time required to estimate the random masks with different number of
sets.
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parts of the malicious payload appear in the bad-content model of Anagram, then
he can distribute this content around the delimiters too, in such a way that it will
be split and will no longer match this bad-content model.
Figure 4.11 exemplifies this idea with a simple instance of an XSS attack using
javascript. The attack actually just launches a pop-up window in the client side.
The first payload only contains the code needed to perform the attack. In the second
payload, padding is added to reduce the percentage of unseen n-grams. Assume that
“image/” is a string that appears in the normal model. In such a case, padding is
inserted as comments of the language (after the characters // and between /* and
*/).
The third payload in Figure 4.11 refers to the same attack, but is especially
crafted to evade detection by using the estimated mask. We assume that the string
“<script>” is in the bad-content model, as it is a frequent word in XSS attacks.
Therefore, when preparing the payload, this word should be placed around some
delimiter in order to have it split. Afterwards, the attacker places the desired amount
of padding bytes in proper places to benefit from the randomization process. Figure
4.12 shows an example of such a payload prepared for a random mask of 2 sets. It
can be seen that when using randomized testing, the word “<script>” will be divided
into the 5-gram “<scr*/” and tested as part of the set 1, and the 5-gram “ipt>/”,
tested as part of the set 0. Table 4.3 shows the anomaly scores obtained for each case.
For the original payload (first row), both anomaly scores (for normal and randomized
testing) are very large, which means that the payload is undoubtedly considered as an
anomaly. For the modified payload with normal padding (second row) the anomaly
score is 0.45, exceeding the threshold established and therefore being considered
anomalous again. However, when using randomized testing and preparing the rogue
payload with padding inserted in the proper positions (third row), the anomaly score
obtained is even lower than the one of the normal test. Moreover, as discussed in
Section 4.4.1, the anomaly threshold is higher when using randomization than when
using normal testing. In fact, in this case the anomaly threshold is 0.55, so the
attack payload will be classified as normal, and thus evasion would succeed. This
example illustrates that the randomized testing is a double-edged sword, since if the
adversary is able to guess the mask, then he can use it against the detection system.
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Figure 4.11: Examples of attack payloads used to evade Anagram.
Payload 1 is the original without padding. Payload 2 adds normal padding. Payload 3 is crafted to
evade Anagram once the random mask has been estimated.
Figure 4.12: Example of how an adversary can set up an attack using the estimated random mask to
evade Anagram.
Table 4.3: Anomaly scores obtained with the original payload, the payload with normal padding, and
the payload prepared to evade the system using the estimated random mask.
Normal testing Random testing
1) Original payload 1.50 2.00
2) Payload with padding 0.45 0.53
3) Payload with prepared padding 0.60 0.38
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have analyzed the strength of randomized Anagram against mask
recovery attacks. Even though the use of randomization certainly makes evasion
harder, we have shown that an adversary who manages to find out such a mask could
actually take advantage of the randomized detection process to evade Anagram,
thus turning a security measure into an undesirable feature. We have proposed and
evaluated a procedure to recover the secret mask by querying Anagram with carefully
constructed payloads and observing the results. Our attack is quite efficient in terms
of the number of queries employed, requiring no more than 2 minutes to recover the
mask in the worst scenario for the range of the suggested parameters. As discussed
above, we do not make any claims about the feasibility of the proposed attack in
real-world scenarios, as this strongly depends on the adversary having the ability to
interact with Anagram in the ways detailed in Section 4.3.1.
A possible countermeasure to the proposed attack is to randomize the choosing of
random mask itself. Thus, each analyzed packet should be tested against a different
random mask, possibly with different parameters too. While this would certainly
stop our attacks from being effective, we have not assessed the potential impact of
such a double randomization from the detection point of view.
While the attacks presented in this chapter are not directly applicable to other
randomized anomaly detectors, the underlying ideas are general and can be used to
reverse engineer other schemes based on similar constructions.
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5A Model for Intrusion Detection
Networks and Adversarial Attacks
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have discussed that hardening IDN nodes against evasion
attacks is not a straightforward task. A possible countermeasure to obscure the way
the detection is performed is the use of randomization mechanisms. However, these
mechanism have not been proven robust. Specifically, in Chapter 4 we detailed how
to successfully evade the randomization scheme proposed for defending Anagram
against adversaries. Indeed, we showed that, rather than improving its security,
randomization makes Anagram more vulnerable once the secret mask has been
guessed with a reverse engineering attack. The key problem behind randomization
techniques to defend IDN nodes is the need to make them compatible with an
accurate detection, which are somehow contradictory goals.
The difficulties found to properly defend the nodes of Intrusion Detection Net-
works against adversaries motivate our research to protect IDNs globally, assuming
the possibility of attacks against some nodes and devising ways of allocating coun-
termeasures optimally. In order to do so, it is essential to model IDNs and the
adversarial capabilities against them.
In this chapter, we address the problem of establishing an adversarial model for
Intrusion Detection Networks. In Chapter 2 we briefly reviewed the question in related
works, and showed the importance of understanding the adversarial capabilities in
order to implement proper countermeasures. Concretely, in this chapter we present
three main contributions:
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1. We provide a conceptual model for IDNs, viewed as a network of nodes
whose connections and roles determine the architecture of the network. We
present a system model that considers a node as a logical entity with four
functional modules and four information channels. Depending on the respon-
sibilities of the nodes, they may play different roles. We define these roles
in terms of the system model and describe various architectures in terms of
these roles. Accordingly, the proposed model focuses on the structure of IDNs
[Bye et al., 2010] and it does not depend on specific detection or correlation
functions implemented in the nodes.
2. We present an adversarial model for IDNs. The state of the art discussed
in Chapter 2 shows that most of the research on attacks against cyberdefense
systems focuses on independent entities, i.e., the IDN nodes. In this work,
we focus on adversarial capabilities that affect the communication between
nodes. Concretely, these capabilities are the well known basic threats in
network security: interception, blocking, fabrication, and modification. Then,
using these capabilities, we provide attack strategies that adversaries may use
depending on the objective of the attack.
3. We provide studies of the adversarial capabilities in two common
scenarios for IDNs. The first scenario is a Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET),
where several nodes are connected using wireless channels without relying on
any central management (all nodes must participate for the proper behavior of
the network). We provide examples of attacks against different IDNs proposed
in the literature to defend MANETs, which were presented in Chapter 2. The
second scenario is a Collaborative IDN (CIDN), where different corporations
share resources and information to detect distributed attacks. Concretely, we
propose a multi-step attack against one specific CIDN: the Distributed Security
Operation Center (DSOC) presented by Karim et al. in [Karim-Ganame et al.,
2008].
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents the
system model for nodes in IDNs. Then, Section 5.3 describes the adversarial model
proposed for IDNs, which consider single threats to communications. Section 5.4
provides conceptual attacks on two specific scenarios. Finally, we conclude the
chapter in Section 5.5.
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5.2 System model
Intrusion Detection Networks (IDNs) include a huge variety of approaches. On
the one hand, different entities located in different places and sharing information
through the Internet form a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network (CIDN)
[Karim-Ganame et al., 2008; Yegneswaran et al., 2004; Zhou et al., 2010]. On the
other hand, different wireless sensors monitoring a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET)
[Li et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2009] also constitute an IDN. Despite their differences
in processing and communication capabilities, both approaches detect distributed
intrusions by interconnecting detection nodes, and therefore share common functional
modules and information channels.
In this section, we define a conceptual model for nodes in an IDN. The main
purpose is to establish common building blocks and thus define common threats,
in order to define a generic adversarial model (which is provided in next section).
Accordingly, we first present a general, functional overview of these nodes in terms of
their logical components, functions, and channels. Then, we define the roles of these
nodes in the network architecture, according to their responsibilities. Finally, we
present the architectures proposed in the literature for IDNs in terms of the system
model and the roles presented.
Every node participating in an IDN contains some basic components, depicted in
Figure 5.1. We identify four channels of information and four functional modules.
Depending on the role of the node in the network, these components may be activated
or not, as we discuss later in section 5.2.3. Finally, nodes are connected to other
nodes to share information. Depending on how the nodes are connected and their
roles, the network may have different architectures.
5.2.1 Channels
We define a communication channel as any input or output interface used by a node
to receive or send information. We consider these channels logically, and do not
focus on the physical implementation of the channel. Nodes manage three different
types of messages:
1. Intrusion Detection Messages (IDMsg). It comprises any exchanged
message containing information related to the detection of attacks. The format
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Figure 5.1: Functional view of an IDN node.
of these messages vary for each IDN. For example, the nodes may implement
the IDMEF format [Gil-Pe´rez et al., 2013], which is an RFC standard [Debar
et al., 2007] that defines a format for IDS alerts.
2. Local Events (LE). This is the data monitored by sensors locally. It includes
both host data (system logs, audit trails, etc.) and network traffic (TCP
headers, HTTP payloads, connections, etc.).
3. Response Actions (RA). A response action is triggered whenever a intrusion
is detected. This includes activities such as logging alerts in a file, blocking IP
addresses or turning devices off, to name a few.
We define four possible channels for nodes, two input channels and two output
channels: the Input Intrusion Detection Messages (IIDM) to receive IDMsgs from
other IDN nodes; the Local Events (LE) channel, to gather data locally; the Output
Intrusion Detection Messages (OIDM), to send IDMsgs to other nodes in the IDN;
and the Response Actions (RA) channel, from which active responses are triggered.
5.2.2 Functions
Distributed IDN nodes communicate with other nodes to share IDMsgs which may
be relevant to detect or block distributed attacks. Every node may run up to four
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functions in the detection process. The inputs and outputs of these functions are
provided by the channels defined above:
1. Event Sharing Function (ESF). This function manages the communication
between nodes in the IDN. Its responsibility in the node is twofold. First, it
processes and formats incoming IDMsgs received through the IIDM channel,
and provides these data to the Distributed Detection Function (DDF). Second,
it processes and formats the output of the DDF and the Local Detection
Function (LDF) to send these messages to other nodes through the OIDM
channel.
2. Distributed Detection Function (DDF). It aggregates and correlates data
from both the LDF and the ESF. Then, the correlated data is sent to the
Response Function (RF) if some response is needed, or to the ESF in the case
that this data is being shared with other nodes.
3. Response Function (RF). The RF is activated whenever a response action
is needed. Among the activities involved in this function are updating blacklists
with suspicious IPs, sending remote commands to shut down compromised
systems, logging alerts, etc.
4. Local Detection Function (LDF). The LDF uses local data, which may
include both host and local network data, to perform local detection. As
in the case of the DDF, it may use any of the classical detection techniques
employed by IDS, like signature matching, anomaly detection, specification
based detection, etc. The output of this function is provided as an input to
the other three functions: to the RF if some response action is needed; to the
DDF to correlate and aggregate local detection with other IDMsgs; and to the
ESF to share the information with other nodes in the IDN.
5.2.3 Node Roles
We define six roles for IDN nodes, which are explained below. Based on these roles,
each node activates some or all of the channels and functions, as shown in Figure 5.2:
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(a) LD role (b) LDA role (c) PC role
(d) RC role (e) RCD role (f) DC role
Figure 5.2: Logical schemes of roles for IDN nodes
1. Local Detection (LD). The node detects intrusions based on local events only.
It gathers local data using the LDF, which includes both network traffic from
its LAN and host-based data. Because alerts are neither shared nor received
from other nodes, the RF must be enabled to generate the corresponding
response action whenever a local intrusion is observed. Figure 5.2-a) shows the
schematic view of this role. Classical IDS working independently, like Snort
[Roesch, 1999] or Bro [Paxson, 1999], have this role. In IDNs, there are no
nodes with this role, because they can neither send nor receive data from other
nodes. However, we include them in our study for the sake of completeness.
2. Local Detection and Alert Sharing (LDA). This is the most complex role
as it uses all the channels and runs all the functions, as shown in Figure 5.2-b).
Nodes perform detection using as input both the local events and the IDMsgs
received from other nodes. First, the LDF processes the local data, which are
then aggregated and correlated in the DDF with external IDMsgs, after being
processed by the ESF. Whenever an intrusion is detected, the RF generates
the corresponding response action. Moreover, nodes with this role must share
IDMsgs (using the OIDM channel and the ESF) with other nodes in the IDN.
3. Pure Correlation (PC). The node correlates IDMsgs received from other
nodes using its IIDM channel and the ESF. It then makes a decision using the
DDF and, if needed, generates a response through the RF. Nodes with this
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role do not use local data and thus the LE channel is inactive. Well-known
SIEM systems [Miller and Pearson, 2011] have this role. Figure 5.2-c) shows
the schematic view of this role.
4. Remote Correlation (RC). The nodes receives multiple IDMsgs from other
nodes through the IIDM channel and preprocesses them in the ESF. Then, it
aggregates and correlates them using the DDF, and share the aggregated data
and results from the correlation to other nodes through the OIDM channel. It
does not generate any response. Figure 5.2-d) shows the schematic view of this
role.
5. Remote Correlation and Detection (RCD). The node performs local
detection based on data gathered locally through the LE channel and the
IDMsgs received from other nodes through the IIDM channel. Then, it shares
the aggregated IDMsgs with other nodes using the OIDM channel, but it does
not generate responses (the role is similar to the LDA, but without emitting
responses). Figure 5.2-e) shows the schematic view of this role.
6. Data collection (DC). The node is in charge of gathering local events through
the LE channel. Then, it processes it with basic filters or routines in the LDF
and provides other nodes with the corresponding IDMsgs, using the ESF and
the OIDM channel. Figure 5.2-f) shows the schematic view of this role. For
example, in a wireless sensor network, different sensors gather data and send it
to a central sink for further processing. These sensors may have the DC role,
while the sink node would have the PC role.
5.2.4 Node Connections
The system model considers nodes regarding their corresponding functions and
channels. Nodes use the ESF, either for sending data (through the OIDM) to other
nodes or to receive data (through the IIDM) from other nodes. The nodes are thus
connected between them. This connection is unidirectional, i.e., if node Ai sends
data to node Aj, then the OIDM channel of Ai is directly connected to the IIDM
channel of Aj and the information flows in one direction, from Ai to Aj. In general,
we refer to the set of n nodes connected to one node Ai as Ci = {A1, . . . , Aj, . . . , An},
with j 6= i.
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When considering the information received externally, nodes may either believe
this information or they may question its correctness. Accordingly, many approaches
in the literature of IDNs propose the concept of trust in the information received by
one node [Gil-Pe´rez et al., 2014; Li et al., 2012]. In our system model, this trust is
represented by an influence factor which takes values between 0 and 1. Consequently,
each connection is weighted by this influence factor.
For each node, the sum of the influences received from the connected nodes must
add up to 1. Concretely, for each node Ai of the IDN, let Iij be the influence from
node Aj to node Ai, with j 6= i. Thus:
∑
∀Aj∈Ci
Iij = 1 (5.1)
5.2.5 IDN Architectures
In this section. we review the architectures defined for Intrusion Detection Networks
in the literature and analyze them in terms of the proposed system model. A rather
complete survey of such architectures can be found in [Zhou et al., 2010].
Centralized
In a centralized architecture, several nodes gather local information and perform
local detection. Detection results are sent to a central node. This central node
receives multiples IDMsgs, aggregates and correlates them, and performs distributed
detection. Figure 5.3 shows the scheme of a centralized architecture with six detection
nodes and a central correlation node. Each detection node has the DC role, as they
just gather local data, process these data (this may include any routine to obtain a
local view from different local sources of data) and send the data with the IDMsg
format (using the OIDM channel) to the central node, which has the PC role. This
central node, upon the reception of new IDMsgs (using the IIDM channel) performs
correlation and aggregation, and activates a response if needed.
Hierarchical
In a hierarchical architecture, the IDN is divided into levels. Nodes in each level
gather data received from lower levels or gathered locally, and send aggregated data
to the upper level for correlation. In the top level, a global node performs the final
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Figure 5.3: Centralized architecture of IDN.
correlation and emits responses if needed. Figure 5.4 shows a hierarchical architecture
with three levels. The lowest level is comprised of nodes with the DC role that locally
gather and process local events. They send these data in the IDMsgs format to some
node in the upper level of the hierarchy, who aggregates and correlates the received
IDMsgs. This node, may have the RC role, if it only uses external IDMsgs in the
correlation, or the role RCD, if it also includes local data. The correlated data is
sent to the upper level, if any, or it is used to emit responses if there are no more
levels. Thus, the highest level in the hierarchy contains a single node with the PC
role. The response module of PC nodes should command response actions to the
lower level nodes through IDMsgs. Thus, the detection events are propagated in a
bottom-up design, while the the responses are emitted in a top-down design.
Distributed
Figure 5.5 shows a distributed architecture with five nodes. All nodes have
an LDA role. The detection process in the nodes combines local and distributed
detection, as it uses both data gathered locally and IDMsgs received from other nodes.
Thus, unlike other architectures, in the distributed architecture there are no critical,
central nodes with higher responsibilities and all nodes are equally responsible of
the cyberdefense. However, because of the large number of connections, attacks to a
single node are rapidly propagated to the entire IDN.
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Figure 5.4: Hierarchical architecture of IDN.
Figure 5.5: Fully-distributed architecture of IDN.
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5.3 Adversarial Model
An adversarial model defines the capabilities assumed for an adversary. Though the
attack scenario is application-specific and may differ from one IDN to another, it is
possible to establish general guidelines to define the adversarial model [Biggio et al.,
2013]. Indeed, the abstraction provided by the system model presented above allows
us to specify an adversarial model. This section describes the capabilities, in terms
of the system model defined in the previous section.
There are two different types of adversaries: external and internal attackers. On
the one hand, external adversaries have control of the channels and communications
between nodes but are not part of the IDN. Thus, if security protocols are used to
provide confidentiality and integrity mechanisms, they may not be able to inject or
intercept packets. On the other hand, internal attackers are adversaries who have
gained access and have control of, at least, one node within the IDN. They may
possess cryptographic keys (if any).
Defending the network from external adversaries can be done using traditional
security mechanisms, such as cryptographic protocols and Public Key Infrastructure
[Fung, 2011] (PKI) . However, these techniques cannot be afforded in many scenarios.
For example, in the Internet the use of a PKI between peers from different institutions
may entail administrative conflicts. Actually, when one node receives external
information (IDMsgs), it usually cannot determine whether the information is real
or it has been forged by the source (i.e., an internal attacker) or manipulated during
the communication through the network (by an external attacker). Knowing how
much trust can be placed in the received information is one of the key challenges in
the design of IDNs [Gil-Pe´rez et al., 2014]. In the model presented above, this trust
is modelled with the use of influence values in the connections between nodes.
In this section, we first describe four basic types of intrusive actions against
networks: blocking, modification, interception, and fabrication [Chen et al., 2013].
Then, we provide a description of attack strategies considering the system model
presented in Section 5.2.
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5.3.1 Basic Intrusive Actions
Nodes in an IDN send and receive data using communication channels, as presented
in Section 5.2. The communication consists of the exchange of packets of information
using some network protocol and the specific format of the IDMsg. Accordingly, we
consider that adversaries in IDNs may perform any of the following intrusive actions:
1. Interception. This is a passive attack which compromises the confidentiality
of the information. The adversary eavesdrop the contents of the messages
transmitted in the channels. For example, a malicious node in a MANET which
promiscuously monitors its neighbors, performs interception. This attack is
hard to detect, but can be counteracted by cryptographic techniques.
2. Fabrication. Fabrication attacks compromise the authenticity of the data.
The adversary generates fake data and sends it to the victim. For example,
using spoofed addresses, the attacker may fabricate packets that match the
signatures of an IDS in order to overstimulate it [Mutz et al., 2003].
3. Modification. This attack targets the integrity of the data. The adversary
intercepts data, modify its content and forwards it to the actual destination.
For example, the adversary may modify the content of an attack to evade the
signatures matching process from IDSs [Wagner and Soto, 2002].
4. Blocking. This attack targets the integrity and availability of the data.
The adversary interrupts the communication or makes it unavailable. Packet
Dropping attacks [Li et al., 2012] in MANETs are an example of blocking attacks,
where a malicious node drops packets that are supposed to be forwarded.
In the following, we refer to these attacks as intrusive actions, in order to
distinguish them from more sophisticated attacks, which are described in the next
section.
5.3.2 Attack Taxonomy Against IDNs
In this section, we classify the attacks against IDNs in terms of the four functions,
four channels, and four intrusive actions presented above. For each function, we
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differentiate attacks according to the classification of adversarial attacks against IDS
in wired networks proposed by Corona et al. [Corona et al., 2013]. This taxonomy
classifies the attacks depending on the adversarial goal (see Chapter 2 for further
details). Next we categorize them considering the intrusive actions explained above.
Later, in Section 5.4, we apply this taxonomy to different example scenarios.
• Evasion. The adversary causes the node to misbehave and stealthily attacks
the IDN. It only affects detection functions, i.e., the LDF and DDF, as the
objective is to force the actual detection to malfunction. This can be done by
means of one of these three intrusive actions:
1. Blocking. In some approaches, the detection process starts when some
suspicious packet or message is received, like anomalous routing data in
MANETs [Su, 2011]. The attacker may perform the attack blocking these
packets in the IDN node to avoid detection.
2. Modification. The attacker carefully modifies the data to hide the intrusion
evidence the IDN node is looking for. This way, the adversary can avoid
signature matching [Vigna et al., 2004], or it can mimic the statistical
properties of a normal model [Fogla and Lee, 2006].
3. Fabrication. The IDN node may be waiting for specific IDMsgs or packets
to see whether a node is correctly forwarding packets or not. In such a
case, the adversary can generate this packet specifically for the IDN node.
• Overstimulation. A set of well-crafted packets are sent to the node to make
it trigger a huge amount of responses. Because the objective is to stimulate the
system to make it impractical, it can be applied to every function of the nodes.
Overstimulation is always performed using fabrication, namely, the adversary
should generate some specific packet that provokes the node reaction. For
example, by fabricating packets that match the signatures of the targeted node
[Mutz et al., 2003], the adversary can overwhelm security analysts or overload
the IDS resources.
• Poisoning. The adversary looks for nodes that update their detection function
in real time with new data. The goal is to inject some noise forcing the detection
function to learn wrong patterns. Similarly to the evasion goal, this objective
is only applicable to the LDF and DDF. Since the objective of the adversary is
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to inject specific information in the node, it needs modification (of data sent
by other nodes in the IDN) or fabrication (of new data) attacks. For example,
two colluding nodes can report good behavior from each other. This way, their
reputation in other IDN nodes would be increased.
• Denial of Service. The adversary overloads the resources of the nodes to
attack their availability. It may affect the LDF, DDF and ESF, which are the
functions receiving external data. To force those functions to stop working, the
adversary may either flood them to overload its resources, using fabrication,
or it can block traffic to prevent the node from receiving the required data to
work.
• Response Hijacking. The adversary sends selected intrusive data to the
node, forcing it to generate a specific response. The responses in the nodes are
generated in the RF, so this is the only function affected by these attacks. To
provoke a specific response in the node, the adversary has to use one of the
following techniques:
1. Blocking. As explained above with the evasion, the IDN node may be
waiting for specific IDMsgs or packets to confirm that a peer is not
malicious. If the adversary blocks this critical data sent by a third peer,
the node may erroneously believe that this third peer is malicious.
2. Modification. The adversary may modify reports or IDMsgs to indicate
that a third node is malicious.
3. Fabrication. As with the modification, the adversary can generate false
reports about a third node to force the detector to trigger an erroneous
response.
• Reverse Engineering. The adversary gains information about the behavior
of the node (architecture, detection function, set of measurements, etc.). It
is applicable to every function in the nodes. This could be done using the
same techniques employed for an overstimulation attack, but in addition the
node must intercept traffic to monitor both the inputs and outputs to the node
and make the analysis. A paradigmatic reverse engineering attack in IDNs
occurs when the adversary performs traffic analysis of the network in order
to locate IDN nodes and responsibilities (for example, to know which nodes
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are performing correlation in a hierarchical architecture). Additionally, the
attack presented in Chapter 4 shows a query response analysis that allows the
adversary to infer secret information used internally by nodes [Pastrana et al.,
2014].
In our analysis, we define an Attack Strategy (AS) as a set of techniques that
the adversary may use to reach a specific objective. We identify seven different AS:
• AS-1. B ∨ M ∨ F (Blocking or Modify or Fabricate).
• AS-2. F (Fabricate).
• AS-3. M ∨ F (Modify or Fabricate).
• AS-4. (M ∨ F) ∧ I (Modify or Fabricate and Intercept).
• AS-5. I (Intercept).
• AS-6. B ∨ F (Blocking or Fabricate).
• AS-7. B (Blocking).
Table 5.1 shows which AS should be applied on each channel to target each
function. It is important to observe in Figure 5.1 the relationships between functions
and channels. For example, for a node with the role LDA, which performs both local
and distributed detection, the output of the LDF is given as input to the remaining
functions. Thus, attacks targeted against the LDF will affect the other functions as
well.
5.4 Attack Scenarios
In Section 5.3 we have proposed a taxonomy of attacks against generic IDNs, indicat-
ing for each attack which intrusive actions the adversary can use in each channel. In
this section, we provide specific examples of how these attacks could be implemented
in two different scenarios: a MANET and a cooperative IDN. In the following, the
term attack refers to malicious activity against the IDN, and the term intrusion to
attacks detected by the IDN (e.g., black hole, packet dropping, etc.).
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Table 5.1: Taxonomy of attacks. The table shows which attack strategy (AS) should be performed on
each channel (LE, IIDM, OIDM and RA) to target each of the functions (LDF, DDF, ESF and RF),
depending on the adversarial goal.
4 functions Objective [Corona et al., 2013]
4 Channels
LE IIDM OIDM RA
LDF
Evasion AS-1 – – –
Overstimulation AS-2 – – –
Poisoning AS-3 – – –
Denial of Service AS-6 – – –
Reverse Engineering AS-4 – AS-5 AS-5
DDF
Evasion AS-1 AS-1 – –
Overstimulation AS-2 AS-2 – –
Poisoning AS-3 AS-3 – –
Denial of Service AS-6 AS-6 – –
Reverse Engineering AS-4 AS-4 AS-5 AS-5
ESF
Overstimulation AS-2 AS-2 AS-3 –
Denial of Service AS-6 AS-6 AS-7 –
Reverse Engineering AS-3 AS-3 AS-5 –
RF
Overstimulation AS-2 AS-2 – AS-2
Reverse Engineering AS-4 AS-4 – AS-5
Response Hijacking AS-1 AS-1 – AS-1
5.4.1 Scenario 1: IDNs in MANET
In MANETs, the detection is distributed among different nodes in the IDN. In this
section, we first present the technical capabilities assumed for the adversary as well
as some notation used to explain the attacks. Next, using these technical capabilities,
we present methods to perform each of the four intrusive actions against the channels
presented above. Finally, we present specific attacks targeted against IDNs proposed
in the literature for MANETs.
5.4.1.1 Technical Assumptions and Notation
Nodes in MANETs use an antenna that emits radio waves to transmit data in
the wireless medium. Data is usually sent uniformly in all directions with an
omnidirectional antenna. A sender node has a transmission range that depends on
the power of the signal and the noise in the channel. Once the data is transmitted,
every node located within the transmission range of the sender is able to receive it.
We assume that the adversary is able to send information in one preferred
direction and with a specific, chosen transmission range. As done in [Johnston and
Narula-Tam, 2012], we consider that a node knows exactly the position of every node
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within its transmission range, and thus it can choose the receivers of the packets
transmitted. We present two techniques an adversary can use for this purpose:
1. Using a directional antenna [Takai et al., 2002]. A directional antenna emits
radio waves just in one direction. For example, nodes can use a metallic panel
oriented to reflect all the radio waves to the desired destination. This situation
is shown in Figure 5.6.
2. Controlling the signal power. The adversary can modify the signal power to
cover a specific transmission range. For example, if two nodes A and B are
at distance DA and DB from M , respectively, with DA ≤ DB, the adversary
may set the communication range of M to a value C such that DA ≤ C ≤ DB.
This way, the information sent from M will arrive at A but not at B. This
situation is shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.6: Unidirectional antenna in node M .
Figure 5.7: Transmission control by node M .
Values DA and DB are, respectively, the distances from A and B to M , and C is the communication
range of M .
According to the assumptions made above, nodes are able to either send data in
every direction of the antenna (SEND) or just in one direction (directional send,
DSEND), with a specific transmission range. They are also able to receive data
specifically sent to them or to promiscuously monitor data in the neighborhood. We
next describe the notation used:
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• SEND(A,B, P ). Node A sends the packet P to node B. P arrives to every
node within the transmission range of A.
• DSEND(A,B, P ). Node A sends the packet P only in the direction of node B,
within a specific transmission range. Neighbors located in any other direction
or within a distance farther than B do not receive P .
• RCV (A,B, P ). Node A receives the packet P from node B.
• MONITOR(A,B,C, P ). Node A monitors the packet P , sent from node B
to node C.
• COLLISION(B,P1, P2). There is a collision in node B because of the si-
multaneous reception of packets P1 and P2. A collision occurs when a node
receives a signal from different sources in the same channel. This situation
is shown in Figure 5.8. Node B receives at the same time the packets sent
from nodes C and A. In this case, B is not able to process and obtain the
information received. In the absence of adversaries all nodes are cooperative,
and whenever a collision is detected, the sender node sends the data again.
However, this assumption is no longer valid in the presence of adversaries that
provoke collisions.
5.4.1.2 Intrusive Actions in MANETs
In this subsection, we describe how general attack techniques are performed in
MANETs according to the channels affected.
Interception
Due to the mobility of nodes in a MANET, a malicious node M can be placed
in the middle of two nodes A and B. Because data is transmitted over a wireless
medium, M can easily intercept the communication by monitoring the traffic between
A and B. Cryptography is not typically used in MANETs due to resource constraints.
Interception is hard to detect, because it is passive and malicious nodes behave
according to the routing protocol. Therefore, the adversary can monitor both the
input channels (LE and IIDM) and output channels (OIDM and RA) of the nodes.
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(a) Graph view of the network.
(b) Slot-time diagram. Each line corresponds to the medium view of the nodes.
Figure 5.8: Example of a collision.
In time T1, node A sends P1 to B, and in time T2 node C sends packet P2 to B. If T2 − T1 ≤ TP ,
TP being the time spent for a the packet P1 to reach B from A, then a collision is produced.
Fabrication
A fabrication attack occurs when the adversary generates data that in normal
conditions would not exist. A common technique for such a purpose is to perform
spoofing attacks, where the adversary counterfeits the source address when sending
data to its victim. Typically, authentication is used to counteract against spoofing.
However, in MANETs there are further methods to perform fabrication. Let us
suppose that a malicious node M sends a packet P directly to a victim node V ,
i.e., DSEND(M,V, P ), using one of the techniques explained in Section 5.4.1.1. If
the packet P has a destination address different from V (for instance, C), and V
monitors the packet, i.e., MONITOR(V,M,C, P ), V would think that the packet
is being sent to C.
Even if M does not have a directional antenna, it can prevent node C from
receiving P by interrupting its own packet after sending it, as we explain below
for the blocking case. This is a case of fabrication in the input channels of V (LE
and IIDM). Moreover, if the ESF is active in the victim node, the fabrication of
well-crafted LE and IIDM will induce the node to fabricate the corresponding OIDM
and RA. We call this a cross-channel fabrication.
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Modification
To perform a modification attack, the adversary first needs to intercept the
communication. Afterwards, the adversary modifies the content of the intercepted
data and forwards it to the actual destination. Again, defending the IDN nodes from
these actions is done using cryptographic mechanisms. However, these mechanisms
are often unsuitable because they consume resources. The channel affected by the
attack depends on the data being modified. For example, if the adversary modifies a
report of good behavior, it is targeting the IIDM channel. Similarly, if the adversary
modifies the sequence number of a routing packet, it is targeting the LE channel of
the victim.
Blocking
Blocking occurs when the adversary interrupts the information sent to its victim
by any other node. The simplest way to implement a blocking attack in MANETs is
by dropping packets. There are several approaches to detect packet dropping attacks
[Djenouri et al., 2007], and thus the adversary should stealthy perform this attack.
In Section 5.4, we present some evasion attacks for this purpose.
A more sophisticated way to perform blocking is to provoke collisions in the
victim node C. If C is receiving the packet P from other node, a malicious node M
may send a second packet P ′ and provoke a collision, i.e., COLLISION(C,P, P ′).
The overall effect is a blocking of packets sent by a third node to the victim C. In
some cases, the malicious node M may want to block its own packets in the victim
C. In this case, M can wait until it monitors a third node sending a packet to C.
Once it observes that the channel is busy, M starts sending the information. This
situation is shown in Figure 5.9 and described in Algorithm 1. As mentioned above,
this entails a fabrication in A, because M induces A to monitor the packet P while
it is not actually reaching C. In the next section we use these methods to describe
evasion attacks for the packet dropping scenario.
5.4.1.3 Attacks on MANETs
IDNs in MANETs provide security against a large variety of attacks [Xenakis et al.,
2011], reporting good results in terms of efficacy and performance. However, they
have been designed to defend against an adversary interested in the assets of the
MANET, while not taking into account the possibility of being attacked themselves.
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In this section, we provide examples of attacks against IDNs using the actions
presented in Section 5.4.1.2.
Evasion
An evasion attack succeeds when a IDN node is not able to detect a misbehaving
node. As shown in Table 5.1, evasion is possible in the LDF and DDF using the
Attack Strategy 1 (AS-1), in which the adversary should either block, modify, or
fabricate data in the LE and IIDM channels of the nodes. Next, we provide examples
of evasion against some of the state of the art proposals for IDNs in MANETs
presented in Chapter 2:
1. [Marti et al., 2000]. Suppose that an IDN node A is monitoring a malicious
node M to detect whether it forwards a packet P to a third node C or not
(Watchdog). To evade detection, the adversary has two options:
• Blocking packet P in C. The malicious node M causes a collision of
packet P in the receiver node C, just by waiting for a third node B to
use the wireless channel, as represented in Figure 5.9 and described in
Algorithm 1. We call this attack receiver collision(M,A,C,P). The victim
node A actually monitors the packet P being sent from node B to node C.
However, due to the collision, the packet P never reaches the destination
(node C), so it can be considered that M fabricates the packet P to A.
• Fabrication. M can send the packet P in such a way that it reaches A
but not C, i.e., DSEND(M,A, P ). This way, A would believe that P is
forwarded from M to C, i.e., MONITOR(A,M,C, P ), while packet P is
actually not reaching C.
2. [Kurosawa et al., 2007]. In this work, an IDN node looks for either an anomalous
number of route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP) packets sent or
anomalous Sequence Numbers (SN) in these packets. Evasion can be done
using some of the following techniques:
• Blocking. If the adversary blocks RREQ and RREP packets sent to the
victim nodes, then the number of packets observed by the IDN nodes
would be lower than the actual number of packets sent by the adversary.
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Algorithm 1 receiver collision(M,A,C, P )
M → The malicious node
A→ Node running an IDN node to monitor M
C → The victim node (receiver)
P → Packet routed from A to C (must be forwarded by M)
T1 : SEND(A,M,P )
T2 : RCV (M,A, P )
[M waits...]
T3 : SEND(B,C, P
′)
T4 : SEND(M,C, P )
T5 : COLLISION(C,P, P
′)→ RCV (C,M,P ) +RCV (C,B, P ′)
T6 : MONITOR(A,M,C, P )
(a) Graph view. A dotted line represent that a node is monitoring the
communication and solid lines represent actual communications between nodes
(b) Slot-time diagram. Each line corresponds with the medium view of the nodes.
Figure 5.9: Receiver collision
• Modification. The adversary may change the SN in such a way that it
does not exceed the anomaly threshold. This requires that the adversary
knows such a threshold, which can be obtaining using a reverse engineering
attack.
3. [Su, 2011]. In this approach, the detection process of node A starts when it
monitors a RREP packet from a monitored node B. Then, A checks whether
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B has previously forwarded the corresponding RREQ, checking the sequence
number and source IP of the packet stored in a table. If the check fails, A
considers B as malicious. Therefore, an adversary in B can perform evasion
using the following techniques:
• Blocking. Interrupting RREP in node A to prevent the process from
starting.
• Modification. Varying the SN to modify the internal table and thus avoid
detection. This is actually a poisoning attack because the detection data
is specifically modified, as we explain below. However, if the poisoning is
repeated for a while, then it may turn into an evasion.
• Fabrication. Generating RREQ packets in the node A in order to insert
an RREQ packet with a SN that the adversary uses in a posterior RREP
when performing a black hole attack. This way, when node A monitors
this RREP packet, it may check its table and it will see a corresponding
RREQ with the same SN.
4. [Huang and Lee, 2003]. The authors propose a hierarchical approach where the
network is divided into clusters. Each cluster head aggregates data received
from nodes within its cluster and correlates it with data received from other
cluster heads. First, it performs anomaly detection and, if anomalies are
detected, a second rule-based process identifies the attack and the malicious
nodes. If the adversary is able to evade the anomaly detection phase, it may
not be detected. The evasion attack targets the IIDM channel of the cluster
heads. Accordingly, it is needed a preliminary reverse engineering attack to
identify which nodes act as cluster heads.
• Blocking. By continuously interrupting the data sent to the cluster head,
the adversary can isolate it and thus it may not be able to perform
correlation.
• Fabrication. If the adversary has compromised a cluster head, it can use
it to inject false information to other cluster heads. This is a poisoning
attack that can be used for evasion purposes.
• Modification. In a scenario where a malicious node has been detected by
a cluster head, the adversary can modify the corresponding IDMsg sent to
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others cluster heads and remove its malicious behavior from the reports.
5. [Zhang et al., 2009]. The authors propose a fully distributed architecture where
IDN nodes share data to detect black hole intrusions. In their paper, authors
state that collaboration between IDN nodes can detect intrusions even in the
presence of various colluding malicious nodes.
• Blocking. The adversary must interrupt the IDMsgs exchanged between
IDN nodes. The authors assume that nodes cannot use a directional
antenna and they all have the same transmission power, which is not a
realistic assumption. However, even with these assumptions, the adversary
is able to evade this scheme with two colluding nodes by provoking colli-
sions deliberately. Normally, when a malicious node sends a forged SREP
to the IDN node (victim), a collaborative node within the neighborhood
notices that the SREP has been changed, because it monitors both the
original and the forged SREPs. As shown in Figure 5.10, the adversary
can produce a collision using two colluding malicious nodes by means of a
new packet which performs the blocking attack (collision). First, in the
precise moment that M2 sends the original SREP, M1 sends a packet to
A to provoke the collision (represented with a red arrow in Figure 5.10a).
Then, when A receives the forged SREP from M2 (Figure 5.10b), it is
not able to compare both SREP numbers and will not notice the change.
• Fabrication. If we do not consider the assumptions from [Zhang et al.,
2009], M1 can use a DSEND to prevent A from monitoring the forged
SREP.
Overstimulation
The goal in an overstimulation attack is to induce the victim to initiate response
actions (RA). The adversary may use a malicious node to perform fabrication against
the IDN node, and induce it to generate responses. Then, it can use these responses
in a variety of ways. For example, the adversary can intercept the responses and
infer the anomaly thresholds used by means of a reverse engineering attack.
By overstimulating a victim node, the adversary can force it to modify the
packet routes with some purpose. In some schemes detecting packet dropping, like
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Figure 5.10: Modification of the scheme of [Zhang et al., 2009] to cause a collision and evade the
cooperative detection.
Pathrater, explained in [Marti et al., 2000], or Modified AODV (MAODV), from
[Su, 2011], the response action consists of modifying the routing protocol to avoid
routes containing malicious nodes. An adversary can get information about the IDN
topology and architecture using a preliminary reverse engineering attack. Then,
she can overstimulate the victim node provoking that certain routes are modified,
as shown in Figure 5.11. In this figure, node M overstimulates A to avoid the
optimal route (represented in dashed line), because it includes node M which is
blocked. Thus, in order to communicate with C, node A uses the alternative path
B1 → B2 → B3 → C. The benefits for the adversary depend on its goal. For example,
it will increase the overall bandwidth of the network or force a specific node in the
MANET to process extra packets, thus causing a DoS against it (like B1 in Figure
5.11), as we explain later.
Figure 5.11: Overstimulation attack to make a route selection.
IDN node A is overstimulated to avoid the optimal route (represented in dashed line), because it
includes node M , which is blocked.
If the overstimulation is applied to the LDF, then it just affects a single node. In
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cooperative architectures, IDMsgs are exchanged between nodes through the network,
which increments the communication overhead of the network. The adversary can
exploit this using fabrication and overstimulate the ESF of a single node. Because
the propagation of information in IDNs, the effect would spread over the entire
network. Figure 5.12 shows this situation. Nodes with a double circle represent IDN
nodes, and M is the malicious node performing the overstimulation attack. The
overstimulation of the node in the left by M provokes an IDMsg to be shared with
other IDN nodes in the network. If this situation is continuously repeated, then the
network may become overloaded.
Figure 5.12: Distributed overstimulation attack.
The overstimulation of the node in the left by M provokes an IDMsg to be shared with other nodes in
the network.
Poisoning
Poisoning attacks comprise any action produced by the adversary to intentionally
modify the detection function or the data used in the detection. In MANETs, IDN
nodes store information monitored from nodes in its neighborhoods, like the local view
of neighbors and scores of good behaviors [Li et al., 2012]; or the number of RREQ
and RREP monitored [Kurosawa et al., 2007]. This information is modified according
to the activity monitored in the LE channel and the information received from other
nodes by the IIDM channel. An adversary can use fabrication to inject noise into the
IDN node, forcing it to store specific, well-crafted information. Afterwards, it can
take advantage of this and perform a more severe attack. For example, as explained
in Section 5.4.1.3, in the work of Su et al. [Su, 2011] the fabrication of RREQ packets
or the modification of sequence numbers allows the adversary to inject noise in the
nodes and subsequently evade the detection of black hole intrusions when sending
the corresponding RREP packet. In cooperative schemes, where IDN nodes exchange
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information about malicious nodes, the adversary may fabricate false reports or
modify reports from other nodes. For example, in the scheme of Zhang et al. [Zhang
et al., 2009], the adversary can fabricate IDMsgs declaring bad behavior of a benign
node, thus decreasing its reputation value. Moreover, a more powerful adversary
controlling two or more nodes can collude to talk well about each other.
Poisoning attacks are also useful in adaptive approaches where the detection
adapts to the activity of the network. For example, in the approach of Kurosawa et
al. [Kurosawa et al., 2007], IDN nodes periodically recalculate the model of normal
behavior. This model of normality is the average of the normal events recorded
during a previous period, considering “normal” any activity that is measured below
a given threshold. The adversary can fabricate packets with high anomaly score but
which are below the threshold (again, a preliminary reverse engineering is needed to
know which the threshold is). By doing so, the threshold will be increased in the
next update. Therefore, step by step the adversary is able to smoothly increase the
accepted level of anomaly values.
Denial of Service
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack prevents the victim node from performing
detection. In MANETs it is straightforward to perform a DoS attack by forcing the
IDN node to consume its battery power. For instance, by continuously performing
fabrication against the victim, the adversary causes this node to consume its battery
power or resources (flooding attacks [Yi et al., 2006]). Moreover, due to cooperation
and routing in MANETs, it is not necessary that the adversary itself sends the data
to overload the IDN node. For example, the adversary can use an overstimulation
attack to redirect several routes to a victim IDN node, forcing this node to process
more packets (see Figure 5.11).
Additionally, some approaches use internal data structures to track the monitored
data. A DoS occurs if the adversary is able to overload these structures. For example,
in [Su, 2011], IDN nodes use a table with the monitored RREQ and RREP packets
from each neighbor. Each time that a new tuple [src node, dst node, sequence number]
is observed, a new entry in the table is added. The adversary can continuously
fabricate packets with different sequence numbers to fill it up and overload this table.
Another specific DoS occurs in a packet dropping detection if the adversary
interferes with an IDN node monitoring a nodeB. Let us consider thatA is monitoring
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B to watch whether it forwards packets appropriately. If a malicious node M
continuously interrupts packets in A that B is actually forwarding, the node A cannot
determine whether B forwarded the packet or not. A monitor collision(M,A,B, P )
attack is shown in Figure 5.13 and described in Algorithm 2. In time T3, node
B sends the packet P to node C, which actually receives the packet in time T7.
However, due to the collision provoked by M in time T6, A is not able to monitor
this communication and thus cannot determine whether B forwarded the packet or
not.
Algorithm 2 monitor collision(M,A,B, P )
M → Malicious node.
A→ Victim node; it runs an IDN node to monitor B.
B → Monitored node.
P → Packet sent from A to B to be forwarded to C.
P ′ → Packet fabricated by M to provoke a collision in A.
T1 : SEND(A,B, P )
T2 : RCV (B,A, P )
T3 : SEND(B,C, P )
T4 : MONITOR(M,B,C, P )
T5 : DSEND(M,A, P
′)
T6 : COLLISION(A,P, P
′)→ RCV (A,M,P ′) +MONITOR(A,B,C, P )
T7 : RCV (C,B, P )
(a) Graph view. A dotted line represents a node is monitoring the corresponding
communication and solid lines represent actual communications between nodes.
(b) Slot-time diagram. Each row corresponds to a node channel view.
Figure 5.13: Monitor collision attack.
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The adversary can cause a DoS attack to the ESF by continuously blocking IDMsgs
destined to the victim node. Thus, the victim is isolated from the network, as shown
in Figure 5.14. If the isolated IDN node requires some IDMsg acknowledgement
to detect any of the malicious nodes (M), it would never receive such an IDMsg.
Another DoS against IDN nodes occurs if the adversary overloads the IDN through
an overstimulation attack, as explained above. In this case, the entire MANET would
suffer from a DoS, and no IDMsgs could be shared.
Figure 5.14: Denial of Service attack by means of isolation.
Response Hijacking
In a response hijacking attack, the adversary induces the RF of the IDN nodes
to generate false response actions which may affect itself or a third victim node.
The severity of this attack depends on the type of response action performed by
the IDN node. A malicious node can block packets and prevent the IDN node from
monitoring some required information. For instance, if packet dropping detection
is performed by A in the scenario shown in Figure 5.13, node A monitors node B
to see whether it forwards the packet P to C. Node M can block the packet P to
prevent A from observing the packet forwarded by B. As explained above, A is
victim of a DoS. However, after sending several packets and waiting for B to forward
them, node A may decide that B has dropped all the packets and thus consider
it malicious. In such a case the DoS attack turns into a response hijacking attack.
Similarly, in the black hole detection scheme presented in [Su, 2011], the attacker
may block RREQ packets in A each time that a benign node (say, B) forwards these
RREQ packets. Due to the working procedure of [Su, 2011], when B forwards an
RREP packet, A does not notice any RREQ previously forwarded by B (due to the
blocking action), and therefore the intrusion score of B would be increased. This is a
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case of poisoning attack, because only the reputation score in the table is increased.
However, when this score exceeds a threshold, node B would be considered malicious,
and an erroneous response would trigger a response hijacking attack.
When IDN nodes share IDMsgs containing reports of bad behavior, like in [Zhang
et al., 2009], the adversary can poison the view of an IDN node by continuously
fabricating false IDMsg packets about a benign node (victim). After the fabrication
of several fake reports, the IDN node may classify the victim node as malicious.
Reverse Engineering
A reverse engineering attack allows the adversary to gather information about
the detection procedure or architecture used by the IDN in the MANET. We identify
two possibilities:
1. Localization of the dominating set. Using traffic analysis attacks, the adversary
can discover the roles and localization of IDN nodes. This is rather useful
information to perform more serious attacks.
2. Interception. In MANETs, detection is performed by monitoring suspicious
activity from other nodes. Thus, it is quite difficult to detect intruders that
apparently behave according to the routing protocol, but are actually performing
passive attacks. This gives advantage to an adversary to mislead the IDN.
By promiscuously monitoring IDN nodes, the adversary can perform a query-
response analysis to obtain information about the internal detection function.
This way, the adversary may be able to find out the thresholds used in the
detection process or the role and responsibilities of the nodes in the IDN.
Moreover, due to cooperative nature of the IDN, each time an IDN node
observes a malicious behavior, it may fabricate IDMsgs to inform other IDN
nodes. Therefore, it is easy for an adversary to query the node and force it to
output alerts. Then, using interception, the adversary can obtain the responses,
analyze them, and gain information about the detection process. Indeed, in
Chapters 3 and 4 we have presented two reverse engineering attacks against
IDS that exploit this technique.
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5.4.2 Scenario 2: Distributed Security Operation Center
(DSOC)
In this scenario we provide two ways to attack a cooperative IDN, namely DSOC,
presented by Karim et al. in [Karim-Ganame et al., 2008]. DSOC is a hierarchical
approach composed of different node roles. In the lower level, nodes called CBoxes
are responsible of gathering local data from local systems and networks in a specific
site, which can be either a LAN, a WAN, or a big corporate network geographically
distributed. These CBoxes format the data according to some standard (correspond-
ing to the IDMsg in our system model) and send it to a Local Intrusion Database
(LIDB), located in the same site. In each site, an LA node reads the logs from the
LIDB and performs correlation, sending the alerts to a Global Intrusion Database
(GIDB) located in a different site (using a SSL tunnel). Finally, a Global Analyzer
(GA) analyzes alerts from the GIDB, correlates them, and performs distributed
detection. There are also special CBoxes that gather data from critical sensors. The
special CBoxes send their data to a Local Analyzer (LA) situated in a different site,
using an SSL tunnel through the Internet. These Cboxes are called Remote Cboxes
(R-Cbox).
Next, we explain how the DSOC architecture fits within the system model
presented in Section 5.2. The Cboxes have the role of Data Collection (DC). They
only use the LE channel to gather local information and the OIDM channel to
transmit the data to the LIDB. LA nodes have the role of Remote Correlation (RC),
which takes logs from the LIDB using the IIDM channel, performs correlation, and
send alerts to the GA using the OIDM channel. Additionally, if a system runs both
an LA node and a CBox node, its role would be Remote Correlation and Detection
(RCD). Finally, the GA node has the role of Pure Correlation (PC), since it only
retrieves data from the GIDB (through the IIDM channel), performs distributed
detection, and generates responses through the RA channel. It can be observed
that the architecture of DSOC [Karim-Ganame et al., 2008] matches perfectly with
our representation of a hierarchical architecture shown in Figure 5.4. In DSOC,
the communications between the middle and top layers are encrypted, as well as
some of the communications from the lower to the middle layers (i.e., the ones that
correspond to R-CBoxes). Accordingly, below we provide a set of attacks against
hierarchical architectures, giving specific instances of how these attacks could be
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implemented against DSOC.
First, we explain which specific intrusive actions from the adversarial model
presented in Section 5.3 are required to perform different attacks against DSOC,
which are then used to perform a combined attack.
1. Fabrication (1). The adversary is capable of sending malicious data to every
node located in its LAN.
2. Fabrication (2). The adversary can spoof the source address of the transmitted
data in the site or modify its identity (IP or MAC address) at will.
3. Interception. The site traffic is non-encrypted and, thus, the adversary can
perform man-in-the-middle attacks to intercept the traffic sent by any node in
the site to the Internet. Even though the data is encrypted the addresses are
sent in cleartext, and thus the adversary is still able to know the identities of
the sender and the receiver nodes.
4. Blocking. Same as in the case above, the adversary can use a man-in-the-middle
attack to drop packets sent to Internet.
Using these actions, a combined attack is presented that isolates a site from the
rest of the hierarchical architecture and thwarts alert sharing. Thus, the goal is to
produce a denial of service targeting the ESF function. The attack is composed of
three correlative sub-attacks with different goals. These sub-attacks are depicted in
Figure 5.15, which has been obtained from [Karim-Ganame et al., 2008] and modified
to incorporate our attack:
1. Overstimulation attack on the ESF of the DC nodes in the site (the CBoxes
in DSOC). As a consequence of this attack, the DC nodes will produce several
IDMsgs which are sent via the OIDM channel to the RC node (in DSOC, it
is implemented by storing logs in the LIDB). For such a purpose, according
to Table 5.1 the adversary should use the Attack Strategy AS-2 on the LE
channel, which requires fabrication of traffic to stimulate the IDN. In DSOC,
the adversary may fabricate malicious data to some of the systems connected
to the site (there is no need of targeting all of them), in order to stimulate the
CBoxes.
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2. Reverse Engineering attack to know which systems implement IDN nodes
with the RC role. The goal is to discover what nodes running the ESF share
alerts with the PC node in the top of the hierarchy (in DSOC, this means
discovering which systems runs the LA and R-CBoxes). The adversary should
implement the Attack Strategy AS-5, which means intercepting the OIDM
channel to discover who is responding to the previous overstimulation attack.
In DSOC, the adversary should perform a man-in-the-middle attack to the
Internet access point (router) of the site under attack and perform traffic
analysis of the systems sending information to Internet.
3. Denial of Service attack against the ESF of these RC nodes. Once an
adversary discovers which are the RC nodes, she may try to deny the service
of the ESF in order to isolate the site from the rest of the IDN. It uses the
Attack Strategy AS-7 on the OIDM (see Table 5.1), which in DSOC means
that the alerts sent from the LA and R-CBox to other sites through Internet
are blocked. Once the denial of service attack succeeds, the RC nodes are
blocked and the site is isolated from the IDN.
Figure 5.15: Isolation attack of a site on the DSOC architecture [Karim-Ganame et al., 2008].
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5.5 Conclusions
Intrusion Detection Networks constitute a key component of current cyberdefense
infrastructures to detect distributed attacks. They facilitate different entities to share
information about attacks detected within their local networks. This make IDN an
effective countermeasure for detecting complex intrusion scenarios like distributed
DoS or multi-step attacks. IDNs are composed of different nodes interconnected,
and thus they offer various entry points for potential adversaries.
Research on IDNs typically considers the way that detection is performed, i.e.,
how data is correlated, detection functions, trustworthiness algorithms, etc. However,
it is also required to assess the security from the structural point of view. Indeed, it
is unclear how the attacks targeting nodes placed in one part of the IDN would affect
nodes located in other areas or performing different functions. This may depend on
several factors, like the IDN architecture and the adversarial model considered.
In this chapter, we have presented a system model for IDNs. The model considers
common building blocks that we have observed in the works proposed in the literature.
The abstraction of the IDN allows for the definition of common threats. Concretely,
we consider four basic threats in network communications: blocking, modification,
interception and fabrication. The likelihood of these threats to materialize depends
on the adversarial model considered. The strongest adversary may be able to perform
any of these intrusive actions in every node, while a weaker adversary may be only
capable of intercepting data in certain network locations.
By means of the system model and the basic intrusive actions defined, we have
provided a comprehensive set of attacks to IDNs, following the taxonomy presented
by Corona et al. [Corona et al., 2013]. We have provided examples of such attacks
for two different scenarios. The first includes a review of different defense systems
proposed for IDNs in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), and the second is a
collaborative IDN where different entities collaborate to detect distributed attacks
[Karim-Ganame et al., 2008].
Both the system model and the attack description presented in this chapter allows
for further investigation of IDNs. For example, given a common adversarial model,
it could be studied which architectures are more robust, or which are the settings
that make the IDN more secure. Additionally, when deciding where to implement
countermeasures in the IDN, the system model also allows to perform quantitative
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studies in terms of cost and risk. The next chapter addresses some of these problems
and presents a framework that leverages the system model presented in this chapter
to facilitate the design of resilient IDNs.
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6Optimal Allocation of
Countermeasures in Intrusion
Detection Networks
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present DEFIDNET, a framework to evaluate the risk of IDNs and
to optimally set countermeasures to mitigate it. Due to the connectivity of nodes in
IDNs, threats affecting one node may propagate and affect the entire network. To
completely mitigate such threats, it is required the protection of every single node
which is at risk. In many scenarios this is not possible due to resource constraints (in
terms of time, human and financial costs, etc.) and the problem turns into investing
in security measures optimally to minimize the residual risk. Similarly, given an
acceptable level of the residual risk, the budget spent can be minimized.
In this sense, the placement of countermeasures in IDNs plays an important role.
Deciding what has to be protected, i.e., where to allocate countermeasures, is a
complex task. This decision depends on many factors, such as the adversarial model,
the impact of the attacks, or the cost of implementing the countermeasures. These
factors vary considerably even within the same network. For example, the cost in
terms of time and energy of implementing cryptography mechanisms for wireless
communications is different depending on the operating system and the software
used [Almenares et al., 2013]. Similarly, the impact of a denial of service attack on
a Security Operations Center (SOC) is typically higher than that of an anti-virus
solution for a personal computer.
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Due to the wide variety and complexity of IDNs proposed in the literature, the
risk-rating of these networks is typically done in an ad-hoc manner, what makes it
expensive and error prone. Thus, in this chapter we develop a generic risk rating
framework, called DEFIDNET. This framework uses the system model presented in
Chapter 5 and tailors it to specific IDNs, by means of the customization of different
factors of the network and the adversarial model. Then, it incorporates procedures to
asses the risk of the IDN. Concretely, considering that some nodes may be targeted,
the framework evaluates the propagation of intrusive actions through the network
considering the influences between nodes. It then estimates the impacts of these
actions regarding different attack strategies. Accordingly, the risk of the network is
calculated considering the impacts and likelihood of attacks. Finally, the framework
provides the set of optimal countermeasures in terms of cost and mitigated risk. To
show the benefits of DEFIDNET, we provide experimental results using different
network architectures and a case study using a complex cooperative network.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe the framework
in detail, including the threat, risk-rating and allocation modules. We provide the
experimental results in Section 6.3, and in Section 6.4 we present a case study.
Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the chapter summarizing the main contributions.
6.2 Description of the Framework
In this section, we describe DEFIDNET, a framework for risk-rating and optimal
allocation of countermeasures in IDNs. The framework uses the system model
presented in Chapter 5, which allows for the abstraction of nodes composing the
IDN. The framework is divided into three modules, depicted in Figure 6.1: the threat
module, the risk-rating module, and the allocation module. We next describe each
module in detail.
6.2.1 Threat Module
This module is used to define the threats to which IDN nodes are exposed and
the propagation of the intrusive actions throughout the network. It receives an
specification of the IDN based on the system model introduced in Section 5.2. For
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Figure 6.1: Modules of the framework DEFIDNET.
It uses as input a network abstraction and applies the different modules to the network. The output is
a set of optimal solutions (the choice of a specific allocation depends on the particular objective)
.
every IDN node, this specification defines four channels: input of local events (LE),
input of IDMsg (IIDM), output of IDMsg (OIDM), and output of response actions
(RA). Each channel is exposed to four different intrusive actions: blocking (B),
modification (M), interception (I), and fabrication (F).
We consider an adversary who targets a certain number of nodes at a time,
performing one or more intrusive actions. The threat module is applied in to steps.
First, it receives the probabilities of each intrusive action being performed for every
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channel and every IDN node. These probabilities are manually entered. Then, the
threat-module automatically propagates these initial probabilities throughout the
network. We next explain these two steps of the module.
6.2.1.1 Attack Probabilities in Node Channels
The threat module receives as input the system model and the probabilities of
intrusive actions for each channel of every node. If the nodes uses the same physical
channel for input and/or output of data, then the probabilities would be the same.
For example, if a computer uses the same network interface to monitor local traffic
and to receive messages from other computers, then blocking the data in that network
interface may block the LE and IIDM channels of the node. Additionally, in many
adversarial scenarios, the probabilities of the intrusive actions are similar. For
example, if the adversary is able to perform modification, it is probable that she
may perform fabrication too. In any case, we do not consider in our framework how
these probabilities are established, because it may strongly depend on the adversarial
model and the network specifications. They are just defined manually, as shown in
Figure 6.1.
This step of the threat module provides information about which nodes have been
targeted initially. Thus, the threat module indicates where countermeasures should
be allocated to protect nodes against the intrusive actions. However, it does not
specify where it is better to place these countermeasures if the resources are limited,
because it depends on the damage of each action and the cost of implementing the
associated countermeasures. Moreover, as explained in the next step, the probabilities
of intrusive actions are propagated throughout the nodes, and thus the damage may
vary depending on the architecture of the IDN. These issues are dealt with by the
the allocation and the risk-rating modules, respectively, which are described later in
this chapter.
6.2.1.2 Propagation of Probabilities Throughout the IDN
Nodes in an IDN share information using IDMsg. Accordingly, the intrusive actions
that affect one node are propagated throughout the connected nodes. The degree
of propagation depends on the influences of the nodes connected. Consequently, a
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single intrusive action in a channel of a node may not increase considerably the risk
of the network. However, due to propagation, an adversary who wisely select its
victims or combines several actions can provoke a serious damage in the network.
For example, suppose that a node A with the role DC is connected to a node B
with the role PC. A provides data to B, who correlates this data and emits responses,
if needed. Suppose that the adversary modifies the data in the LE channel of A.
This intrusive action affects the OIDM channel of A as well, because the LE and
the OIDM channels are internally connected through the event sharing function
(ESF). Moreover, the OIDM channel of A is connected to the IIDM channel of B,
and thus the modification would affect B as well. The degree of damage caused in B
depends on the influence of A in B. The lower the influence, the lower the damage
propagated from A to B.
The initial probabilities are manually entered for each node, and define the nodes
that are vulnerable to external attacks. Then, the probabilities are propagated
throughout the network as follows. First, the nodes propagate the probabilities
internally. Depending on the role and the functions enabled in each node, the IIDM
and LE channels may be connected to the RA and/or OIDM. Thus, the probabilities
of every action affecting the input channels are propagated to the output channels in
each node. Second, the probabilities of the OIDM channels are propagated to the
IIDM channels of the connected nodes, weighted by the influence of the connection.
Equation 6.1 indicates the propagation between connected nodes. In this expression,
Ci represents the set of nodes connected to Ai, and Iij is the influence from the node
Aj to node Ai, with j 6= i. If one node previously had a probability in the IIDM
channel (PIIDM) greater than zero, then the new probability after propagation is
the maximum between the previous probability and the sum of the probabilities
propagated from connected nodes.
PIIDM(Ai) = max{PIIDM(Ai),
∑
∀Aj∈Ci
POIDM(Aj) ∗ Iij} (6.1)
Figure 6.2 shows an example of the propagation effect in a network with three
nodes. The boxes in each node correspond with the probabilities of the four intrusive
actions (B, M, I, and F) in each channel of the node. The nodes with role DC (Slave1
and Slave2 ) are connected to a node with role PC (Global). In the initial state, only
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Slave1 and Slave2 are targeted, but after the propagation effect, the probabilities of
the node Global are updated following Equation 6.1, and thus it becomes at risk.
Initial state State after propagation
Figure 6.2: Effect of propagation of the probabilities of attack in an IDN with three nodes.
The channels are represented as in Figure 5.1, i.e., the LE is on the bottom, the IIDM is on the left
side, the OIDM is on top, and the RA is on the right side. Each box corresponds to the probabilities of
the four intrusive actions (B, M, I, and F) in each channel of the node. The influence is represented a
weight associated to each with arrow.
6.2.2 Risk-Rating Module
Risk in ICT systems is calculated as the product of the damage caused by attacks
to the system times the likelihood (i.e., probability) of these attacks happening
[Stoneburner et al., 2002]. As explained in the previous section, the threat module
outputs the probability of each intrusive action in each channel of every node. The
risk-rating module first receives the impact of the attacks, and then calculates the
risk using the probabilities of these attacks happening. Next, we explain how the
impacts and likelihood are defined, and how the risk is calculated from these metrics.
6.2.2.1 Attack Impacts
The adversarial model of IDNs is rather different to other ICT networks, where
the main objective of attackers is to compromise the information confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of data. In IDNs, though, attacks may have different goals.
We adopt the taxonomy proposed by Corona et al. in [Corona et al., 2013], which
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classifies attacks to Intrusion Detection Systems. This taxonomy is further explained
in Chapter 2.
The impacts of attacks in each node depends on its consequences and it may be
different depending on the adversarial model, the architectures, etc. For example, a
DoS attack on a node with role DC may have higher impact in a distributed network
than in a centralized network. Thus, in DEFIDNET the impacts are defined for
each node and each attack (i.e., evasion, overstimulation, DoS, poisoning, reverse
engineering, and response hijacking), by manually entering a damage value.
6.2.2.2 Attack Likelihoods
When targeting IDNs, adversaries may use different attack strategies. To assess the
risk, each possible attack strategy should be considered. For example, a DoS could
be performed by blocking the IDMsgs sent to the node, or by flooding the node
with local events. Table 6.1 summarizes the intrusive actions required depending
on the attack goal. In Chapter 5, we provide details of each specific strategy and
examples of how they are actually implemented in real scenarios. We next provide
three examples of attacks using these strategies.
1. Evasion with modification in LE. An evasion occur if the adversary modifies
the data to blend with statistical properties of a normal model [Fogla and Lee,
2006]. This implies the adversary acting on the LE channel of the attacked
node.
2. DoS with fabrication in LE. Some approaches use internal data structures
to track the monitored data, like observed anomalous behavior of nodes in
MANETs [Su, 2011]. A DoS occurs if the adversary is able to overload these
structures by fabricating specific packets, which implies acting in the LE
channel.
3. Reverse engineering with fabrication in LE and interception in OIDM. By
performing query-response analysis, the adversary can infer information used
internally by the nodes [Pastrana et al., 2014]. Moreover, if the goal of the
adversary is to discover the roles of nodes in an IDN, it can perform a traffic
analysis attack. For example, by injecting intrusive packets in the IDN (LE
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channels of nodes) and observing who is responding (OIDM channel) and the
destination of the IDMsg, the adversary can determine who is gathering data
to perform correlation.
Accordingly, using the probabilities of intrusive actions to node channels estab-
lished in the threat module, and the attack strategies showed in Table 6.1, the
likelihood of each attack is calculated as the maximum probability of actions that
conduct to it. For example, consider the Global node in Figure 6.2 after the propa-
gation. The probabilities of intrusive actions in the IIDM channel (left side of the
node) are 0.75 for blocking, 0.6 for modification, 0.25 for interception, and 0.35 for
fabrication. As shown in Table 6.1, evasion in the node Global can be done by either
blocking, modifying or fabricating in the channel IIDM. The most probable action is
blocking (0.75).
Table 6.1: Taxonomy of attacks showing which intrusive actions may use the adversary on each channel
to achieve different goals.
Adversarial attack
intrusive actions on channels
LE IIDM OIDM RA
Evasion B ∨ M ∨ F B ∨ M ∨ F – –
Overstimulation F F M ∨ F –
Poisoning M ∨ F M ∨ F – –
Denial of Service B ∨ F B ∨ F B –
Reverse Engineering (M ∨ F) ∧ I (M ∨ F) ∧ I I I
Response Hijacking B ∨ M ∨ F B ∨ M ∨ F – B ∨ M ∨ F
6.2.2.3 Calculation of the Risk
Once the impact of attacks are entered, and the likelihood of these attacks happening
is calculated, the risk-rating module calculates the risk of one attack as the product
of the likelihood of this attack multiplied by its impact on the node. Assuming that
the impact of evasion in the Global node from Figure 6.2 is 100 and the likelihood of
evasion is 0.75, then the risk of the Global node being evaded would be 0.75∗100 = 75.
The risk-rating module outputs the total risk of the IDN, and for each node, the
risks for each attack and its aggregated risk (sum of all the attack risks). The total
risk of the IDN is the sum of the risks of all the individual nodes. This information
together with the information about which nodes have been targeted (given by the
threat module), is given to the allocation module described in the next section.
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6.2.3 Allocation Module
DEFIDNET is a framework to optimally allocate countermeasures in an IDN. In
this section, we consider the problem of reducing the estimated risk using the lowest
possible quantity of resources. The allocation module first receives the cost of the
countermeasures, and then calculates optimal allocation of these countermeasures to
reduce the risk. We next explain the two steps involved in this module.
6.2.3.1 Cost of Countermeasures
We define the cost of a countermeasure as the quantity of resources required to protect
a single channel for one node against a specific intrusive action. We consider this
cost as a single value, and we do not consider neither what exactly it is (money, time,
energy, etc.) nor how it is measured. For example, to protect against interception,
it can be used cryptographic mechanisms to encrypt the communications. These
mechanisms may require the use of secret keys or a PKI. Depending on the network
and the scenario of application, this may be more or less costly. Moreover, the cost
of protecting against interception is not the same in different nodes and channels.
For example, encrypting the communication in a MANET is usually more costly
than encrypting a wired link. Similarly to the probabilities, DEFIDNET uses as
input the cost to protect each intrusive action on each channel of the nodes.
In the following, we consider a solution as a set of countermeasures to be applied
to the IDN. On the one hand, when a countermeasure is applied to one channel to
counter an intrusive action, the probability of this action happening in this channel
becomes zero. However, since not all the channels are protected, after applying the
countermeasures of a solution, some residual risk is left behind in the IDN. On the
other hand, each countermeasure has an individual cost, and thus, applying a set of
countermeasures has a total cost calculated as the sum of each individual cost.
6.2.3.2 Optimization of the Cost-Risk Tradeoff
For each solution, the more risk is mitigated, the higher the cost. Ideally, optimal
solutions should minimize both the risk and the cost. However, these are mutually
conflicting objectives, and there is not a single optimal solution. Thus, a tradeoff
between risk and cost must be considered. Accordingly, we use Multi-Objective
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Optimization (MOO) to obtain the set of optimal solutions that conform the pareto
set. In MOO with two objectives, a solution from the pareto set is called non-
dominated if there is not any other solution that improves one of the objectives
without degrading the other objective. The set of non-dominated solutions is called
the pareto front.
There are several algorithms to obtain the pareto front. In our experiments,
we use an evolutionary MOO algorithm known as SPEA2 [Zitzler et al., 2001] (an
optimization of the Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm). SPEA2 is one of the
most popular MOO evolutionary algorithms and has been successfully applied in the
intrusion detection domain [Sen and Clark, 2011; Sen et al., 2010]. Indeed, it is one
of the two MOO algorithms implemented in the ECJ framework [Luke, 2010], which
we use in our experiments. The other algorithm implemented in ECJ is NSGA2
(Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm) [Deb et al., 2000]. While both of them
are valid algorithms, SPEA2 obtains further optimization in the central points of
the pareto front than NSGA2, which is more convenient to obtain solutions in the
boundaries of the pareto front. In our particular domain, solutions that are very
costly or that reduce very low risk are generally not recommended. Accordingly,
the main purpose is to optimize the points where it is unclear the tradeoff between
cost and risk, which are the central points of the pareto front. For these reasons, we
choose SPEA2 in our experiments.
As explained in Chapter 2, evolutionary algorithms perform heuristic search to
explore a solution space. The algorithm manages a population of “individuals”,
which in our case are the different solutions to allocate countermeasures expressed
as a binary mask (1 means that the concrete countermeasure is applied, 0 that
it is not applied). Figure 6.3 shows an schematic view of an individual. Each
position of the mask indicates which actions (i.e, blocking, modification, interception,
and/or fabrication), for each channel, and for every IDN node, are counteracted
by the solution represented. The evolution applies various genetic operators to the
individuals to obtain each new generation. We next explain such operators:
• Crossover. Given two individuals, (i.e., binary masks), the crossover breeds
a new individual by mixing certain genes from the individuals (i.e., chunks
from the masks). Concretely, in our experimentation, the crossover randomly
divides the masks of both individuals in 5 chunks, which are swapped between
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them uniformly.
• Mutation. Given one individual, the mutation operator flips a 10% of the
bits from its mask. These bits are randomly chosen.
• Selection. This operator selects individuals from one generation to compose
the next generation. We use the tournament selection, which creates several
“tournaments” randomly choosing a number k of individuals from the population.
Then, the best individual in each “tournament” is selected.
Figure 6.3: Representation of a SPEA2 solution to allocate countermeasure as a binary mask.
Each position in the mask indicates whether a countermeasure to each intrusive action must be applied
(1) or not (0) in the corresponding channel of every IDN node.
.
The population evolves during several generations, increasing the “fitness” of
individuals. The fitness is a value associated with each individual, which indicates
how good it is. Concretely, the individuals are evaluated as follows. First, the
countermeasures indicated by the mask are applied (i.e., the corresponding probabil-
ities are set to zero) and its corresponding cost is calculated. Then, the remaining
probabilities of intrusive actions in the IDN nodes (i.e., these whose action have not
been counteracted) are propagated, and the risk is re-calculated. Finally, the pair
“cost-risk” is given to the algorithm to calculate the fitness. In the case of SPEA2,
the fitness of each solution considers the number of points that are dominated by
the pareto points in the solution.
When it is required to reduce the risk completely or when there are unlimited
resources, then all the nodes are protected completely (i.e, all the risk is mitigated).
However, when the cost is limited or the IDN tolerates some risk, the pareto front
indicates which are the optimal solutions. These solutions indicate which are the
countermeasures to be applied in order to solve one of the two following problems:
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1. Given a tolerable risk, the problem is “selecting the cheapest set of counter-
measures that mitigates the risk below a tolerable level of risk”.
2. Given an available budget, the problem is “selecting the set of countermeasures
that reduce the risk the most while spending less resources than the given
budget”.
If the budget is limited, the allocation solution must reduce the risk the most. If
there is a tolerable risk, the allocation solution must be the cheapest that decreases
the risk below the tolerated level. In some situations, though, neither the cost nor
the risk are limited. In these cases, it is helpful to know whether it is worth to spend
more resources to reduce the risk or not. When defending an IDN, one may think
that the more resources are spent, the more risk is mitigated. However, this is not
always the case. In the following section, we show experimental results that confirm
this intuition.
6.3 Experimental Work and Discussion
As it has been discussed in the previous section, the main advantage of DEFIDNET is
that it allows to model IDNs through the definition of architectural parameters (size
of the IDN, role of the nodes, connections, and influences) and per node parameters
(probabilities of intrusive actions, impact of attacks, and cost of countermeasures).
In this section, we provide analytic results using DEFIDNET. Concretely, we
model two IDNs with different architectures: a hierarchical network and a centralized
network. First, we explain how the networks are modeled and the parameters
established. Second, we analyze and discuss the tradeoff between cost and risk on
each IDN, which helps to decide the placement of countermeasures and whether it
is worth or not to spend resources, depending on the mitigated risk. Finally, we
discuss the use of DEFIDNET in the modeling of IDNs and how it provides optimal
alternatives to allocate the countermeasures depending on the resources available or
the tolerable risk.
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6.3.1 Network Modeling
We have conducted experiments using two IDNs, each of them with 101 nodes, but
distributed with different architectures: a centralized network and a hierarchical
network. We next describe the use of DEFIDNET applied to each of these networks.
6.3.2 IDN Definition
For each IDN, we first define the system model, which is composed of the number of
nodes, the role of each node, and the connections between them. Depending on the
role of each node, some of their functions and channels are activated, as explained in
Chapter 5.
In a centralized network, a central node correlates the information received from
several nodes and generates responses. We use a network with 100 nodes that collect
data and send it to a central correlation node. In a hierarchical IDN, the network
is divided into levels. We have established 3 levels in the network. In the top level
there is one global node (with role PC). In the middle level, there are 10 nodes (with
role RC) connected to the global node. Finally, in the bottom level, 10 nodes nodes
are connected to each of RC nodes in the middle level. The nodes in the bottom
level have the role DC.
The influences between nodes determine how the intrusive actions that affect one
node are propagated to the connected nodes. In our experimental work, we establish
different values for these influences, according to different data distributions. In the
following sections, we retake this and detail how the influences are established.
6.3.3 Adversarial Model
Once the system is modeled, we establish the attack probabilities on each node and
their impacts. We consider a powerful adversary who targets all the DC nodes that
collect data locally, with a probability equal to 1. These DC nodes only send data to
a correlation node and do not emit responses. Thus, the impact of the attacks in
DC nodes is low, as opposite to the impact in the correlation nodes, which is one
hundred times greater. Since the impact is greater in the correlation nodes, and
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because only the DC nodes are targeted, the risk of the entire IDN depends on how
the risk propagation within the IDN affects other systems.
6.3.4 Allocation Module
The allocation module requires as input the cost of the countermeasures and the
output of the threat module, i.e., the definition of which nodes are at risk and
which countermeasures should be taken. Optimal allocation of countermeasures
depends on two factors, the residual risk of the network after the countermeasures
are implemented, and the cost of these countermeasures. On the one hand, the risk
of the network is affected by the propagation of attacks, which in turn depends on
the influences between nodes. On the other hand, the cost of the countermeasures
varies from one node to another.
We conduct experiments using different values for the influences and costs of the
countermeasures. Concretely, these values are established following four different
data distributions (in the following, we refer to the value of influence or cost given
to each node as quantity):
1. Exponential (E). This distribution is shown in Figure 6.4-(a). With this
distribution, the lower the quantity is, the fewer the number of nodes receive
this quantity. Thus, the highest quantity is given to many nodes.
2. Fractional (F). As shown in Figure 6.4-(b), with this distribution the highest
value is given to a single node, and then the lower the quantity is, the more
the number of nodes that receive it.
3. Gaussian (G). The assignment follows a normal distribution. The majority
of the nodes receive a medium quantity, while some few nodes receive low
quantities and some few nodes receive high quantities. Figure 6.4-(c) shows
this distribution.
4. Uniform (U). All the nodes receives the same quantity.
In all the experiments, the total cost of the network distributed among the nodes
is 100. This means that, if we consider a network with 100 nodes and an uniform
distribution, the cost to defend each node is one.
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Figure 6.4: Data distributions used. The plots show the percentage of cost or influence (quantity)
assigned to each node in a network of 100 nodes.
For each distribution of influences and each distribution of cost, we use DE-
FIDNET to analyze the tradeoff between the cost of the countermeasures and the
mitigated risk. Thus, for each IDN we conduct sixteen experiments.
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6.3.5 Analysis of the Obtained Results
We have run 16 experiments, using four distributions of influence, and for each of
them, four distributions of cost. Each experiment can be viewed as an alternative to
distribute the influences and costs over the same IDN. The analysis provides insights
on which of these alternatives is optimal in different situations.
We provide the results both as a numerical analysis, showing the actual percent-
ages of risk mitigated and associated cost by the solutions, and a graphical analysis,
plotting the pareto fronts and analyzing their trend lines.
6.3.5.1 Numerical Analysis
Table 6.2 shows the quartiles of the amount of risk mitigated. Each quartile indicates
the percentage of the cost required to mitigate the 25% (Q1), 50% (Q2), 75%
(Q3), and 100% (Q4) of the risk. The total cost is calculated by applying all the
countermeasures in the network, i.e., spending all the resources.
The symbols F, E, G and U corresponds to fractional, exponential, gaussian and
uniform distributions respectively. We have highlighted the lowest values for each
quartile, which indicates which are the cheapest alternatives. These values indicate
the situations where some distributions of cost and influence are better than other.
For example, in the centralized network, to reduce the risk 25%, the best alternative
would be the fractional distribution of influences and exponential distribution of
costs (referred as IF-CE). This alternative only requires 14.6% of the cost. The
alternative with exponential influence and gausssian cost (referred as IE-CG) would
require more than the double of the cost (31.6%) to mitigate the same risk. However,
the table shows that to reduce 75% of the risk, the best alternative is precisely this
IE-CG, which barely requires 69% of the cost.
The comparison between the alternatives IF-CE and IE-CG shows that the
election of one alternative or another depends on the goal. On the one hand, for
the centralized network, the IF-CE alternative must be selected if, 1) its required to
completely mitigate the risk, or 2) reducing 25% of the risk is enough. On the other
hand, if the goal is to mitigate the risk substantially (75%), the best alternative to
use is the IE-CG.
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A similar analysis can be done with the hierarchical network. In this case, the
IU-CF alternative reduces 25% of the risk spending only 9.8% of the cost, while the
IG-CG alternative requires three times more cost (30.5%). However, the IG-CG
alternative is the best choice to mitigate the risk completely. A general observation
is that the percentage of risk to be mitigated determines which alternative is better
to save resources.
Table 6.2: Percentage of the cost required to mitigate 25% (Q1), 50% (Q2), 75% (Q3), and 100% (Q4)
of the risk in centralized and hierarchical IDNs.
Distributions Centralized architecture Hierarchical architecture
Influence Cost Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
F
F 20.7 54.8 88.0 96.7 21.7 44.9 83.5 96.2
E 14.6 39.2 71.0 89.4 20.8 42.3 76.7 94.6
G 31.1 43.7 70.6 92.4 28.4 45.0 73.0 93.9
U 32.1 43.2 69.2 91.5 25.1 46.0 73.8 94.8
E
F 18.7 29.7 81.8 94.0 17.6 40.7 77.7 96.4
E 26.9 54.6 87.3 95.1 19.0 49.3 85.3 94.0
G 31.6 45.8 69.0 91.4 34.9 50.2 68.3 93.5
U 29.5 48.7 71.1 92.2 21.8 48.1 77.6 95.3
G
F 14.7 39.5 80.9 94.9 10.8 37.8 85.1 94.7
E 20.6 45.3 80.0 92.8 13.1 43.8 81.5 91.6
G 29.2 52.3 75.9 93.2 30.5 51.9 72.0 91.0
U 27.6 53.0 73.6 92.8 17.5 49.5 80.9 94.3
U
F 18.8 38.4 86.5 95.0 9.8 42.4 87.9 95.0
E 15.7 50.3 83.8 95.7 14.8 46.3 85.3 92.3
G 27.1 52.9 74.5 90.5 25.4 53.4 72.4 91.7
U 25.5 52.7 75.3 94.1 22.1 51.6 78.4 92.5
6.3.5.2 Graphical Analysis
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 shows the solutions of the pareto fronts obtained for the centralized
and hierarchical networks, respectively. For the sake of illustration, we have grouped
the pareto fronts in 4 plots, each one corresponding to an influence distribution.
Each plot shows the percentage of residual risk (y-axis) and the percentage of cost
(x-axis) associated with the solutions. A 100% of risk means that no countermeasures
are applied (i.e., 0% of the cost spent), while a 100% of the cost means that all the
required countermeasures to protect the network are applied.
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Figure 6.5: Cost-risk tradeoff in the centralized IDN.
Each plot shows the pareto front obtained for each cost distribution and one influence distribution.
Assume that, in a given time, some countermeasures have been applied in the
IDN, and thus the risk has been reduced partially. At this point, is it better to spend
more resources to further reduce the risk, or is it better to do nothing, thus saving
resources? The analysis of the trend line of the obtained pareto front helps to answer
these questions. We next provide two examples:
• Example 1. In the centralized IDN, consider the pareto front of the IE-CF
alternative depicted in the red lines in Figure 6.5-(c). The trend line indicates
that spending half of the cost (Q2) reduces almost the same risk than spending
75% of the cost (Q3). Thus, supposing that the IDN risk has been reduced up
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Figure 6.6: Cost-risk tradeoff in the hierarchical architecture.
Each plot shows the pareto front obtained for each cost distribution and one influence distribution.
to 30% (using half of the budget), the next reduction of risk would require to
spend 30% more cost. In this case, if there are no restrictions about the risk,
an intelligent decision would be to save resources and do not implement more
countermeasures.
• Example 2. In the hierarchical IDN, consider the IF-CG alternative depicted in
green line of Figure 6.6-(b). In this case, with 28% of the cost, the risk is only
reduced to a 80%. However, analyzing the trend line, it can be observed that
with only some more cost (around 12% more) the risk is drastically reduced
to less than 50%. Thus, contrarily to Example 1 above, it is worth spending
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some more resources because it reduces a significant amount of risk.
Similarly to the numerical analysis, the trend line of the pareto fronts can be
used to compare between different alternatives. In this case, the decision of what
alternative to choose is done by analyzing the lines: the line “arriving” first to the
desired quartile is the best alternative. In the centralized network, for example, with
fractional influence (IF), the blue line (CE) is the first to reach the first quartile (Q1)
of the risk. Accordingly, the IF-CE alternative is the best choice to reduce a 25%
of the risk. This result matches with the numerical analysis done in the previous
section.
6.3.6 Discussion
In this section we have discussed how DEFIDNET helps to decide when it is better
to spend more resources to reduce the risk, and where. In many IDNs, establishing
countermeasures in a indiscriminate manner may reduce the risk proportionally to
the cost, i.e., spending more resources involves reducing more the risk. Graphically,
the trend line of the pareto front of this approach would have a constant decrement,
like the black line of Figures 6.5-(a) and 6.6-(a). However, the analysis performed in
this section shows that in some IDNs, the previous effect is not true, and increasing
the cost does not always translates into a risk reduction. In this case, the trend
line of the pareto front would have substantial leaps, like the lines analyzed in this
section.
In order to save resources, it is useful to know when it is convenient to allocate
new countermeasures, and where should they be placed. The decision depends on
several parameters, like the architecture of the network, the influences between nodes,
the cost of setting countermeasures in the nodes, etc. In the presented experiments,
we have analyzed different alternatives for rather small and simple IDNs. We defined
different alternatives by randomly assigning influences and costs using different
distributions. However, when dealing with bigger networks and having non-trivial
alternatives (i.e., which are not random), the value of DEFIDNET is even greater.
In the next section, we provide experimental results using a larger and more complex
IDN than the ones used here.
6.4. Case Study 153
6.4 Case Study
In this section, we use DEFIDNET to analyze a Cooperative Intrusion Detection
Network (CIDN). In a CIDN, several entities (companies, organizations, governments,
etc.) share the information that they have obtained from their own corporate network.
Each of these corporate subnetworks are proprietary of one entity, and thus they
may have different architectures, sizes, and also the adversary model varies for each
of them.
In this section, we first define the IDN and all its parameters. Second, we
show the tradeoff between cost and risk of different solutions in terms of the pareto
front. Finally, we select one specific solution according to a budget and discuss the
countermeasures that this solution suggests.
6.4.1 Architecture Design and Adversarial Model
Figure 6.7 shows the IDN used for the case study, once the probabilities are en-
tered and propagated. The network simulates a scenario where five entities share
information of intrusion attempts in their corporate subnetworks. Each corporate
subnetwork has a global node in charge of the communication with global nodes
from other corporations. The global nodes correlate data received from their cor-
porate subnetwork and from the other global nodes. If needed, global nodes emit
responses. Because the corporations are independent and they are vested with the
same authority, the global nodes are interconnected in a distributed fashion, and
each of them is connected with all the remaining global nodes. Next we describe
each corporate subnetwork:
1. Subnetwork centralized-100. Within this network, 100 nodes with role DC
gather data locally and send it to the global node. The influence of these nodes
to the global one is established with a fractional distribution, and the costs of
each DC node is established with an exponential distribution. This subnetwork
is highly targeted: 70% of the DC nodes have full probability of being attacked
(i.e., the probability for each intrusive action is set to 1).
2. Subnetwork centralized-20. This network has a centralized architecture
but, unlike the previous network, it has only 20 nodes collecting data. Moreover,
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these nodes do not communicate directly with the global node of the entity,
but with a proxy who actually communicates with this global node. The
distribution of influences and costs of the subnetwork are uniform, and only
10% of the nodes are targeted.
3. Subnetwork hierarchical. The global node of this entity is the root of a
hierarchical subtnetwork. The hierarchy has two middle level nodes (with role
RC), each of them correlating data gathered from five DC nodes. This network
is completely targeted, and thus all the nodes have their probability of being
attacked equal to one. The distribution of the influences is uniform, and the
distribution of the costs is fractional.
4. Subnetwork ring. This subnetwork uses a special architecture with a ring
of hierarchies. Four nodes are interconnected within a ring architecture (i.e.,
a node is connected to just another node and receives data from a different
one). At the same time, each of these nodes correlates data received from three
nodes who gather data locally. One of the nodes in the ring, acting as proxy, is
connected to the global node of this entity. Both the influences and costs are
uniformly distributed, and only three nodes in the lower level of the hierarchy
are targeted.
5. Subnetwork distributed. The detection within this network is distributed,
and all the nodes have the same responsibility. Each node has the role LDA
and is connected to 10% of the remaining nodes of the subnetwork. One of the
nodes is the proxy connected to the global node. The distributions of the costs
and influences are uniform. Only a small subset of these nodes are targeted
(5%). However, it can be observed in Figure 6.7 that, due to the propagation
of the probabilities, almost every node within this network is put at risk. The
impact of compromising each of these nodes, though, is one-hundred times
lower than the impact of compromising the global node of this entity (following
we explain the impacts assigned to the nodes of the network).
Each global node, besides cooperating with the remainder global nodes, generates
responses.1 Accordingly, the impact of attacks on these nodes is higher than in the
remaining nodes of the network. The impacts established for each node role are:
1Note that we do not consider in our study the specific responses emitted by nodes
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Figure 6.7: CIDN for the case study in its initial state.
• Global nodes: 100
• Proxy nodes (those that are connected to a global node): 10
• Data Collector and peers in the partially-distributed: 1
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A priori, it is not easy to determine where it is better to set countermeasures in
this network. Should every node in the centralized-100 subnetwork being protected
first?, or is it better to protect the hierarchical subnetwork because it is smaller? We
next use DEFIDNET to analyze the cost-risk tradeoff by plotting the pareto front
obtained. Then, we analyze specific solutions suggested by DEFIDNET.
6.4.2 Cost-Risk Tradeoff
Figure 6.8 shows the pareto front of the solutions for the cooperative network. As
explained above, each point in the pareto front correspond to an optimal solution
for each risk level with the least cost. In the figure, we have highlighted certain
points which we analyze further in the next section. The trend line of the pareto
indicates that, spending few resources in the beginning, the risk rapidly decreases,
and spending approximately 10% of the cost, the risk decreases to 75%. In that
point, the gradient of the line becomes zero for an appreciable interval. That means
that there is no improvement in the mitigated risk spending 15% and 22% of the
cost. In the next subsection we analyze these two solutions and analyze why this
situation occurs. Suddenly, the trend line substantially falls below 50% (between the
orange triangle and the blue circle points), which means that, a solution that spends
only 7% more of the cost than the previous one, reduces the risk 24%. Again, in the
next section we analyze why this improvement occurs.
Following the analysis of the trend line, we observe that once the risk has been
reduced below 50%, the trend line relatively enters in a decreasing interval for a
while. However, it can be observed that it is required a greater percentage of the
cost than the corresponding risk reduction. Finally, just before the line crosses the
third quartile of the risk (i.e., just before reducing the risk below 25%), the trend
line suffers a significant decrease, and the network becomes practically secured by
spending 80% of the cost.
The analysis of this specific line shows that, if the budget for defending the
network is low, then a good option is to reduce the risk at least 50%, because it can
be achieved with little more than 25% of the budget. However, if the budget is high,
it is better to spend the 80% because in such a case the risk is practically reduced to
zero.
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Figure 6.8: Pareto front showing the cost-risk tradeoff of the CIDN studied.
The highlighted points are the solutions analyzed in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.3 Analysis of Specific Solutions
As explained above, each point in the pareto front correspond with one solution
in the network, i.e., the set of countermeasures to be applied to optimally reduce
some risk using some cost. In this section, we analyze four solutions suggested by
DEFIDNET which are highlighted in Figure 6.8.
The two solutions S1 and S2 mitigate little risk and spend few resources. The
difference between them is that, while S2 mitigates only 1% more than S1, it costs
7% more. However, analyzing the line in the point S2, it can be seen that spending
again another 7% of the cost provokes that the risk is reduced 25% (as seen in the
solution S3 highlighted in Figure 6.8). What exactly is the difference between S1, S2
and S3?
In Table 6.3 we show the number of countermeasures that solutions S1, S2, and S3
allocate in each of the corporate subnetworks. The biggest different between solutions
S1 and S2 is in the subnetwork centralized-100 and the subnetwork distributed. This
difference suggests that setting countermeasures in these subnetworks does not reduce
substantially the risk, unless all the risk in these subnetworks is mitigated. In the
case of the centralized-100 subnetwork, the problem is that all the DC nodes are
directly connected to the global node. In the case of the distributed subnetwork,
the problem is that a single targeted node will propagate the risk throughout the
158 6. Optimal Allocation of Countermeasures in Intrusion Detection Networks
entire network, and because one of the participants in this subnetwork is directly
connected to the global node, the attack is propagated to the entire CIDN.
Regarding the difference between the solutions S2 and S3, it can be observed
that in the hierarchical subnetwork, the defenses allocated by S3 are doubled, and
even in the centralized-20 there is one less countermeasure. It can be observed that
it spends more resources in protecting the hierarchical subnetwork and the overall
risk is considerably reduced. The costs in the hierarchical network follow a fractional
distribution, which means that some of the nodes has a high cost while the remainder
has low cost. This means that, if there is enough budget to protect the highest cost
nodes, then it is worth doing so, because the remaining nodes are cheap and then it
becomes easier to protect the entire subnetwork.
Figure 6.9 shows the countermeasures allocated per action type. As it can be
observed, in the solution S4, countermeasures to interception are almost the same
than in solutions S3 and S2. This suggests that avoiding interception is not optimal
unless there are enough resources. Actually, as shown in Table 6.1, the interception
is only valuable for an adversary to perform a reverse engineering attack. Thus,
protecting against interception only reduces the risk for reverse engineering. Another
conclusion that can be extracted from Figure 6.9 is the importance of avoiding
fabrication actions. Indeed, between S1 and S2, the countermeasures to protect
against fabrication are the same, while there are considerable differences in the
blocking, modification, and interception. As seen in Figure 6.8, solutions S1 and
S2 mitigate almost the same risk, S2 being a 7% more expensive than S1. Solution
S3, though, by spending of few more resources than S2 to protect nodes against
fabrication, decreases the risk considerably.
Table 6.3: Analysis of the solutions highlighted in Figure 6.8.
Solution Number of countermeasures in each subnetwork
Centralized-100 Centralized-20 Hierarchical Ring Distributed
S1 96 3 5 3 7
S2 131 3 7 4 11
S3 139 2 14 6 14
S4 167 5 33 11 33
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Figure 6.9: Number of countermeasures per action type.
Finally, Figure 6.10 shows the CIDN after the solution S4 is applied. It can be
observed that, as it was suggested in the analysis of solutions S1, S2, and S3, when
allocating countermeasures, the optimal approach is to leave the centralized-100
network at the end of the queue and protect the other subnetworks first.
6.5 Conclusions
Intrusion Detection Networks are used to detect complex, distributed attacks. They
aggregate several nodes with different roles that are interconnected to share informa-
tion. Accordingly, a compromised node may expose the entire IDN to a risk. Due
to the adversarial scenarios in which these networks operate, the design of robust
architectures is critical to maintain an acceptable level of security.
In this chapter, we have presented DEFIDNET, a framework that assesses the risk
of IDNs against specific attacks in the nodes. Node abstraction allows the definition
of single probabilities of intrusive actions in the channels of each node, which is
simpler than defining the probability of complex attacks in the entire network. Then,
considering these probabilities and their propagation throughout the network, the
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Figure 6.10: CIDN after applying the countermeasures of the solution S4.
likelihood of different attacks being happening is calculated. These attacks are defined
regarding its consequences on the IDN, and they have an associated impact. Using
the likelihood and the impact of attacks, the global risk of the IDN is calculated.
In order to save resources, it is important to analyze the tradeoff between
cost and risk of implementing countermeasures in the channels. To this end, we
use a Multi-Objective Optimization algorithm to get optimal allocations of these
countermeasures. Concretely, we use an evolutionary algorithm known as SPEA2.
This algorithm provides solutions that are pareto optimal, where a solution is the set
of countermeasures to be applied in order to protect the channels of the IDN nodes.
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In our experimental results we have seen that, depending on the cost and the
connections in the network, deciding what to fix and deciding whether it is worth
doing can help saving resources. Moreover, we have provided an analysis of a case
study that suggest that the use of DEFIDNET helps to determine the optimal
allocation of resources in big complex networks.
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7Conclusions
Intrusion Detection Networks (IDNs) are mechanisms that provide security to ICT
systems. IDNs constitute a primary component for securing computing infrastruc-
tures, and thus have become themselves the target of attacks. This Thesis has
focused in the protection of IDNs against adversaries. In this chapter we provide
the conclusions of our work. We first summarize the main contributions and discuss
how they meet the objectives established. Second, we discuss open issues and future
work. Finally, we mention the list of results published related to this Thesis and
other publications obtained from parallel work carried out while working on this
Thesis.
7.1 Summary of Contributions and Conclusions
We next summarize the contributions and discuss the main conclusions that arise
from them:
• In Chapter 2 we have reviewed the state of the art of IDNs in adversarial
environments. We have seen that since the beginning of 21st century, many
works have considered the possibility of attacks against IDS. Additionally, since
a commonly used approach used in anomaly detection is the application of ML
algorithms, recently the research community has questioned the robustness of
such algorithms in adversarial settings. From the analysis of the state of the
art, several conclusions are drawn:
1. Though the security of ML is an active research topic, little progress has
been made over the last few years in the design of resilient algorithms.
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Moreover, there is a substantial lack of experimental work exploring the
problems derived from an attacker who can modify instances at will to
subvert the detection function.
2. In order to secure IDSs against attacks, many state of the art solutions
have proposed the use of random components in the detection process
that are kept secret for the adversaries. Some of these solutions assume
that a potential adversary could not know which parts of the events are
being processed by the IDS. However, a formal security analysis of such
solutions is still missing.
3. While strong analysis models for attacks on individual IDN nodes have
been explored, almost no research works have focused on the study of
resilient IDNs in the face of adversaries.
• In Chapter 3 we have presented reverse engineering and evasion attacks, which
corroborate the need for robust machine learning algorithms. The reverse
engineering process derives a model from a training distribution assumed to
be the same the detector uses. This model is then processed by a searching
algorithm which suggests evasion strategies. Furthermore, we show that IDS
that rely on lightweight feature construction algorithms are easily manipulable
by an adversary, facilitating the mapping of feature vectors into real world
evasions. The experimental work carried out leads to the following conclusions:
1. The use of machine learning for intrusion detection, though it is effective
and efficient, must consider robustness against adversarial manipulation.
2. The dataset used to train the classifiers should represent properly the
complete data space. Otherwise, the classifiers may learn patterns that
are valid for a dataset with such distribution, but are not robust enough
to classify data specifically modified by an adversary.
3. The use of lightweight feature construction methods allows an adversary to
obtain real world evasions from the feature vectors. Ideally, in adversarial
environments, the feature construction should be a one-way function, i.e.,
whose invert function is computationally hard to calculate.
• In Chapter 4 we have evaluated the randomization of the detection boundary,
which is one of the proposed solutions to counteract reverse engineering and
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evasion attacks. We have focused on a popular anomaly detector in the
research community called Anagram [Wang et al., 2006]. The proposed reverse
engineering attack shows that not only the attacker can infer the decision
boundary, but this knowledge indeed makes it easier for an adversary to
evade the detector. While the attacks presented in Chapter 4 are not directly
applicable to other randomized anomaly detectors, the underlying ideas are
general enough and can be used to reverse engineer other schemes based on
similar constructions. The work presented leads to the following conclusions:
1. In general, the use of query-response analysis allows an adversary to build
“nearly-anomalous” events which may be close to the detection boundary.
Then, by performing small incremental modifications and observing the
output, the adversary can learn what the decision boundary is.
2. Randomization provides security, but it may turn into a loss of effectiveness,
because the inputs are slightly modified internally to hide how they are
processed. An adversary who manages to find out the secret information
used in the detection, could actually take advantage of the less efficient
randomized detection process to evade the IDS, thus turning a security
measure into an undesirable feature.
3. From the above conclusions, it can be observed that, while randomization
is a promising countermeasure to protect IDSs, further improvements to
this technique are required to counteract reverse engineering and evasion
attacks.
4. The contributions presented in Chapters 3 and 4 meet the objective O1
stated in the beginning of this Thesis, which was to “Study techniques to
reverse engineer and evade IDSs based on ML algorithms”.
• In Chapter 5 we have proposed a system model for IDN that integrates the
key features of individual nodes of an IDN and existing architectural options.
The system model facilitates the definition of goals, tactics, and capabilities
of adversaries aiming at disrupting the IDN operation. After analyzing the
main features of IDNs, both in wired an wireless networks, we have built a
general model from common building blocks. Accordingly, we have defined
a set of common threats against these communication channels, that lead us
to the provision of a list of attacks against IDNs. Finally, we have presented
166 7. Conclusions
such attacks in two scenarios: MANETs and Collaborative IDN. Regarding
this work, we state the following conclusions:
1. The different nodes operating in an IDN share common functional compo-
nents, which are generalized in a system model. With the proposed model
it is possible to define the assets and the adversarial model of an IDN,
which facilitates the risk assessment and the design of defense strategies
for the IDN.
2. The main goal stated at the beginning of this Thesis was to “improve the
security of intrusion detection systems and networks operating in adver-
sarial settings by developing techniques to analyze their vulnerabilities
and countermeasures to increase their resiliency”. Our findings shows that
perfectly securing IDNs in real scenarios is an almost impossible mission.
Indeed, it would be required that each independent node in the IDN is
properly secured, which is unrealistic in real settings where economical
and operational constraints apply. Consequently, it is necessary to pro-
vide resilient architectures that maintain the protection operative, even
assuming that some nodes are being targeted. Concretely, the system
model presented in Chapter 5 accomplishes the objective O2.
3. A risk assessment of IDNs involves knowing the assets and threats to
which the IDN is exposed. Then, deciding what to fix and how many
resources to spend presents a tradeoff between cost and risk. This tradeoff
helps to make decisions about when and where it is worth to implement
countermeasures. Indeed, depending on the cost and the specific settings
of the network, deciding where to allocate countermeasures can aid in
saving resources.
• In Chapter 6 we have proposed a framework called DEFIDNET. This framework
can be used to obtain a set of countermeasures and evaluate the cost and risk
tradeoff. The main steps of the framework are summarized as follows. First, the
model of nodes discussed above allows the definition of probabilities of different
intrusive actions in each communication channel. Second, the connections
and influences between nodes determine how intrusive actions targeted to one
node affect the IDN, i.e., how threats are propagated across the IDN. Third,
the risk of the IDN is calculated from the probabilities and the impacts of
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the attacks. Finally, the framework calculates the set of countermeasures to
optimally protect the network, along with a tradeoff between cost and risk of
these countermeasures, using a multi-objective optimization algorithm. We
have also provided a case study that uses DEFIDNET to determine the optimal
allocation of resources in a complex IDN. Next we provide two conclusions
from the work carried out in this chapter:
1. IDNs may have many different architectures and operational settings,
which makes them a complex scenario. Traditionally, the more complex a
system is, the more security breaches it may expose. Accordingly, it is
critical to design methods to provide operators with global awareness of
the IDNs, including the assets of the IDNs and the threats to which it is
exposed. Thus, these methods may facilitate the security evaluation of
IDNs.
2. The abstraction offered by DEFIDNET provides several advantages to
design resilient architectures for IDNs. On the one hand, it facilitates the
definition of the assets of the IDNs and the adversarial capabilities, which
facilitates the risk assessment of the IDN. On the other hand, it allows
to devise defense strategies, optimizing the allocation of countermeasures
that save resources. Accordingly, the objective O3 established at the
beginning of the Thesis is accomplished.
7.2 Open Issues and Future Work
As stated in this Thesis, the sophistication of attackers evolves parallel to the
robustness of defenses. Thus, the design of robust countermeasures seems to be
a never-ending research topic. In this Thesis, we have provided contributions to
counteract current attacks. These contributions admit extended work and open new
interesting research challenges. In what follows we discuss future work directions
that arise from this Thesis:
• Defending machine learning from reverse engineering and evasion
attacks. The attacks against ML based IDSs presented in Chapter 3 made some
assumptions for the adversary that nowadays are reasonable. Concretely, that
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the attacker knows the training data distribution and the feature construction
method. Even assuming that this information is available to the adversary, an
effective mechanism would be to hide some other relevant information for the
detection. This way, the attacker would not know how to find attack vectors
that evade the classifier. A recent approach is to use keys in the detection
function. These keys, which are secret, determine the internal behavior of the
detector. However, as we have also shown in this Thesis, the use of secret
information might be vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks if it is not done
properly. Thus, further research must be done to improve the robustness of
this solution.
The attacks presented actually succeed because the adversary can easily invert
the feature construction process, and thus obtain real world evasions from the
feature vectors. Accordingly, research on one way feature construction methods
(i.e., which cannot be inverted) may counteract such attacks. Still, it would be
required a security analysis of these functions before considering them for real
scenarios.
• Generalization of attacks against randomized IDS. Another open issue
derived from this work is the generalization of reverse engineering attacks to
randomized IDSs. In Chapter 4, we have described why these attacks succeed
and we have detailed a concrete attack against Anagram. Since the same idea
can be extended to other randomized detectors using a formal definition, more
research work is required to generate similar attack strategies.
• Improve the robustness of Anagram. Even though the attack presented
in Chapter 4 allows an adversary to recover the random mask used by Anagram,
this detector is still a valid candidate to use in real settings. Thus, another
open issue is the design of countermeasures against reverse engineering attacks
for Anagram. For example, a possible countermeasure to the proposed reverse
engineering attack is to randomize the choice of the random mask itself. How-
ever, the potential impact of such a double randomization from the detection
point of view must be further studied.
The three points commented until now suggest that attacks and defenses to
strengthen the security of IDSs is a race between attackers and defenders. As
pointed out before, this race makes the design of attacks and defenses for IDSs
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a promising research topic.
• Implementation of real attacks on state of the art proposals for IDNs.
In Chapter 5, we have presented several attack strategies to IDNs, describing
how these strategies would be applied in two scenarios. Concretely, we analyzed
IDNs proposed in the literature for MANETs and Collaborative IDNs. Since we
have provided conceptual attack strategies, it would be interesting to actually
implement such attacks in either simulated networks or actually in real networks.
For example, since many IDNs studied for MANETs have been tested using
simulated networks, an interesting work would be to simulate adversaries for
such IDNs.
• Update DEFIDNET to facilitate dynamic analysis of IDNs. One of
the advantages of the proposed framework DEFIDNET is that it facilitates the
assessment of the risk of IDNs, by virtually defining the assets and adversarial
capabilities in the IDN. Thus, it can be applied in dynamic scenarios by
properly setting the parameters in real time. The dynamic analysis assumes
that the adversarial model changes over time, due to the establishment of
new countermeasures in the node channels, the addition of new nodes and
connections in the IDN, changes on the influences, etc. This dynamism requires
a constant reconfiguration. For example, if it is known that a certain node is
compromised and setting countermeasures in this node cannot be afforded, then
it may be useful to decrease the influence on this node to reduce the propagation
of the risk. Currently, reconfiguration is not optimized in DEFIDNET as it
must be performed manually. Thus, automatic reconfiguration of the network
would allow to perform a faster, dynamic risk analysis.
A possible implementation of DEFIDNET with dynamic analysis would be
its integration with cloud computing platforms designed to deploy and man-
age large networks of virtual machines. These virtual machines would be
instantiated as nodes of the IDN. Thus, whenever a new virtual machine is
created in the network, DEFIDNET may automatically suggest reconfiguration
alternatives and countermeasures to reduce the risk of the IDN.
• Application of DEFIDNET in real scenarios. We have evaluated DE-
FIDNET with a simulated network, obtaining promising results. However, it is
desirable to assess the framework with real IDNs which are actually protecting
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some infrastructure. The framework should be applied in simulated scenarios,
which in turn would not differ substantially from the case study provided in
Chapter 6. We are currently developing a graphical user interface and we
plan to make it publicly available. Thus, users will be able to download and
use it, reporting any inconsistency or improvement that they consider to the
framework.
7.3 Results
The research work done during this Thesis has resulted in some publications and
contributions to journals, conferences, and a book chapter. In this section we first
describe the publications that have a direct relation with the Thesis presented in
this document. Then, we describe publications obtained from research work carried
out while working on this Thesis.
7.3.1 Publications Directly Related to the Thesis
Journal papers
1. Title: Randomized Anagram Revisited.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Agustin Orfila, Juan E. Tapiador, Pedro Peris-
Lopez.
Journal: Journal of Network And Computer Applications.
Reference information: Volume 41. Pages 182-196, May 2014 [Pastrana
et al., 2014].
Impact Factor 2012: 1.467.
Journal Ranking: Position 11/50, Hardware and Architecture (Q1).
Conference papers
1. Title: Anomalous Web Payload Detection: Evaluating the Resilience of 1-
grams Based Classifiers.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Carmen Torrano-Gimenez, Hai Than Nguyen and
Agustin Orfila.
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Conference: 8th International Symposium on Intelligent Distributed Com-
puting.
Reference information: September 2014, Madrid (Spain).
2. Title: A Functional Framework to Evade Network IDS.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Agustin Orfila and Arturo Ribagorda.
Conference: Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences (HICSS44).
Reference information: January 2011, Kauai (USA) [Pastrana et al., 2011].
Conference Ranking: CORE A [Research and Education, 2013].
3. Title: Modeling NIDS Evasion Using Genetic Programming.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Agustin Orfila and Arturo Ribagorda.
Conference: World Congress in Computer Science, Computer Engineering
and Applied Computing.
Reference information: July 2010, Las Vegas, USA [Pastrana et al., 2010].
Conference Ranking: CORE C [Research and Education, 2013].
Book chapters
1. Title: Evading IDS and Firewalls as Fundamental Sources of Information in
SIEMS.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Jose Montero, Agustin Orfila.
Book: Advances in Security Information Management: perceptions and out-
comes.
Reference information: NOVA Publishers, ISBN 978-1-62417-221-2 (2013)[Pas-
trana et al., 2013].
Submitted papers
1. Title: DEFIDNET : A Framework for Optimal Allocation of Cyberdefenses
In Intrusion Detection Networks.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Juan E. Tapiador, Agust´ın Orfila and Pedro Peris-
Lo´pez.
Journal: Computer Networks (Impact Factor=1.231)
Submission date: May 2014
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7.3.2 Related Publications
Journal papers
1. Title: Evaluation of Classification Algorithms for Intrusion Detection in
MANETs.
Authors: Sergio Pastrana, Aikaterina Mitrokotsa, Agustin Orfila, Pedro Peris-
Lopez.
Journal: Knowledge Based Systems.
Reference information: Volume 36. Pages 217-225. December 2012 [Pas-
trana et al., 2012].
Impact Factor 2012: 4.104.
Journal Ranking: Position 6/115, Artificial Intelligence (Q1).
Conference papers
1. Title: Artificial Immunity-Based Correlation System.
Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Esther Palomar, Arturo Ribagorda and
Sergio Pastrana.
Conference: International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SE-
CRYPT).
Reference information: July 2011, Sevilla, Spain [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2011].
Conference Ranking: CORE B [Research and Education, 2013].
Glossary of Terms
AI Artificial Intelligence
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
AS Attack Strategy
B Blocking (attack to communications)
CID Intrusion Detection Capability index
CIDN Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network
DC Data Collection (role)
DDF Distributed Detection Function
DoS Denial of Service
EA Evolutionary Algorithm
ESF Event Sharing Function
F Fabrication (attack to communications)
FC Feature Construction
GP Genetic Programming
HIDS Host based Intrusion Detection System
I Interception (attack to communications)
ICS Industrial Control System
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IDMsg Intrusion Detection Message
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IDN Intrusion Detection Network
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IIDM Input Intrusion Detection Message (channel)
LD Local Detection (role)
LDA Local Detection and Alert sharing (role)
LDF Local Detection Function
LE Local Events (channel)
M Modification (attack to communications)
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network
ML Machine Learning
MOO Multi-Objective Optimization
NIDS Network based Intrusion Detection System
NSGA2 Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm
OIDM Output Intrusion Detection Message (channel)
PC Pure Correlation (role)
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RA Response Action (channel)
RC Remote Correlation (role)
RCD Remote Correlation and Detection (role)
RF Response Function
SPEA2 Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm v2
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ADetailed Description of the Reverse
Engineering Attack Against Anagram
The attack to recover the secret mask is divided into several functions. In order to
limit the execution of the algorithm, it takes as inputs two estimated thresholds: the
number of sets and the maximum random mask length (see Figure 4.2). We next
provide a pseudocode description of the attack divided into 4 algorithms, namely
Algorithm 3, 4, 5 and 6.
As shown in Algorithm 3, the attack starts by initializing the mask with the
value ‘-1’. The value ‘-1’ in the position I means that the algorithm has not yet
obtained the set corresponding to I. The algorithm also initializes an empty list of
the positions that are first delimiters. These two structures are global to all the
processes. At each iteration of the algorithm’s main loop, the function findSet is
called with the starting point Is and the current set Scurrent. This starting point
is the position from which the algorithm will search delimiters of the set starting
in this position (Scurrent). In the first step, the algorithm starts at 0 and obtains
the delimiters of the set 0 of the mask. Once obtained, it will proceed similarly but
starting from a new point (line 9 in Algorithm 3), specifically the next delimiter
whose set has not been processed yet (i.e., a delimiter whose next position in the
mask is still ‘-1’).
The function findSet, shown in Algorithm 4, receives the starting position Is and
the current set Scurrent. This is the core function of the attack. First, it selects a
payload P which is considered “normal” by calling the function anagramTest (lines
4-9 in Algorithm 4). Next, it looks for a “nearly-anomalous” payload P ∗ that is
used in the following steps of the algorithm. It does so by calling the function
getValidPayload, which is shown in Algorithm 6 and explained in Figure 4.3. The
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malicious byte µ is inserted into the 10 positions immediately next to the starting
point of payload P (lines 2-5 in Algorithm 6). If this modification causes the payload
to become anomalous (line 7 in Algorithm 6), then it removes the byte µ backwards,
one position at a time, until the packet becomes normal again. This process will
only work with payloads P that are close enough to become anomalous. As we can
only use 10 positions following the starting point Is (by definition these are the only
positions that belong to the same set with certainty), we need payloads classified
as normal that, with the addition of just a few previously unseen bytes, become
anomalous.
Due to the behavior of the randomized test of Anagram, P ∗ (function findSet
showed in Algorithm 4) will become anomalous only when µ is inserted into chunks
of data that are mapped into the set Scurrent. The key point here is that when µ is
inserted in the region of a set different from Scurrent, the anagramTest will still output
“normal”, as this µ is no longer considered within the bytes of the set S. Therefore,
by sliding the malicious byte through the payload (lines 17-28 in Algorithm 4), as
shown in the Figure 4.4, and looking where the output of anagramTest changes, we
can estimate where the delimiters of the set Scurrent are. Regarding Figure 4.4, in the
steps 1, 2, 3 and 4, anagramTest may output “anomaly” because the malicious byte
is still inserted in the Set 1, whereas steps 5 to 14 may output “normal”. However,
in the step 15, as the malicious byte is inserted again into the Set 1, it may output
again “anomaly”. In order to optimize the process and to avoid unnecessary queries
to Anagram, this step is skipped (line 18 in Algorithm 4) if the position where µ is
going to be inserted has a value different from ‘-1’ in the estimated random mask.
We repeat this process for several payloads and record the delimiters indicated by
each of them, which we call VOTES (line 24 in Algorithm 4). The final step of the
algorithm is to process all votes using the function processVotes (line 31 in Algorithm
4).
The function processVotes, shown in Algorithm 5, processes the votes obtained by
all payloads. We consider that a position is a delimiter of Scurrent if it is supported
by at least half of the votes (line 4 in Algorithm 5). If so, we add this position to
the final list of delimiters of Scurrent: D1, D2, ..., Dd. The algorithm also saves the list
of possible next starting points (FIRST DELIMITERS). Then, the estimated
mask is updated by setting the set Scurrent to the positions between the consecutive
delimiters Da and Db (lines 15-17 of Algorithm 5). Finally, the function obtains and
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returns the next starting delimiter whose set has not been already obtained (lines
22-26 in Algorithm 5). This NEXT Is delimiter will be the next starting point (Is)
for the algorithm (line 5 in Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 FindMask
Input: Number of estimated Sets NS and maximum estimated random length
MAX LENGTH
Output: Estimated MASK.
1: MASK = {−1, ...,−1}
2: FIRST POSITIONS = ∅
3: Is ← 0
4: for S = 0→ NS do
5: {NEXT Is} ← findSet (Is, S)
6: if NEXT Is = NULL then
7: return MASK
8: end if
9: Is ← NEXT Is
10: S ← S + 1
11: end for
12: return MASK
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Algorithm 4 findSet
Input: Initial position Is and current set S
Output: Next starting positionsNEXT Is.
1: V ALID = 0
2: V OTES = {0, ..., 0}
3: while V ALID < NUMPAY LOADS do
4: P ← getPayloadFromPool ()
5: OUTPUT ← anagramTest (P )
6: while OUTPUT 6=′ NORMAL′ do
7: P ← getPayloadFromPool ()
8: OUTPUT ← anagramTest (P )
9: end while
10: P ∗ ← getV alidPayload (P, Is)
11: if P ∗ 6= NULL then
12: V ALID ← V ALID + 1
13: POSITION ← lastIndexOf (µ, P ∗) + 1
14: LOOKER← P ∗
15: LOOKER[POSITION ] = µ
16: PREV IOUS ← anagramTest (LOOKER)
17: while POSITION < MASK.LENGTH do
18: if MASK[POSITION ] < 0 then
19: POSITION ← POSITION + 1
20: LOOKER← P ∗
21: LOOKER[POSITION ] = µ
22: OUTPUT ← anagramTest (LOOKER)
23: if OUTPUT 6= PREV IOUS then
24: V OTES[POSITION ]← V OTES[POSITION ] + 1
25: end if
26: end if
27: PREV IOUS ← OUTPUT
28: end while
29: end if
30: end while
31: return processV otes (V OTES, V ALID, S)
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Algorithm 5 processV otes
Input: An array of votes V OTES, the number of valid packets V ALID, the
current set S, the current starting position Is
Output: Next starting delimiterNEXT Is.
1: DELIMITERS ← {Is}
2: END DELIMITER←′ TRUE ′
3: for I = 0→ V OTES.LENGTH do
4: if V OTES[I] >= V ALID/2 then
5: DELIMITERS.add (I)
6: if END DELIMITER then
7: END DELIMITER←′ FALSE ′
8: FIRST DELIMITERS.add (I)
9: else
10: END DELIMITER←′ TRUE ′
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: for I = 0→ DELIMITERS.LENGTH − 1 do
15: for J = DELIMITERS[I]→ DELIMITERS[I + 1] do
16: MASK[J ] = S
17: end for
18: I ← I + 2
19: end for
20: sort (FIRST DELIMITERS)
21: NEXT Is ← FIRST DELIMITER[0]
22: while MASK[NEXT Is + 1] > 0ANDNEXT Is 6= NULL do
23: FIRST DELIMITERS.remove (0)
24: NEXT Is ← FIRST DELIMITER[0]
25: end while
26: return NEXT Is
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Algorithm 6 getV alidPayload
Input: A payload P and the starting position Is.
Output: A payload P ∗ or “NULL′′.
1: P ∗ ← P
2: for i = Is → Is + 10 do
3: P ∗[i] = µ
4: i← i+ 1
5: end for
6: output← anagramTest (P )
7: if output =′ ANOMALY ′ then
8: for i = Is + 10→ Is do
9: P ∗[i] = P [i]
10: output← anagramTest (P ∗)
11: if output =′ NORMAL′ then
12: return P ∗
13: end if
14: i← i− 1
15: end for
16: end if
17: return NULL
